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U C L
Abstract
Department of Civil, Environmental and Geomatic Engineering
Bayesian Networks for the Multi-Risk Assessment of Road Infrastructure
by Pierre Gehl
The purpose of this study is to develop a methodological framework for the multi-risk
assessment of road infrastructure systems. Since the network performance is directly
linked to the functional states of its physical elements, most efforts are devoted to the
derivation of fragility functions for bridges exposed to potential earthquake, flood and
ground failure events. Thus, a harmonization effort is required in order to reconcile
fragility models and damage scales from different hazard types.
The proposed framework starts with the inventory of the various hazard-specific damag-
ing mechanisms or failure modes that may affect each bridge component (e.g. piers, deck,
bearings). Component fragility curves are then derived for each of these component fail-
ure modes, while corresponding functional consequences are proposed in a component-
level damage-functionality matrix, thanks to an expert-based survey. Functionality-
consistent failure modes at the bridge level are then assembled for specific configurations
of component damage states. Finally, the development of a Bayesian Network approach
enables the robust and efficient derivation of system fragility functions that (i) directly
provide probabilities of reaching functionality losses and (ii) account for multiple types
of hazard loadings and multi-risk interactions.
At the network scale, a fully probabilistic approach is adopted in order to integrate multi-
risk interactions at both hazard and fragility levels. A temporal dimension is integrated
to account for joint independent hazard events, while the hazard-harmonized fragility
models are able to capture cascading failures. The quantification of extreme events
cannot be achieved by conventional sampling methods, and therefore the inference ability
of Bayesian Networks is investigated as an alternative. Elaborate Bayesian Network
formulations based on the identification of link sets are benchmarked, thus demonstrating
the current computational difficulties to treat large and complex systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The risk assessment of critical infrastructure exposed to natural disasters has been a
growing concern over the past years, especially since the occurrence of catastrophic
events such as the Tohoku earthquake or the Canterbury earthquake sequence in 2011.
Most catastrophic disasters have been shown to result from unforeseen combinations of
adverse events or cascading effects, which exceed the loading levels for which infrastruc-
ture systems have been designed. These observations reveal the need for a robust method
for the risk assessment of infrastructure systems, with an emphasis on the prediction of
high impact low probability events.
However, the risk assessment of critical infrastructure systems is hindered by a series of
factors that have to be accounted for:
• Cascading events are a common cause for infrastructure failures. They may consist
of cascading hazards (i.e. one hazard event that is triggered by another one)
or cascading failures (i.e. a localised failure occurring on a single element and
propagating through the whole system).
• The risk assessment of an infrastructure system exposed to multiple hazard types
usually requires a wide range of hazard and fragility models, which use hardly
reconcilable intensity measures and damage scales.
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• Infrastructure loss has consequences that go well beyond the direct repair costs or
the casualties it induces. The computation of the downtime and the associated
economic losses is therefore of key importance: in addition to the system perfor-
mance, it is also useful to track which physical elements have failed, in order to
estimate the severity and the duration of repair operations.
• Most infrastructure systems are interconnected, so that they are often referred to
as a ‘system of systems’. Therefore the consideration of interdependencies between
systems is necessary in order to account for the beneficial or detrimental effects of
this interconnection.
• The interdependence between infrastructure elements and their respective con-
tribution to the system performance lead to a solution space with a very high
dimensionality (i.e. number of potential outcomes corresponding to specific com-
binations of element failures). The use of Monte Carlo simulations enable the
approximation of the probabilistic distribution of the system losses, however the
exploration of rare events requires more efficient algorithms.
Some of these conceptual difficulties have been recognised and addressed by recent stud-
ies during the last years [Pitilakis et al., 2014], although there remains a need to assess the
reliability of these systems, both at the component level (i.e. through probabilistic vul-
nerability models) and at the system level (i.e. evaluation of the system performance or
serviceability through network analysis). In this context, the FP7 INFRARISK project
[O’Brien and the INFRARISK Consortium, 2013–2016] aims at developing a stress test
framework to assess the coupled impacts of natural hazards on interdependent infrastruc-
ture networks, while focusing on low-probability high-consequence events. This thesis
has been carried out with the objective of providing results that are directly usable and
consistent with the INFRARISK framework, especially with respect to the harmoniza-
tion of fragility models and damage scales in a multi-hazard context.
1.2 Scope and Aims of Research
The scope of this study is concentrated on the multi-risk assessment of road infrastruc-
ture: while most of the work presented here is focused on seismic risk, the impact of
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other hazard types (i.e. floods and ground failures) is also considered in order to ac-
count for multi-hazard interactions. Such hazard events may be considered either as
independent events that have a concomitant occurrence or as triggered events that are
generated by the same source.
While a road infrastructure may be broken down into a wide range of physical elements
(e.g. road segments, bridges, tunnels, earthworks, etc.), this study specifically addresses
the case of highway RC bridges. Such elements are considered to be critical assets,
due to both their exposition to natural hazards and the crucial influence they have on
the network’s performance. Bridges are complex structural systems where the various
components are likely to experience a wide range of damage mechanisms, depending on
the type of hazard loadings they are subjected to. Therefore they make for a suitable
test subject, on which to apply the various tools and methods that are presented here.
Finally, the choice of highway bridges is motivated by the criticality of some highways
networks across Europe, which are identified as being part of the core TEN-T network
[European Union, 2013].
Within this context, the main objective of this thesis is to address some of the concep-
tual challenges that are raised by the multi-risk assessment of infrastructure systems.
More specifically, the use of original modelling approaches such as Bayesian Networks
is investigated as an alternative to simulation-based methods such as Monte Carlo sam-
pling, in order to successfully quantify the probability of occurrence of rare events. It is
then anticipated that the proposed framework will be able to provide technical solutions
to the issues at hand, through the application of the Bayesian Network method at two
levels:
• At the element level (i.e. bridge), Bayesian Networks are developed in order to
assemble hazard-specific component fragility curves, thus enabling the quantifica-
tion of system failure modes that are consistent in term of induced functionality
losses for all hazard types. This step presents the twofold merit of (i) directly
providing harmonized functional losses and (ii) accounting for cumulated damages
in the case of joint hazard events.
• At the infrastructure level (i.e. road network), Bayesian Networks are used to
quantify the probability of exceedance of system losses, starting from the def-
inition of multiple hazard source events. The aim is to explore the ability of
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Bayesian analyses to treat multi-risk problems and to discover extreme and po-
tentially catastrophic events, which may be overlooked by more classical sampling
techniques.
Finally, the core of the thesis is devoted to the development of an original methodolog-
ical framework, which is intended to be applied to any type of infrastructure and any
hazard, provided that the relevant physical models are specified. On the other hand, the
bridge and network examples that are used in the different chapters do not necessarily
correspond to real-life infrastructure objects: the difficulty to access the huge amount
of sensitive data that is required for infrastructure risk studies constitutes a significant
limitation, which is avoided here by assuming hypothetical yet realistic values for some
of the parameters. This assumption then provides a total control over the input vari-
ables, which is a desirable feature when performing a sensitivity analysis of the potential
sources of uncertainty, which is the focus of the final part of the thesis.
1.3 Outline of Thesis
Chapter 2 starts with a literature review of the three main technical concepts that are
involved in the proposed framework, namely (i) fragility analysis of bridges, (ii) infras-
tructure risk assessment and (iii) multi-risk analysis. The current gaps and shortcomings
that may prevent a robust analysis are then identified. Finally, the proposed framework
based on Bayesian Networks is detailed with respect to the various levels of analysis, i.e.
from the network system to the structural components, and the methodology underlying
the study is presented in detail.
At the bridge level, Chapter 3 makes the inventory of the various component failure
modes that have been found in the literature or following post-disaster surveys, for all
three hazard types considered (i.e. earthquakes, floods and ground failures). Since the
severity levels of the different damage scales prove to be inconsistent, each component
damage state is associated with loss measures, such as functional loss or repair duration,
which enable the harmonization of the different failure modes. The quantification of
functionality losses is made possible by the probabilistic treatment of an expert-based
survey among infrastructure managers.
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For each of the component damage states that have been previously identified, Chapter 4
aims at deriving specific fragility functions. In the case of seismic hazard, component
fragility curves are analytically derived through finite element simulations, while simpli-
fied fragility assessment methods are also benchmarked. The state of knowledge for the
fragility curve derivation for floods and ground failures does not yet permit the applica-
tion of robust analytical methods, therefore empirical or expert-based fragility functions
existing in literature are reviewed and proposed in some cases.
Parallel to the hazard-specific component fragility curves, Chapter 5 presents the Bayesian
Network method that is proposed for the derivation of system fragility curves that predict
consistent levels of functionality losses. The merits of this approach are demonstrated
through two applications, namely (i) the derivation of harmonized multi-hazard fragility
functions and (ii) the derivation of probabilistic functionality curves that directly express
the probability of exceeding some functional losses given the hazard intensity.
Then, Chapter 6 conducts a review of the various sources of uncertainties that are
involved in the multi-risk analysis of infrastructure systems, as well as the possible tools
that can be used to propagate and visualise these uncertainties. Examples of uncertainty
quantification are then developed, with specific attention to the epistemic uncertainties
due to the choices of GMPEs and bridge fragility models.
At the network level, Chapter 7 presents the Bayesian Network method for the perfor-
mance assessment of spatially distributed systems, with the double objective of facilitat-
ing the propagation of uncertainties and identifying the probability of occurrence of ex-
treme events. Various Bayesian Network formulations are benchmarked with respect to
their ability to efficiently model large and complex systems, while hybrid methods, based
on simulation results and simplified Bayesian Networks, are shown to yield promising
prospects. This approach is demonstrated with an application of the Bayesian Network
method to a small-scale network in the case of multiple hazards.
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the main findings of the thesis and concludes by recom-
mending future directions of investigation.

Chapter 2
Background and Proposed
Framework
2.1 Literature Review
The aim of this literature review is to identify existing works on the three main technical
concepts that are necessary to perform the multi-risk assessment of road infrastructure,
namely (i) fragility analysis of bridges, (ii) infrastructure risk assessment and (iii) multi-
risk analysis. Based on the available literature references, current technical gaps and
shortcomings are then identified.
2.1.1 Fragility Functions for Bridges
This section details the state-of-the-art for the derivation of fragility functions for bridges,
which is an essential component for the subsequent infrastructure risk assessment. Fragility
derivation methods are mostly presented in the context of seismic risk, due to the avail-
ability of more advanced studies in this field. While a very large body of literature
exists for the derivation and interpretation of fragility functions for different assets, the
discussion here will be confined primarily to works applicable to bridges.
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2.1.1.1 General Principles
Over the past decades, fragility functions have become a widespread probabilistic tool
for the seismic vulnerability assessment of a given structural system [Calvi et al., 2006].
They are based on a set of prerequisites, which include the following [Negulescu and
Gehl, 2013]:
• an Intensity Measure (IM) that represents the hazard loading applied to the struc-
ture. It is usually a ground-motion parameter such as Peak Ground Acceleration
(PGA) or Spectral Acceleration (SA) at a period of interest.
• a damage scale that comprises a set of discrete Damage States (DS). The damage
states are bounded by limit states or damage levels, which usually correspond to
a given threshold in the potential values of a given engineering demand parameter
(EDP).
• a functional form linking the probability of reaching or exceeding a damage state as
a function of the selected IM. For instance, if a cumulative lognormal distribution is
adopted, then the distribution parameters (i.e. mean α and standard deviation β)
represent the fragility parameters, with α indicating the IM value that corresponds
to the 50% chance of damage exceedance, and β representing the dispersion of the
fragility curve (see Figure 2.1).
0
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
IM
P 
(D
S 
≥ 
D
1 
| IM
) D0
D1
β
α
Figure 2.1: Fragility curve for damage level 1, showing the probability of reaching or
exceeding damage state D1.
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The mathematical expression of a fragility curve can then be written as a conditional
probability, where the aforementioned log-normal assumption enables the variable log IM
to be represented within a standard normal cumulative distribution function φ, with log
representing the natural logarithm:
P (DS ≥ ds|IM) = φ
(
log IM− logα
β
)
(2.1)
Fragility curves are a key element of the Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering
(PBEE) framework [Krawinkler, 1999]: the standard deviation β is directly linked to
the various uncertainties that are contained in the prediction of DS given IM. These
uncertainties are usually classified as aleatory or epistemic [Kennedy et al., 1980], i.e.
respectively related to the inherent variability of the process or the lack of knowledge.
For instance, an important aspect is that just knowing the IM alone does not provide
sufficient information for predicting the damage state, therefore most of the dispersion
is associated with the ‘predicting power’ of the IM with respect to the damage state.
It is then possible to decompose the total dispersion into specific uncertainty sources,
i.e. whether they are linked to the loading demand or the structural capacity [Bradley,
2010, D’Ayala et al., 2014a, Wen et al., 2003]:
• βc, the standard-deviation representing the uncertainties in the capacity of the
studied structure (e.g. modelling uncertainties, variability in the mechanical or
geometrical properties).
• βd, the standard-deviation representing the uncertainty in the seismic demand,
e.g. the record-to-record variability.
• βDS, the standard-deviation that is linked to the probabilistic EDP threshold iden-
tifying the damage level. It is related to the empirical nature of EDP in trying
to quantify damage. For instance, βDS = 0.4 is recommended by HAZUS [FEMA,
2003] in the case of buildings. βDS can also be estimated by compiling field data or
conducting surveys with engineers or inspectors in order to obtain a distribution
of the EDP threshold for a given damage state [Nielson, 2005].
If the uncertainties are assumed to be independent, which is mostly the case for common
structural systems, all the aforementioned standard-deviations can then be combined in
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order to obtain the total dispersion of the fragility model, which is expressed as [D’Ayala
et al., 2014a]:
β =
√
β2c + β
2
d + β
2
DS (2.2)
The specific choice of IM, damage scale, functional form and uncertainty approach pro-
vide a base for the classification of fragility functions. Proposed approaches to determine
or describe each of the above elements are discussed in turn.
a. Derivation Methods
Fragility curves are derived through regression models that use various sources of data
points. Empirical fragility curves are mainly based on post-earthquake field observations,
where the observed damage states are associated to the ground motion levels that have
been recorded in the vicinity [Basoz et al., 1999, Elnashai et al., 2004, Shinozuka et al.,
2000]. While the empirical approach results from direct observations, this method still
presents some shortcomings, such as the difficulty to obtain accurate ground motion
parameters next to the studied site, or the presence of data gaps for higher seismic
intensity levels.
In the case of scarce data, expert judgement may be needed: a panel of experts in the
adequate technical field can be interviewed in order to propose a mean and a dispersion
for a given fragility function. Each expert judgement can then be weighted, depending
on the level of experience of the expert or the trust they place in their own opinion
[Jaiswal et al., 2013, Porter et al., 2007].
Alternatively, analytical fragility curves are based on numerical models of the studied
structures, thus enabling the computation of the structural response for an extended
range of ground motions. For instance, Mander [1999] has derived fragility curves with
a static capacity spectrum approach, while introducing additional variability in the
mechanical properties of the models. With the increase in computing capacity and
the development of more robust finite element codes, non-linear dynamic analyses with
a large set of ground motion records have also become more popular, whether they
are carried out via Monte-Carlo sampling [Nielson and DesRoches, 2007, Shinozuka
et al., 2000], or Incremental Dynamic Analysis [Vamvastikos and Cornell, 2002]. Even
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though the analytical approach enables to perform sensitivity tests on various input
parameters, the use of numerical models may also introduce biases with respect to the
actual structural response or additional modelling uncertainties, especially in the non-
linear range where not all physical phenomena can be accounted for.
Finally, hybrid fragility curves [Kappos et al., 2006] can also be derived in order to
calibrate analytical results with some posterior post-earthquake observations [Singhal
and Kiremidjian, 1998] or with in-situ measurements [Michel et al., 2010], through a
Bayesian updating process. Jaiswal et al. [2011] have used Bayesian updating to compute
the posterior distribution of collapse fragility using post-earthquake field observations,
where the prior fragility curves are either based on expert judgement or estimated with
the EMS’98 [Gru¨nthal, 1998] vulnerability classes.
The estimation of the fragility parameters is achieved by performing a regression over
the set of data points. Two distinct approaches can be identified in the literature and
common practice. First, Cornell et al. [2002] and Baker [2007] present the so-called
‘regression on a cloud’, where a least-square regression is performed on the [IM-EDP]
points, while assuming the following model:
log EDP = a · log IM + b+  (2.3)
where a and b represent regression parameters, and  represents the regression residuals.
The response residuals of the regression are then computed, and β denotes the stan-
dard deviation of the residuals. After selecting a given damage threshold EDPth, the
fragility parameters (median α and standard-deviation β of the distribution detailed in
Equation 2.1) can then be expressed as:
 α = exp
(
log EDPth−b
a
)
β = βa
(2.4)
This approach is based on the actual EDP values in the data set and it has proven to
be rather stable, even with a reduced amount of points [Gehl et al., 2015]. However, it
appears that, in the case of a multi-state structure, the estimated standard-deviation
stays the same for all damage levels. While this constraint may be desired to avoid the
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overlapping of successive fragility curves, it constitutes also an over-simplification of the
problem, since it assumes that the β parameter is constant for all damage states, with
is not necessarily the case for highly non-linear structures [D’Ayala, 2005].
On the other hand, the maximum likelihood approach proposed by Shinozuka et al.
[2000] directly translates the EDPs into the corresponding DSs: for a fragility curve
with a given damage level, the vector of DSs is then comprised of binary values (1 if
damaged, 0 if not). The fragility parameters α and β are then estimated so that they
maximize the following likelihood function:
L (α, β) =
n∏
i=1
[Pi (α, β)]
xi · [1− Pi (α, β)]1−xi (2.5)
where Pi (α, β) is the probability of reaching damage, n is the number of data points
and xi is a binary variable (1 if damage is reached, 0 if not).
Even though this approach is more suitable for the derivation of empirical functions
(i.e. due to the use of discrete damage states), it has also been applied to analytical
results in previous studies [Baker, 2015, Gehl et al., 2013a, Zentner, 2007]. The main
reason for this is that the maximum likelihood model only requires a clear dichotomy
between ‘damage’ and ‘no damage’ regardless of the actual EDP values. Therefore it can
be applied to cases where the numerical model fails to accurately describe the response
after the damage has occurred (e.g. derivation of collapse fragility curves). As a result,
only a linear elastic model is required in order to estimate the fragility curve associated
with the yielding limit of a given structural component. It should be noted that the
maximum likelihood approach applied to a lognormal distribution is only a special case
of the more generic concept of Generalized Linear Model (GLM) regression, which has
been applied to seismic fragility models [Ioannou et al., 2012] (see details in Appendix B).
b. Selection of Intensity Measures
The selection of the IM is a key step in the derivation of fragility curves, since an in-
formative IM can reduce the standard-deviation of the probability distribution, thus
delivering a sharper prediction of the damage states. In the case of seismic risk, due the
inherent properties of a ground-motion record, the hazard loading is only imperfectly
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represented by any single ground motion parameter while the rest of the unaccounted pa-
rameters is usually considered as aleatory uncertainty (i.e. record-to-record variability).
Therefore the objective is to find an IM that provides the highest correlation possible
to the structural response.
Several criteria are proposed by Padgett et al. [2008b] in order to assess the ‘adequacy’
of a given IM, such as efficiency, sufficiency, practicality, proficiency and hazard com-
putability.
The efficiency of an IM can be quantified by the standard error of the residual of the
prediction of the EDP given IM, through the following power law:
log ˆEDP = a · log IM + b+  (2.6)
where the residual  is assumed to have a normal distribution with standard deviation
β, which is used as the efficiency measure.
The slope parameter in Equation 2.6 may also be used to quantify the practicality of
an IM, which measures the strength of the correlation between the IM and the demand
parameter. The larger the slope parameter a, the more practical the IM.
On the other hand, proficiency is a composite measure of efficiency and practicality,
which is based on the modified dispersion ξ of the regression in Equation 2.6 (a lower ξ
means a higher proficiency):
ξ =
β
a
(2.7)
Moreover, an IM is considered as sufficient if the residuals  are statistically independent
from the characteristics (e.g. magnitude, type of fault rupture, depth and epicentral
distance) of the earthquake that generated each ground motion. A qualitative way
to check sufficiency is to plot the residuals with respect to some earthquake measures
and to check whether a trend can be observed [Padgett et al., 2008b]. A quantitative
method to compare the sufficiency of two IMs is proposed by Jayaler et al. [2012], who
have introduced a relative sufficiency index. The additional quantity of information I
provided by an IM2 with respect to a reference IM1 is expressed as:
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I (EDP|IM2|IM1) =
∫
log2
p (EDP|IM2 (x¨g))
p (EDP|IM1 (x¨g)) · p (x¨g) · dx¨g (2.8)
where x¨g represents a possible acceleration time-history used in the fragility analysis,
with p (x¨g) its probability of occurrence, given the location of the studied site and the
seismotectonic context. A base 2 logarithm is used in the equation, so that the results
may be seen as bits of information.
The final quality indicator for an IM is the computability, which describes the ability
to accurately characterise the IM at the site of interest. This measure is usually linked to
the availability of GMPEs for the given IM, which may be used to qualitatively estimate
robustness of the uncertainty structure of the prediction models.
For a given structural system, an efficient and sufficient ground motion parameter is
usually SA at the period corresponding to the first mode of vibration. It has also been
found that the addition of a second parameter (e.g. SA at a higher period) generates a
vector-valued fragility function (i.e. fragility surface) that has a lower dispersion than
a scalar-based fragility curve [Gehl et al., 2013a, Seyedi et al., 2010]. Using the Akaike
information criterion, it can be shown that the accounting for a second IM is statistically
relevant. In the case of bridge portofolios (i.e. bridge classes incorporating variability
in the geometric configuration and the modelling properties), however, Padgett et al.
[2008b] have shown that PGA should be preferred: the choice of PGA as IM is motivated
by the various types of bridges (i.e. with different modal periods) that may compose a
given infrastructure network and the need for a common IM, for comparison purposes
for instance. In the case of a single bridge, spectral quantities such as SA could still be
the IM of choice: specific computations of the efficiency or sufficiency indices should be
carried out as a part of the fragility estimation process.
c. Damage Scales
A set of fragility curves has to be associated with a damage scale that describes the
different physical states that the structural system can reach: such a scale usually ranges
from the elastic/linear state to complete damage or collapse. A damage state represents
the configuration in which a structural system or component is found. It can be viewed
as an interval that is bounded by two successive limit states (see example in Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2: Example of a damage scale based on the level of deformation sustained
by a structural element. The LSi values represent the limit states.
In the case of bridge systems exposed to seismic hazard, several damage scales have
been proposed in previous studies [Cardone, 2014, FEMA, 2003, Nielson, 2005]. They
are usually built in a way that the consistency between the component damage states is
ensured: for instance, two different component types have equivalent damage states in
terms of severity, so that the system damage state can directly be estimated from the
states of the component. While this approach has proven to be very convenient to derive
system fragility curves, it lacks information on the specific impact of each component
damage state on the structural system. As a result, the correlation between local and
global damage states is not straightforward in the case of bridges, due to existence of
multiple types of structural components, with subtantially different responses.
Other hazard types do not present so well constrained damage scales, since most of the
fragility models that address a specific damage mechanism due to ground failure or flood
loadings only consider a single damage state, i.e. the failure of the component [ALA,
2005]. In the case of subsidence in embankments or backfill soils, some damage scales
based on the extent of vertical settlement may be used [Werner et al., 2006], while the
damage to pier foundations due to scour can be represented by the scour depth with
respect to the bridge footing [Pearson et al., 2002].
The link between damage scales and bridge functionality is often neglected, even though
such information is vital to quantify the performance of the road network after the
disrupting event. Still, in the case of bridges exposed to seismic hazard, some studies
address the issue of functionality, such as the REDARS methodology [Werner et al.,
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2006] or the HAZUS model [FEMA, 2003]. These loss model propose bridge closure
percentages and restoration times for the global damage states that are defined by their
respective damage scale.
2.1.1.2 Repositories of Fragility Functions for Earthquakes
One of the key results of the FP7 SYNER-G project [Pitilakis and the SYNER-G Consor-
tium, 2009–2013] consists in the collection and review of fragility functions for critical
infrastructure components. More specifically, fragility functions of road and railway
bridges have been critically appraised and stored in a Fragility Function Manager Tool
[Silva et al., 2014, Tsionis and Fardis, 2014]. The tool proposes a taxonomy for the differ-
ent bridge typologies, based on a dozen of parameters, such as material, superstructure
type, deck type, pier-to-deck connection, dimension, pier type, seismic design or regular-
ity. Other classifications have been defined, such as the one by HAZUS [FEMA, 2003],
including the following prescriptive parameters:
• Geographic area: California, Non-California;
• Construction year: 1900, < 1975, > 1975, < 1990, > 1990;
• Design: Seismic, Conventional;
• Description: Major bridge (> 150 m), Single span, Single-/Multi-column bent,
Box girder, Simple support, Continuous concrete, Prestressed concrete, Continuous
steel.
Other taxonomies can also be found in the studies by Nielson [2005] or Basoz and
Kiremidjian [1996]. The bridge typology strongly influences the type of components that
comprise the bridge system. In the present study it is proposed to focus on multi-span
RC girder bridges, with either simply-supported or continuous decks, which represent
the most widely used typology for highway bridges in Europe [Cardone, 2014].
The SYNER-G database of bridge fragility functions is particularly useful in this con-
text. It contains 373 curves for various typologies, extracted from around 30 literature
references. The distribution of the fragility derivation methods is detailed in Figure 2.3:
it can be noticed that dynamic non-linear analyses are the most common way to derive
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fragility curves, while PGA still remains by far the IM of choice. The reason for the
low proportion of empirical fragility curves for bridges may lie in the lack of focus on
infrastructure components during post-earthquake surveys (at least until recently), as
well as the limited number of bridges damaged by an earthquake in any given event
when compared to buildings, and hence the difficulty of building a robust statistical
model based on observations.
Analytical − Nonlinear Dynamic
Analytical − Nonlinear Static
Empirical
PGA
PGV
SA(T)
Other (SI, ASI...)
Figure 2.3: Proportion of derivation methods (left) and selected IMs (right) among
the references considered in the SYNER-G database.
According to Crowley et al. [2011], RC bridges represent the vast majority of the studied
typologies, 76% of them consisting of bearing-isolated pier-deck connections, the rest of
them forming a monolithic pier-deck block. In the case of decks supported by bearings,
a further distinction has to be made between independent deck spans (i.e. bearings
allowing translational movement between two deck spans) and continuous decks (i.e.
bearings mainly allowing free rotation between the pier and the deck).
It is also possible to identify the geographical area for which the bridge fragility functions
have been derived, as shown in Figure 2.4. The apparent high proportion of European
fragility curves should be moderated by the fact that most of these curves have been
derived during the SYNER-G project and are extracted from a single reference [Tsionis
and Fardis, 2014]. On the contrary, U.S. fragility curves are found in a variety of
references, thus covering a larger range of typologies and derivation methods. Some
studies have considered bridges from very different locations, such as United States and
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Greece or Japan: they are usually the outcomes of the empirical treatment of various
recent earthquake events (e.g. 1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe earthquakes).
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Figure 2.4: Geographical areas of applicability for the fragility curves contained in
the SYNER-G database.
The review by Tsionis and Fardis [2014] proposes also a comparative analysis of the
respective merits of non-linear static and dynamic analyses, confirming the ability of
non-linear dynamic analyses to account for the contribution of higher modes and for
the ground-motion variability, while pushover-based fragility curves are usually derived
with an arbitrary standard deviation. Another key aspect is the distinction between
fragility curves derived for a single bridge or for a class of bridges: the aforementioned
bridge taxonomies are then useful in the latter case, in order to define a variable space
from which a set of mechanical or geometrical properties can be sampled [Padgett and
DesRoches, 2007]. In order to optimize the number of analyses on the different bridge
models, parametrized fragility curves can then be derived, where the evolution of the
fragility parameters as a function of the model variables is represented on a response
surface [De Felice and Giannini, 2010, Park and Towashiraporn, 2014].
The analytical derivation of fragility curves has first been limited to the study of bridge
piers as the most vulnerable components. For instance, Franchin et al. [2008] have simply
compared distributions of ductility demand and ductility capacity in order to quantify
the probability of pier failures. Other studies [Karim and Yamazaki, 2001, Kibboua
et al., 2011, Kim and Feng, 2003] have only considered the damage to bridge piers when
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conducting non-linear dynamic analyses, which presents the merit of requiring only one
damage scale with one type of EDP (e.g. column curvature or drift).
The study by Nielson [2005] has considered nine bridge classes in the Central and South-
eastern United States for the derivation of analytical fragility curves, using non-linear
time-history analyses. Probabilistic seismic demand models are derived for all bridge
components, while system-level fragility curves for global damage states are assembled
through joint probability distributions that account for the correlation between bridge
components. This robust fragility analysis demonstrates the contribution of components
other than piers to the global fragility of bridges. The same approach, using similar
bridge models with component- and system-level fragility curves, has then been used by
Aygu¨n et al. [2010], Nielson and DesRoches [2007], Padgett and DesRoches [2008] for
various applications.
These fragility curves have also led to more elaborate models that account for some of
the following issues:
• Fragility curves can be derived on a retrofitted bridge model in order to quantify
the effect of different retrofit measures on the vulnerability of the bridge. This
enables to estimate which specific measure is adequate for a given bridge typology
or a given damage state [Padgett and DesRoches, 2009].
• The effect of the skew angle on the fragility curves has been studied by Avsar et al.
[2011], where an increase in the mean of the fragility curve is observed for skew
angles higher that 30◦.
• Spatial variability in the seismic loading for large span bridges may have a detri-
mental impact on the fragility curves, depending on the soil heterogeneity and the
wave propagation velocity that can induce a loss of coherence in the input signal
[Lupoi et al., 2005, Saxena et al., 2000].
• Temporal fragility curves can assess the vulnerability over the lifetime of the bridge,
accounting for effects such as corrosion [Ghosh and Padgett, 2010], flood scour or
cumulated seismic loadings [Franchin and Pinto, 2009].
Tsionis and Fardis [2014] have proposed a method for fast fragility analysis of regular
bridges with a reduced set of parameters such as the deck-pier connection type and
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the bridge geometry (e.g. pier height, span length). This approach follows the design
procedures of Eurocode 2 [CEN, 2004a] or Eurocode 8 [CEN, 2004b], based on the level
of seismic design. As a result, significant efforts are still needed to assess the fragility of
bridges with low design levels, prior to the application of Eurocodes.
Simplified analytical methods have also been used, as the one proposed by Paulotto et al.
[2007]: it is based on the use of substitute linear models and response spectra, while the
hysteretic energy dissipation is simulated by an increased damping ratio. The damping
ratios for individual members (i.e. beams and columns) are averaged and weighted with
the elastic energy dissipated in each member, in order to compute the modal damping
ratios for the system. The substitute linear structure is obtained by evaluating the secant
stiffness corresponding to the ductility ratio of each element. Finally, the method is
applied to RC bridge piers, while the deck is assumed to remain linear elastic. A similar
approach has been proposed by Peloso and Pavese [2008], namely the ‘Secant Modes
Superposition’: it relies on the same iteration steps, i.e. updating the secant stiffness
of the members and using an over-damped response spectrum in order to obtain the
member displacements at the modal level, which are then recombined. Starting from a
target displacement profile, an equivalent modal analysis is conducted with the updated
stiffness matrix at each iteration until convergence is reached. However, few examples
of the application of this approach to systematic structural analysis have been found.
Sadan et al. [2013] have developed the concept of direct displacement-based seismic
assessment (DDBA) of bridges, which is based on the direct displacement-based design
(DDBD) method by Priestley et al. [2007]. Key differences in the DDBA compared to
the DDBD are summarized in the following steps:
• Acquisition of structural information, e.g. for piers, in terms of moment-curvature
and force-displacement curves and shear failure capacity.
• Derivation of the deformed shape of the structure for the target displacement
(i.e. corresponding to the deformation of the a priori critical element at a given
performance limit state): the equivalent modal shapes are estimated with the
secant stiffness matrix via an iteration process, referred to as ‘Iterative Eigenvalue
Analysis’ (IEA).
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• Computation of equivalent SDOF system properties, namely the total base shear
capacity and the effective stiffness and damping ratio.
• Assessment of the bridge by comparing the displacement capacity with the demand
spectrum, using a reduction factor in order to account for over-damping.
However, in Sadan et al. [2013], DDBA is only applied to continuous decks that are
pinned to bridge piers or supported by bearings. Using a set of regular and irregular
bridge configurations, comparisons are conducted between DDBA, IDA and standard
response spectrum analysis, showing a good performance of DDBA, especially in the
case of bearing-supported decks.
Cardone [2014] has extended the DDBA to the case of independent bearing-supported
deck spans. For each performance limit state, performance displacement profiles (PDPs)
are defined based on the first component that reaches the limit state (see example in
Figure 2.5): the procedure for the PDP estimation is assessed through different ap-
proaches, especially the displacement adaptive pushover (DAP) [Antoniou and Pinho,
2004] and the effective modal analysis (EMA). The latter approach is actually the one
that is described by Sadan et al. [2013], i.e. the iterative eigenvalue analysis. Finally,
an inverse adaptive capacity spectrum approach [Cardone et al., 2011] is used in order
to find the PGA value of a given design spectrum that corresponds to the performance
point of the equivalent SDOF system. Assuming a arbitrary value for the standard de-
viation (i.e. β = 0.6), Cardone et al. [2011] also show that this approach can be used to
derive fragility curves for the different performance limit states.
Figure 2.5: Illustration of a performance displacement profile (deformed shape in
red).
Chapter 2. Background and Proposed Approach 22
More recently, Franchin et al. [2016] have developed a procedure for the automated
and fast generation of bridge fragility curves, based on the knowledge of a few struc-
tural parameters (e.g. geometry, pier type, material strength, etc.) that are fed into a
Bayesian belief network. In the proposed application, the content of the Bayesian net-
work (e.g. conditional probability tables) is acquired through the analysis of an Italian
bridge database [Borzi et al., 2016].
2.1.1.3 Fragility Functions for Ground Failures
In the present study, ground failure hazard refers to all phenomena that are related
to large permanent deformations of the soil, such as subsidence, lateral spreading or
slope failure. Such mechanisms are usally triggered or facilitated by heavy rainfall (i.e.
raise of water table) or earthquake ground motion. There is no ready-to-use fragility
model for a global bridge system exposed to ground failure: this is mostly due to the
nature of the hazard loading, which can take many forms as opposed to seismic ground
motions. As shown by Pitilakis et al. [2011], who have compiled the most up-to-date
fragility functions for buildings and structures exposed to ground failure, a wide range of
models exist for road segments along slopes or embankments, but none of the developed
methods have been applied to bridges.
However, there are available methods to quantify the occurrence of two of the most com-
mon manifestations of ground failure hazard, namely slope failure and subsidence/set-
tlement. Ground failure is usually considered as a cascading hazard, in the sense that it
may be triggered by a seismic ground motion while heavy rainfall with saturation of the
soil with water is an aggravating factor. For this reason, fragility functions for ground
failure are mostly expressed with respect to a seismic intensity measure (e.g. PGA)
[Saygili and Rathje, 2009].
Regarding slope failure, analytical methods may be distinguished between finite element
models and simplified approaches, such as the rigid block model [Newmark, 1965]. The
latter method may be applied to different types of landslides: in the case of shallow pla-
nar landslides, an infinite slope model may be adopted in order to perform the stability
analysis of the rigid block, as proposed by Jibson et al. [2000]. Then, the probabilistic
relations between the permanent ground deformation and the PGA applied to the slope
enable the derivation of fragility curves for different levels of soil deformation [Bray and
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Travasarou, 2007]. In the case of deep-seated rotational landslides, a circular slip surface
is usually proposed in order to minimize the factor of safety of the slope [Sarma, 1975].
For a given PGA level, the probability of slope failure can then be derived by consid-
ering uncertainties on the soil parameters, using for instance a mean-value First-Order
Second-Moment method as proposed by Wu [2015].
On the other hand, finite element analysis of the supporting soil is a popular approach
in the case of subsidence/settlement. For instance, Argyroudis and Kaynia [2014] have
modelled the backfill soil of a bridge abutment with a vertical retaining wall and they
have applied ground-motion time histories at the basis of the soil-structure system in
order to quantify the permanent strain of the supporting soil. Thus, once some defor-
mation thresholds have been defined, these data points can be used to derive fragility
curves for the subsidence of bridge abutment backfill soil, for various heights and EC8
soil types.
2.1.1.4 Fragility Functions for Floods
The HAZUS Flood Model [FEMA, 2005] discusses very briefly the vulnerability of
bridges, since there is no available bridge damage database from which to extract valu-
able information. Therefore the HAZUS model focuses on the vulnerability of bridge
foundations, while ignoring potential damage to the superstructure. For a few prede-
fined return periods of flood events, failure probabilities due to scour are then proposed,
for different values of scour potential rating (i.e. scour vulnerability index). Such prob-
ability tables are similar to Damage Probability Matrices, which cannot be really be
compared to more elaborate models such as fragility curves. Moreover, it appears, for
other assets, that the HAZUS model advocates the use of damage functions express-
ing a damage percentage as a function of water depth, instead of probabilistic fragility
functions.
However, recent catastrophic flood events have resulted in the collapse or the damage
of numerous bridges, thus providing valuable information for the derivation of empirical
fragility curves. For instance, Padgett et al. [2008a] have collected damage data from 44
bridges exposed to either storm surge, wind, debris impact or inundation, following the
2005 Katrina hurricane. An analytical approach is also developed by Kameshwar and
Padgett [2014], where meta-models are built in order to represent the bridge response
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under the effects of hurricanes. A logistic regression model is then derived, enabling the
expression of the fragility with respect to surge elevation and wave height.
While a few references propose fragility curves for bridges exposed to scour [Alipour
et al., 2012, Tanasic´ et al., 2013], the importance of the waterway conditions and config-
urations in the evaluation of scour usually limits the derivation of scour fragility curves to
specific single case-studies, until realistic representations of typologies of {bridge− waterway}
systems can be produced. Therefore the modeller can refer to the HEC-18 guidelines
[Richardson and Davis, 1995] in order to quantify scour depth, for any type of bridge
and waterway configurations. Moreover, the HYRISK methodology [Pearson et al., 2002]
proposes to separate the bridge condition from the waterway configuration by providing
tabulated probabilities of scour failure based on a scour vulnerability grade (i.e. linked
to the susceptibility of the bridge to scour) and an overtopping frequency (i.e. directly
linked to the waterway adequacy).
2.1.2 Infrastructure Risk Assessment
Infrastructure constitute the backbone of increasingly connected and interdependent
societies, therefore the risk assessment of infrastructure systems has emerged has a key
aspect for the resilience analysis of communities. The development of procedures for
infrastructure risk assessment has been the object of growing interest over the past few
years, as shown by the following studies and projects:
• In the United States, the HAZUS methodology has developed a framework for the
vulnerability assessment of various assets, with respect to earthquakes [FEMA,
2003] and floods [FEMA, 2005]. Fragility models are developed for all elements at
risk composing the infrastructure systems, such as utility lifelines or transportation
networks. These developments have been implemented in risk assessment tools
such as HAZUS-MH and MAEViz. The MAEViz model is focused on consequence-
based risk assessment, with decision-support tools that enable to compare socio-
economic losses resulting from physical failures (e.g. bridge closure or pipeline
rupture).
• The FP6 Risk-UE project [Mouroux et al., 2004] is concentrated on the seismic
risk analysis of seven cities in Southern and Eastern Europe. Most of the work
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is devoted to the vulnerability of buildings, however a section of the project has
tackled the issue of critical lifelines: some fragility models are proposed for the
lifeline components, even though no framework for network analysis is provided.
• The FP7 SYNER-G project [Pitilakis and the SYNER-G Consortium, 2009–2013]
has led to the development of a method for the systemic analysis of interdepen-
dent infrastructures (i.e. system of systems) exposed to seismic hazard, using a
scenario-based approach. To this end, various fragility models have been reviewed
and implemented for all elements at risk, in order to generate failure events and
compute the system’s performance with connectivity or serviceability level ap-
proaches.
While the final objective is usually the quantification of the system’s performance based
on the exposure of the components to various hazard loadings, the high number of
possible damage scenarios across all interdependent components constitutes the main
computational hurdle in the case of a probabilistic analysis. Several approaches have
been proposed in the past, as detailed below.
2.1.2.1 Simulation-based Methods
Monte-Carlo simulations consist in the sampling of random realisations of the various
input variables and the estimation of the final risk metric for each run, thus enabling the
derivation of a probability distribution for the quantity of interest. This framework is
fairly straightforward to implement and it has the ability to treat any types of systems,
without any needs for analytical solutions. Therefore Monte-Carlo simulations are a
popular way to assess the reliability of systems, especially in the case of spatially dis-
tributed infrastructure systems that are exposed to seismic hazard. For instance, Adachi
and Ellingwood [2008] have used Monte Carlo sampling to quantify the serviceability of
a water supply system subjected to a single earthquake scenario. The functionality of a
water system facility is a combination of the physical failure of the facility, the presence
of a backup power system and the failure of the supporting electrical system, thus ac-
counting for the interdependency between water and electrical supply systems. A similar
Monte-Carlo-based approach has been implemented by Duen˜as Osorio et al. [2007], who
provide probabilities of the connectivity loss of interdependent water and power distri-
bution networks. The loss probabilities are computed for various earthquake scenarios
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that are representative of increasing return period events. Wang and Au [2009] have
also used Monte Carlo simulations to quantify the water supply reliability under seismic
risk. Local and global performance indicators such as the Damage Consequence Index
or the Upgrade Benefit Index are introduced in order to identify critical components
within the system.
While most studies focus on utility networks (e.g. water supply systems or electric
power networks), the simulation of transportation networks has also been the object of
some developments. For instance, a simulation approach for the seismic risk analysis
of highway systems has been proposed by Werner et al. [2000]. The authors use four
simulation modules (i.e. hazard, component, system and transportation cost) that are
coupled in order to quantify expected monetary losses and increased travel times for
different durations of infrastructure exposure. Goretti and Sarli [2006] have also used
Monte-Carlo simulations to assess the connectivity and serviceability of road networks
after an earthquake. Functional interactions with the built environment are taken into
account through short-term (i.e. connectivity between strategic buildings and damaged
areas) and long-term (modification of network demand due to displaced population)
objectives, while a physical interaction is also considered due to the potential blockage
of roads from to collapsed buildings.
In Europe, the FP7 SYNER-G project has led to the creation of an Object-Oriented
Framework for Infrastructure Modeling and Simulation (OOFIMS) [Franchin and Cav-
alieri, 2013]. This tool aims at addressing the issue of a ‘system of systems’ exposed to
seismic hazard.
The object-oriented approach presents the merit of organizing each considered system
(i.e. built area, utility systems, transportation system and health-care system) with a
set of classes, attributes and methods, thus grouping components with similar features
(see Figure 2.6). The simulation framework is designed in a way that a probabilistic
sampling is performed at various levels:
• earthquake events (i.e. epicentre location and magnitude) are sampled from given
seismogenetic areas;
• spatially correlated ground motion fields are sampled from the GMPE uncertain-
ties;
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Figure 2.6: Details of the object-oriented structure of the road network (RDN) class
in OOFIMS, adapted from Modaressi et al. [2014]. EPN stands for electric power
network, WSS for water supply system and TAZ for traffic analysis zone.
• component damage states are sampled from the dispersion in the fragility curves.
Based on the component damage states, functional losses are then derived and various
simulations methods may be applied, depending on the type of systems, in order to
compute the distribution of system performance indicators. An option is available to
apply importance sampling instead of plain Monte-Carlo sampling, in order to improve
the convergence of the loss distributions. The OOFIMS tool has been successfully applied
to the seismic risk assessment of the road network of the city of Thessaloniki in Greece
[Argyroudis et al., 2015] and the gas network in the L’Aquila area in Italy [Esposito
et al., 2015].
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2.1.2.2 System Reliability Methods
As opposed to simulation-based methods, other approaches focus on the investigation of
the system’s structure and topology, in order to extract some rules that directly provide
the system’s response from the components’ states. Any system may be represented as
a graph, where the logical relations between the various elements and events may be
explicated (see glossary in Appendix A).
First, a fault-tree [NRC, 1981] is a logic graph, where a set of basic events (i.e. com-
ponent failures) is assembled through Boolean gates (e.g. AND or OR gates) in order
to represent their impact on the failure event of the system (e.g. loss of connectivity or
functionality), referred to as the top event. As stated by Bensi et al. [2011], a fault tree
is specifically designed to identify the potential causes of a given system failure mode,
therefore a single fault tree is usually insufficient to account for all possible failure modes
of the system. Due to their visual nature, fault trees are preferentially used for quali-
tative analyses, although it is possible to build a quantitative framework by assembling
the component failure probabilities according to the rules of the Boolean gates. A fault
tree can also be represented as a reliability block diagram, which enables to visualize
the system’s topology and the relations between the components, and between virtual
source and sink nodes (see Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7: Example of a fault tree for a virtual system (left) and its corresponding
reliability block diagram (right). The dotted lines represent the outline of the MLSs
(in blue) and MCSs (in red), as explained in the text. For clarity purposes, the MCSs
{1, 4, 5, 6} and {3, 4, 5, 6} are not represented.
Within a fault tree, it is possible to decompose the system into sub-systems with specific
properties (see example in Figure 2.7):
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• A minimal link set (MLS) is the smallest set of components whose joint survival
induces system survival. It corresponds to a series sub-system.
• A minimal cut set (MCS) is the smallest set of components whose joint failure
induces system failure. It corresponds to a parallel sub-system.
Fault-tree analyses have been used in multiple studies for the reliability assessment of
engineered structures. They are often useful to incorporate different types of failure
mechanisms at the component level, thus leaving the possibility to account for various
hazard types. For instance, in the case of bridges, loading events such as scour, overload-
ing, fire, corrosion, collisions, earthquakes or floods can be assessed throughout the life
cycle of the bridge, along with their reliability indices [Davis-McDaniel, 2011, LeBeau
and Wadia-Fascetti, 2000, Zhu, 2008]. The location of the MCSs within the fault tree
can then be used to identify the most critical events that are likely to lead to bridge
failure.
Another application of the fault-tree analysis lies in its ability to identify which com-
ponents are the most likely to lead to the system failure. This enables to evaluate all
possbile component failure combinations within the fault tree, each of these configura-
tions being associated with a given repair cost or recovery time. Therefore, even if the
system has a given functionality state, the specific way it has failed is a key information
to evaluate the severity of the repairs. This approach has been applied by Porter and
Ramer [2012] to a data centre submitted to an earthquake, thus enabling the compu-
tation of the downtime duration. Ferrario and Zio [2014] have also proposed a new
framework, referred to as a ‘goal-tree success-tree’: it is based on the same concept as
fault trees, except that the top event represents the ability of the system to fulfil its
function, and that the basics event represent all the components that are required by
the system to operate. This approach is applied to a power plant facility subjected to
an earthquake, while each component failure is associated with a recovery time.
The formalisation of the system reliability with respect to the component failures has
been achieved by Song and Kang [2007] and Kang et al. [2008], which introduce the
matrix-based system reliability method: in this framework, the probability of the sys-
tem being in a given state results from the matrix product of a matrix of component
configurations and a vector of component damage probabilities. The main advantage of
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this approach is its computational simplicity, since the probabilities can be estimated
with matrix-based operations. In the case of large or complex systems, the size of the
matrices can also be reduced by considering sub-systems and adopting a multi-scale
approach [Der Kiureghian and Song, 2008]. When the components are statistically de-
pendent, it is possible to assume conditional independence between component events
given a set of random variables, which represent ‘environmental dependence’ or ‘common
source effects’ [Kang et al., 2008]. This system reliability approach has been applied to
the seismic vulnerability assessment of various engineered systems, such as:
• A highway network composed of vulnerable bridges [Kang et al., 2008], linking
different cities to a hospital. By defining the bridge failures as basic MECE (i.e.
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive) events, various measures for the
system event can be introduced (e.g. disconnection between a city and the hospital,
number of failed bridges, disconnection between a county and the hospital...).
• A bridge structure [Song and Kang, 2009], where the component failures represent
the basic events. The damage state of the bridge system can then be estimated,
based on the component fragility curves. Other measures are also explored, such
as the number of failed components as a function of the seismic IM.
• A truss structure [Song and Kang, 2009], composed of a set of perfectly brittle
members. By using a global damage state criterion such as the number of failed
members, the system failure probability can then be assembled. In the case that
one member has failed, the load distribution across the structure is updated and
new component events are introduced for the surviving members.
• A network of electrical substations [Der Kiureghian and Song, 2008], where a
multi-scale approach is applied in order to decompose the substations into a set of
sub-systems of electrical components.
Finally, Bensi et al. [2011] have detailed the application of Bayesian networks to the
seismic risk assessment of infrastructure systems. Modelling techniques are proposed in
order to generate Gaussian random fields (i.e. to account for the spatial correlation of
the ground motion field) and to assess the system performance as a function of the com-
ponents’ performance. Two illustrative examples are described, namely the connectivity
of a transportation network and of a high-speed rail system.
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The discrete nature of the Bayesian variables is well adapted to the discrete damage
states that are usually used for structural systems. However, variables such as seismic
IMs or sampled structural properties, which are usually forming the root nodes, have an
inherent continuous distribution, thus requiring a discretization process. The Bayesian
updating of probabilities can be carried out within a forward or a backward analysis:
due to the application of Bayes’ theorem, backward analysis (i.e. inference) constitutes
a characteristic feature of the Bayesian framework. However, for large systems, the
computation of the CPTs for a node with many parent variables can become intractable:
to this end, a careful definition of the structure of the Bayesian network or the application
of efficient inference algorithms are key steps in the probabilistic assessment of the
system.
While Bayesian networks have become a popular tool among transportation network
managers for the health monitoring (e.g. fatigue, corrosion) or the life-cycle analysis
of bridges [Wang, 2012, Wang et al., 2010], their application to the progressive failure
of structural systems subjected to extreme loading such as earthquakes is less common.
Mahadevan et al. [2001] have proposed an approach for the reliability reassessment of
structural systems with Bayesian networks, accounting for multiple failure sequences as
well as for the correlation between the component damage states: the method is applied
to structural systems of bars and trusses in parallel or in series, where conditional fail-
ure probabilities are updated depending on the state of the other components and the
load redistribution. This study shows the benefits of using a Bayesian network when a
backward analysis is performed, i.e. the estimation of the component failure probabil-
ities when evidence is provided at the system level. In order to reduce the number of
damage configurations, algorithms such as branch and bound or truncated enumeration
are recommended to discard insignificant (i.e. low probability) failure sequences.
Bayesian networks have also been used by Banazadeh and Fereshtehnejad [2011] for the
identification of the different failure mechanisms of steel moment frames. Failure modes
are defined as the sequence of plastic hinges that form across the frame until the collapse
of the structure. The Bayesian network formulation enables also the introduction of basic
random variables (i.e. root nodes), such as record-to-record variability or modelling
parameters, with the possibility to track the effect of specific configurations on the
occurrence of failure modes.
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2.1.3 Multi-Risk Analysis
While the aforementioned studies provide a clear framework for the analysis of critical
infrastructure, one could argue that they are mainly focused on single risk analyses.
Due to the inter-dependencies between systems and the large spatial extent covered
by most lifelines, it is necessary to consider a multi-risk framework, where cascading or
coincidental events may lead to unforeseen system failures [Pate´-Cornell, 2012]. Also, the
inclusion of various hazard types and damaging mechanisms may result in harmonization
issues at the level of fragility models and their interpretation in terms of physical or
functional damages.
2.1.3.1 Multi-Hazard Frameworks
The FP7 MATRIX project [Zschau and the MATRIX Consortium, 2010–2013] has fo-
cused on the hazards that are the most likely to affect Europe, namely earthquakes,
landslides, volcanoes, tsunamis, wild fires, storms and fluvial and coastal floods. A
distinction is made between the following frameworks:
• Single-type risk assessment, where losses are estimated for a single independent
hazard type.
• Multi-type risk assessment, which may result from the occurrence of multiple haz-
ard types, in the following configurations:
– simultaneous (and possibly independent) events occurring in the same area
and time window;
– cascading events, where a given hazard event may trigger a secondary hazard
event.
In the case of independent single risks, the use of probabilistic risk curves is advocated by
the MATRIX project, since these enable a straightforward combination and comparison
of the considered risk levels. The combination of the aggregated risk that is associated
with a given area is performed, thanks to the independence assumption of the considered
hazards. The comparison of two independent risks can then be performed for a given
return period: the median of the loss distribution curves for the selected return period
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can be compared with some significance statistical tests, in order to check whether the
differences between the potential losses induced by different hazards are notable or not.
Such an exercise is directly aimed at facilitating the decision-making process that is
involved in the resource allocation for risk mitigation.
When multiple hazards are considered, interactions have to be taken into account at
both the hazard (i.e. cascading hazard events) and the consequence levels (i.e. cascading
failure events): whether hazard events are considered as simultaneous or triggered, the
aggregation of the total losses usually requires fragility models that are able to account
for the joint loading of two or more hazard types (see Figure 2.8) [Marzocchi et al.,
2012]. Finally, a combination of event- and fault-tree formulations is often employed in
order to ensure an exhaustive exploration of all possible cascading scenarios.
Figure 2.8: Multi-risk assessment framework proposed by Marzocchi et al. [2012], for
joint independent hazards (sources 1 and 2) and cascading hazards (source 2 triggering
source 3).
The MATRIX framework has been applied by Mignan et al. [2014], who define a vir-
tual city exposed to generic types of hazards (e.g. earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis,
technological accidents, etc.). A dynamic multi-risk process is implemented through
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the sequential Monte Carlo Method, which enables the generation of coinciding or cas-
cading events while accounting for time-variant vulnerability and exposure. Different
assumptions are tested (e.g. interactions between hazard events, updating of exposure
or fragility models, etc.), so that the comparison of the annual probabilities of occur-
rence of aggregated losses highlights the risk migration that is induced by the multi-risk
interactions.
Independently, Selva [2013] has proposed a probabilistic framework for the statistical
treatment of multi-risk interactions. Functional forms are introduced for the quantifi-
cation of all types of interactions (i.e. in terms of hazard, exposure and fragility), while
various risk factors are defined in order to identify the different types of contributions
from the multiple hazards. The concept of the time window, during which the effects of
multiple hazards are still present on a given asset, is recognised as a key parameter of
multi-risk analyses.
It should be noted that the aforementioned studies focus on single or independent assets
(e.g. a built area or a given facility), while multi-risk assessment in the context of
infrastructure systems remains poorly investigated. An attempt in this direction has
been made by Gehl et al. [2013c], who study the impact of combined hazard events from
a volcanic eruption on Mt Cameroon on various infrastructure systems. These issues are
also studied in the FP7 INFRARISK project [O’Brien and the INFRARISK Consortium,
2013–2016], which aims at proposing a stress-test strategy for transportation networks
subjected to earthquake, flood and landslide hazards.
2.1.3.2 Multi-Hazard Fragility Functions
Apart from the generation of multi-hazard events, multi-risk interactions have also to be
considered at the fragility level, in order to account for the damages that are potentially
accumulated from joint or subsequent hazard loadings. Such effects cannot be taken into
account by the combination of single-hazard fragility curves, since some hazard loadings
will have the effect of altering the state of the structural system and its structural
response to subsequent loading, as shown in Figure 2.8.
One of the first of these models is the one developed by Lee and Rosowsky [2006], who
consider the combined effect of snow and earthquake loadings on woodframe buildings.
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Parametric seismic fragility curves are derived for different values of snow load on the
rooftop, thus resulting in a fragility surface expressing the probability of failure with
respect to seismic intensity and snow load. Similar considerations are investigated by
Zuccaro et al. [2008], who propose vulnerability models that account for cumulated
damages during volcanic eruptions. More specifically, the effect of volcanic ash load on
the rooftop is quantified with respect to earthquakes and pyroclastic flows: no fragility
curves are developed, but load multiplier coefficients or updated vulnerability classes
are proposed as inputs to damage probability matrices.
In the case of bridges, the combined effects of scour and earthquakes have become a
popular subject in the last few years. For instance, through vibration monitoring on an
Italian roadway bridge, Foti and Sabia [2011] have demonstrated the impact of scour
on the dynamic response of the structure. It is shown that modal identification may be
used as a powerful tool to locate and monitor the evolution of scour at bridge piers. On
the other hand, Prasad and Banerjee [2013] have used non-linear time-history analyses
to compute fragility curves for RC bridge piers subjected to various levels of scour: the
results are presented as a response surface, which shows the evolution of the fragility
median with respect to the scour depth and the diameter of the equivalent foundation
pile. Alipour et al. [2012] have also used non-linear bridge models to derive parametric
fragility curves for various scour depths. The probability of failure due to the combined
effects of scour and earthquakes during the design lifetime of the bridge can then be
quantified: it is represented as a joint probability density function of scour depth and
PGA, which can be compared with the maximum acceptable probability of failure given
by design codes in order to obtain scour load-modification factors.
A final example of multi-hazard fragility analysis is the study by Kafali [2008], who
considers the fragility of an offshore platform subjected to both wind and wave loadings.
The wind drag force acting on the deck structure and the wave force acting on the
platform’s column are both included in the equation of motion of a single-degree-of-
freedom system. A reliability analysis on the quasi-static response of the system enables
then the derivation of the probability distribution of failure.
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2.2 Methodology
This section analyses the potential shortcomings of the state-of-the-art with respect to
the objectives of the thesis. As a result, a methodological framework is proposed and
exposed in the last part of this Chapter.
2.2.1 Gaps and Key Issues
Regarding the derivation of seismic fragility curves for bridges, the literature review has
identified a wide range of approaches and studies, which demonstrate the significant
technical developments that have contributed to this topic. However, a majority of the
proposed models mainly focus on the fragility of bridge piers, while the contribution
from the other components (e.g. bearings, abutments, etc.) might be neglected: this is
not a trivial point, since it has been observed that piers do not fail that often [Nielson
and DesRoches, 2004], and if they do, they are expected to yield by design. In this
context, Nielson [2005] has made use of a joint probabilistic seismic demand model to
account for multiple component damage states, while system reliability methods such
as the one by Song and Kang [2009] enable the formalisation of the derivation of system
fragility curves. Such techniques remain however to be systematically applied to wider
scale real-life problems.
On the other hand, existing global damage scales for seismically induced failures focus on
the qualitative description of the state of each component type for each damage grade.
These damage scales are designed to be consistent in terms of damage severity across
all component types, however there is usually little justification or evidence to support
this point. Moreover, the translation of these global damage states into functionality
losses remains unclear, even though such loss metrics constitute critical inputs to the
system evaluation models that are needed to quantify indirect consequences. Some
references [FEMA, 2003] propose restoration curves or traffic disruption models based
on the physical damage of bridges: however one can argue that the damage to a given
component might lead to a much shorter repair time than another, while both component
damage states correspond to the same global damage grade in current approaches.
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If ground failure and flood hazards are added in the context of a multi-risk analysis, the
harmonization of the fragility models between the different hazard types is hindered by
several issues, which are overlooked by the literature:
• There are usually conceptual differences in the respective definitions of fragility
curves between hazard types (e.g. probabilistic models versus vulnerability func-
tions). In the case of ground failure or floods, the actual fragility curves are rather
scarce and they are derived through a variety of approaches.
• The main obstacle resides in the different damage scales that are used across all
hazard types, thus making it difficult to reconcile the consequences in a harmo-
nized multi-risk framework. While earthquake damage scales tend to be specified
through global damage scales, ground failures or floods usually apply loading on
localized areas of the bridge, thus contributing to the failure of specific components.
• Multi-risk interactions must be taken into account at the fragility level as well.
However current fragility models that consider cumulated damage from joint haz-
ard loadings are very scarce, the most common interaction being the combined
effect of scour and earthquake.
In terms of seismic risk assessment to infrastructure systems, simulation-based methods
have been the object of significant developments in the last decade, thus allowing the
derivation of probabilistic loss curves for a wide range of system performance indicators.
These methods have proven to be very efficient for the prediction of average risk levels,
however the quantification of low-probability high-consequence events remains difficult
due to the nature of the sampling techniques used. On the other hand, non-simulation
methods, such as Bayesian Networks or other system reliability methods, are able to
explore all possible configurations of the system, thus providing exact probabilities of
occurrence of potentially catastrophic events. However, such approaches usually suffer
from computational issues when addressing real-life complex systems.
Finally, it appears that multi-risk frameworks have been successfully developed for single
assets or independent elements (i.e. built areas), while infrastructure systems have
not been addressed from this angle yet. This seems quite paradoxical, since spatially
distributed infrastructure are precisely the type of assets that are potentially exposed to a
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wide range of hazards, while a failure at a given location might be able to propagate over
the whole infrastructure. The harmonization of uncertainty sources from various hazard
types constitutes also a challenge in order to provide a robust multi-risk assessment
approach that accounts for possible interactions between hazards.
2.2.2 Summary of Proposed Framework
In view of the current difficulties to reconcile damage events from different hazard types,
a methodological framework for the multi-risk assessment of infrastructure systems is
developed, with the specific aim of harmonizing the fragility models for various hazard
types. At the bridge level, the proposed approach starts from the observation that the
specific effects of various hazard loadings have to be assessed at the local level, in order
to ensure that all failure modes are accounted for. The different component damage
states can then be reconciled by considering their effects on the bridge functionality
instead of using solely the definition of the physical states. If harmonized multi-hazard
fragility functions can be generated, the multi-risk assessment of a road network becomes
straightforward, provided that the hazard events are properly specified in terms of spatial
and temporal dimensions.
Hence the procedure that is presented in this thesis can be summarised in the following
steps (see Figure 2.9):
• The infrastructure system (e.g. road network) is decomposed into its physical
elements (e.g. bridges), which are in turn decomposed into structural components
(e.g. piers, bearings, etc.). This choice is motivated by the need to treat the road
infrastructure as a system (i.e. the network) of sub-systems (i.e. the physical
elements), as opposed to conventional frameworks that consider the vulnerability
of physical elements on a more global scale. The present work is focused on bridges
and their decomposition into structural components, however a similar appraoch
is applicable to other elements such as tunnels or embankments.
• For each component, the failure modes that are specific to each type of hazard
loading are identified, based on the analysis of post-disaster reports or existing
damage scales (i.e. Chapter 3). As discussed in the previous sections, the various
types of structural components and hazard loadings may lead to a wide range
Chapter 2. Background and Proposed Approach 39
of damage mechanisms, which all have to be accounted for in the context of a
multi-risk analysis.
• For each component failure mode previously identified, specific loss metrics (e.g.
repair duration, functional loss, etc.) are proposed through an expert-based survey,
in order to quantify the consequences in terms of functionality (i.e. Chapter 3).
The novelty of this step lies in the identification of the functional losses induced by
specific component failure modes, which has the effect of greatly refining the loss
assessment and harmonizing the potential contribution from each hazard loading.
• In parallel, for each of the component failure modes, hazard-specific fragility curves
are derived at the component level. This step is necessary in order to quantify the
probability of occurrence of each component failure mode. It has to be component-
and hazard-specific, since fragility derivation methods and related assumptions
vary greatly between the different hazard types (i.e. Chapter 4).
• The knowledge of the functionality losses associated with each component fail-
ure mode enables then the creation of a hazard-harmonized damage scale, which
contains system failure modes that are consistent in terms of functionality (i.e.
Chapter 5). The identification of these system failure modes in a multi-hazard
context enables the definition of top events at the bridge level that may be trig-
gered by the occurrence of hazard-specific component failure modes, thus ensuring
the harmonization between the various hazard loadings considered.
• For each of the system failure modes previously identified, hazard-harmonized
fragility curves are assembled at the system level, based on the relevant compo-
nent fragility curves (i.e. Chapter 5). Bayesian Networks are investigated as a
modular and efficient probabilistic tool with respect to the matrix-based system
reliability approach. Thanks to the Bayesian Networks, system fragility curves (i.e.
probability of occurrence of system failure modes) are assembled from the proba-
bilities given by the hazard-specific component fragility curves, while accounting
for the statistical dependence between the damage events.
• Uncertainty sources are identified throughout the process, so that they can be
propagated into the final loss estimations (i.e. Chapter 6). This step is mostly
dedicated to the quantification of uncertainties related to the choice of possible
models (i.e. epistemic uncertainties), for ground-motion prediction equations or
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fragility curves. The objective is to show how the uncertainty sources may influence
the global risk assessment, depending on various levels of knowledge of the studied
area.
• Finally, the hazard-harmonized fragility functions can be used to compute the
probabilistic distributions of losses at the infrastructure level, in a multi-risk con-
text (i.e. Chapter 7). Conventional methods such as Monte Carlo sampling may
be used to obtain an estimate of the loss distrubtion, however the use of Bayesian
Networks as an alternative to simulation-based methods is also investigated. Is-
sues of computability due to the size and the complexity of the infrastructure are
discussed, in order to design a simplified Baysian Network that may be used for
the quick updating of loss probabilities (i.e. towards a decision support system).
2.3 Conclusion
While the literature review has shown that infrastructure risk assessment has recently
benefited from significant research efforts, it appears that current multi-risk frameworks
have not been designed to adress the issue of infrastructure systems such as road net-
works, which comprise numerous types of interdependent elements.
Therefore an original method is presented in the present work, where physical elements
such as bridges are decomposed into their structural components, so that the impact
of each hazard loading on each component may be properly modelled and taken into
account. The definition of a damage scale in terms of functional losses presents the
double merit of harmonizing the respective contributions from various hazard types and
providing loss metrics that are directly usable in the performance assessment of the road
network.
The construction of a Bayesian Network that represents the interactions between poten-
tial damage events in the bridge system constitutes an innovative way to derive system
fragility functions that are expressed with respect to multiple intensity measures. Fi-
nally, a similar Bayesian framework will also be applied at the network level, for which
size limitations and potential solutions in terms of computational load are discussed.
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Figure 2.9: Summary of the proposed method for the multi-risk assessment of road
infrastructure.

Chapter 3
Bridge Failure Modes and their
Functional Consequences
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the first step of the proposed framework, which consists in
identifying the bridge damage states at the component level. The main objective is to
account for all possible failure modes from different hazard types and to associate them
with induced losses and functional consequences, in order to facilitate the harmonization
of the fragility curves in the later steps.
Section 3.2 presents the most common components that are found in highway bridges,
along with a description of their role within the system and a summary of their structural
features. The starting point of this inventory is the bridge taxonomy [Silva et al., 2014]
that has been defined in the frame of the SYNER-G project.
For each of these components, Section 3.3 classifies the most common damage states or
failure modes that are found for each type of hazard loading. This inventory is based on
a literature review and an account of past damaging events, leading to a failure modes
matrix for each combination of component and hazard type.
Finally, Section 3.4 establishes an association between each component failure mode
and a set of loss metrics. The adopted method relies on an expert-based survey, which
leads to probabilistic functionality curves given the component damage state: measures
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such as the duration and cost of repair operations and the functional losses (e.g. speed
reduction or lane closure) are essential to harmonize the impact from all hazard types
and to quantify the performance on the road infrastructure.
3.2 General Description of Bridges
The following paragraphs describe the main components that usually comprise a bridge
system. As it will be shown in the next sub-sections, the geometry and the structural
characteristics of a given bridge heavily influence the component types that need to be
considered. Within the frame of the INFRARISK project, the considered case-study
areas are located in Europe and especially along the Italian highway network. Therefore
this section focuses on bridge types that are consistent with the inventory of these areas,
i.e. mostly RC multi-span bridges with simply-supported decks.
3.2.1 Typological Classification
One of the key results of the FP7 SYNER-G project consists in the collection and review
of seismic fragility functions for critical infrastructure components. More specifically,
fragility functions for road and railway bridges have been critically appraised and stored
in a Fragility Function Manager Tool [Silva et al., 2014].
The tool proposes a taxonomy for the different bridge typologies, based on a dozen of
parameters, such as material, superstructure type, deck type, pier-to-deck connection,
dimension, pier type, seismic design or regularity. This taxonomy is inspired by the
classifications that have been defined in previous classifications [Basoz and Kiremidjian,
1996, FEMA, 2003, Nielson, 2005]. The SYNER-G taxonomy comprises the following
parameters:
• Material 1 (MM1): Concrete (C), Masonry (M), Steel (S), Iron (I), Wood (W),
Mixed (MX)
• Material 2 (MM2): Reinforced concrete (RC), Post-tensioned or Pre-stressed re-
inforced concrete (PC), Unreinforced masonry (URM), Reinforced masonry (RM),
etc.
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• Type of superstructure (TD1): Girder bridge (Gb), Arch bridge (Ab), Sus-
pension bridge (Spb), Slab Bridge (Sb)
• Type of deck (TD2): Solid slab (Ss), Slab with voids (Sv), Box girder (B),
Modern arch bridge (MA), Ancient arch bridge (AA)
• Deck characteristics (DC): Width of the deck
• Deck structural system (DSS): Simply Supported (SSu), Continuous (Co)
• Pier to deck connection (PDC): Not Isolated – monolithic (NIs), Isolated –
through bearings (Is)
• Type of pier column (TC1): Single-column Pier (ScP), Multi-column Pier
(McP)
• Number of columns for pier (NP)
• Type of section of the pier (TS1): Cylindrical (Cy), Rectangular (R), Oblong
(Ob), Wall-type (W)
• Type of section of the pier (TS2): Solid (So), Hollow (Ho)
• Height of the pier (HP)
• Spans (Sp): Single span (Ssp), Multi spans (Ms)
• Spans characteristics (SC): Number of Spans (NS), Span Length (SL)
• Type of connection to the abutments (TCa): Free (F), Monolithic (M),
Isolated – through bearings or isolators (Isl)
• Bridge configuration (BC): Regular (R), Semi-regular (SR), Irregular (IR)
• Level of seismicity (LS): No seismic design – design for gravity loads only
(NSD), Seismic design (SD)
The above taxonomy has been specifically designed for seismic hazard, so that bridges
may be classified according to these parameters and potentially associated with a given
typology with a known response behaviour represented by existing fragility functions.
In the case of other hazard types, fragility developments are usually case-specific, due
to the numerous parameters that have to be accounted for. For instance, the fragility
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to fluvial floods and induced scour is heavily influenced by the shape of the channel, the
material in the stream bed, the position of the piers, the foundations, etc. [Richardson
and Davis, 1995]. A refined topography model and knowledge of the surrounding soil
and its interaction with foundations are also required to assess the susceptibility of the
bridge system to ground failure, since such characteristics are required to feed modelling
tools.
3.2.2 Description of Bridge Components
A bridge typology is strongly influenced by the type of components that comprise the
bridge system. It is proposed here to focus on multi-span RC girder bridges, with either
simply-supported or continuous decks, which represent the most widely used typology
for highway bridges in Europe.
-
-
-
-
-
-
Abutment approach (embankment)
Abutment
Abutment foundation
S hear key
Bearing
P ier
column
P ier foundation
Figure 3.1: Sketch of a half-bridge system and its components.
Such bridge types usually include the following components (see Figure 3.1):
• Piers: single-/multi-column bents, rectangular or cylindrical columns;
• Deck: continuous or simply supported, slab, steel girder, concrete girder, concrete
box girder;
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• Abutments: seat-type abutment supported by a single / double row of RC piles
or by a wall;
• Bearings: fixed / expansion bearings, bolted / unbolted neoprene pads, elas-
tomeric pad and dowel bearings, steel pendulum bearings, sliding/roller bearings;
• Pier foundations: deep or shallow foundations, pile or spread footings, drilled
or driven piles;
• Shear Keys: interior or exterior shear keys;
• Expansion joints: small or large movement joints;
• Energy dissipating systems, in retrofitted cases (e.g. viscous dampers or iso-
lators).
3.2.2.1 Piers
Two main characteristics of the piers are the number of columns and the shape of
the columns. The number of columns per pier has a significant effect on the seismic
response of piers, as it influences whether a flexural or a shear failure mechanism should
be considered. Shear failure of piers is estimated by comparing the shear capacity with
the yield capacity associated to flexural behaviour. The occurrence of one of the two
mechanisms depends strongly on the nature of the connection of the pier system to the
deck: it is especially true in the case of transverse loading, where the value and location
of the maximum bending moment can significantly vary depending on the pier-deck
configuration, as shown by Figure 3.2 [Cardone, 2014]. Smaller flexural moments due
to the connection of the pier cap to the deck might then favour the shear failure as
the main damage mechanism, since the distribution of the shear demand along the pier
remains similar whatever the connection conditions at the pier cap.
Finally, the shape of the pier columns has a strong impact on the flow-structure in-
teractions in the case of a flood, especially for the computation of the scour level. An
additional classification may be made on whether the piers are equipped with scour
countermeasures or not. The main scour protection methods consist in the application
of riprap material or the construction of collars around the base of the bridge piers.
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Figure 3.2: Typical flexural length L for (a) Cantilever pier with torsionally free
deck; (b) Cantilever pier with torsionally constrained deck; (c) Double bending piers
(adapted from Cardone [2014]).
3.2.2.2 Abutments
Seat-type abutments are specifically presented here, because they represent the most
widely used abutment type in Italian highway bridges, according to Cardone [2014].
The study by Nielson [2005] presents four types of seat-type abutments, depending on
the configuration of the supporting piles and walls (see figure 3.3):
• Gravity-type: the bridge seat consists of a wall that is connected to the ground
through a footing, while a full height back wall is used to retain the backfill soil.
• U-type: it is similar to the gravity-type abutment, except that the back wall has
a U-shape in order to laterally restrain the backfill soil.
• Spill-through-type: the back wall is not continuous all the way to the ground, and
the seat is supported by buttress walls.
• Pile bent-type: it is similar to the spill-through abutment, except that the buttress
walls are replaced by RC piles.
While the primary purpose of abutments is to ensure the support of vertical loads, they
also have to withstand horizontal loading, whether it results from traffic loads or from
seismic actions. In the case of longitudinal loading, two types of behaviours can be
identified. When the bridge deck is pulling away from the abutment (extension), the
resistance is only provided by the RC piles or walls (active resistance, if the deck is con-
nected rather than just seating on the abutment). If the bridge deck is pushing towards
the abutment and the deck-abutment gap is closed (compression), the backfill soil starts
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d)
Figure 3.3: Schematic view of common abutment types: a) Gravity-type b) U-type
c) Spill through-type d) Pile bent-type, adapted from Nielson [2005].
to provide some resistance, along with the RC pile/walls (passive resistance). There-
fore the displacement – force relationship of an abutment system usually consists of an
asymmetrical curve, where both passive and active mechanisms are described, depend-
ing on whether the system is in compression or extension (see Figure 3.4). Dissipating
devices, such as dampers, might also be put at the interface between deck and abutment
in order to control this movement: hence this parameter is very important for mitigation
provisions.
0
0
Deformation
St
re
ss
Active behaviour in tension
Piles only
Passive behaviour in compression
Piles + Backfill soil
Figure 3.4: Illustration of the passive and active behaviours in an abutment.
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In the case of transverse loading, the lateral walls are usually not sufficient to make the
backfill soil contribute to the horizontal resistance and it can be assumed that the pile
bents, if present, provide most of the resistance (active behaviour). Shear keys can also
be added between the abutment and the deck in order to restrain some of the lateral
movements.
3.2.2.3 Shear Keys
Shear keys are RC blocks that are usually present at abutments in order to prevent
excessive lateral displacement of the deck. They are usually used as restraints under non-
seismic conditions or moderate earthquakes. However, in the case of large earthquakes,
they should act as sacrificial elements in order to prevent the damage of more critical
components such as abutment walls. According to CALTRANS [2000], shear keys can
be classified according to their aspect ratio α = h/d (see Figure 3.5):
• α < 0.5: sliding shear friction model;
• 0.5 ≤ α < 1.0: strut-and-tie model;
• α ≥ 1.0: flexural / moment resistance model.
An additional distinction can also be on the location of the shear keys, i.e. whether they
are located on the extremity or on the inside of the transversal deck section (exterior
and interior shear keys, respectively).
h
transversal
longitudinal
d
Figure 3.5: Schematic view of interior (left) and exterior (right) shear keys.
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3.2.2.4 Bearings
Bridge bearings can be classified depending on the type of movement they allow [Nielson,
2005], i.e. fixed or expansion bearings. Only rotations are allowed with fixed bearings,
while both rotations and translations – to a certain extent – are permitted with expansion
bearings.
Steel bearings can cover many shapes and designs, among which the most common are:
• Pinned bearings: they only allow rotations and they are usually composed of
a cylindrical steel pin between the pier cap and the deck superstructure, allowing
free rotations (see Figure 3.6).
masonry plate
sole plate
anchor bolts
steel pin
Figure 3.6: Schematic view of a pinned bearing.
• Rocker bearings: sometimes referred to as steel pendulum bearings, they allow
only rotations if they are pinned, and only one-dimensional translations otherwise
(see Figure 3.7). They are also referred to as high-type bearings, as opposed to
sliding bearings (low-types).
masonry plate
sole plate
wing plate
masonry plate
sole plate
wing plate
Figure 3.7: Schematic view of an expansion rocker bearing (left) and a pinned rocker
bearing (right).
Chapter 3. Bridge failure modes and their functional consequences 52
• Roller bearings: they allow one-dimensional translations, but no rotational
movements. They are composed of one or several steel cylinders than can roll
when the bearing takes up forces from the superstructure (see Figure 3.8).
sole plate
steel cylinder
Figure 3.8: Schematic view of a roller bearing.
• Sliding bearings: expansion sliding bearings allow one dimensional translations,
but no rotational movements, while the fixed version allows for rotation while
restricting translations. They are the simplest form of bearing, since they are
mainly comprised of the sole and masonry plates. The sliding plate is usually
made of another material, like stainless steel or bronze to ease up the sliding.
Expansion bearings are usually found with a guide plate that is bolted to the
masonry plate in order to limit the translation to one direction (see Figure 3.9).
masonry plate
convex
sole plate
sliding plateguide plate
masonry plate
convex
sole plate
Figure 3.9: Schematic view of an expansion sliding bearing (left) and a fixed sliding
bearing (right).
Apart from steel bearings, elastomeric pad bearings are also a common alternative, and
expansion bearings of this type can allow bi-dimensional translations (in both longitudi-
nal and transversal directions), as well as rotational movements. Elastomeric pads can
be either bolted or unbolted to the sole plate: their respective damage mechanism will
then differ, as explained in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Possible failure mechanisms for neoprene pads: (a) bolted – rubber shear
failure (b) unbolted – slipping, if low axial load and thin pad (c) unbolted – rollover, if
high axial load and thick pad (adapted from Cardone [2014].
3.2.2.5 Pier Foundations
Pier foundations typically consist of a footing (i.e. pile cap) that is supported by a buried
group of piles, while other types of foundations are simply comprised of a single drilled
or driven pile. The foundation type plays a significant role in the seismic response of the
whole bridge, since it ensures the transfer of inertial forces and determines the nature
of soil-structure interactions. However, pile foundations are usually over-designed due
to the difficulty to inspect structural damages on buried elements. As a result, the piles
may be modelled as linear elastic components.
In terms of flood-induced scour or ground failures, the foundation depth is an essential
characteristic. For instance, in the case of deep foundations, there is usually a portion
of the pile length that is not designed to support the pier, so that it can be excavated to
a certain extent without endangering the stability of the bridge (i.e. the deeper portion
of the pile is still providing enough support).
3.2.2.6 Deck
The deck superstructure can either be made of reinforced concrete or steel, or composite
materials. Deck spans are usually supported by steel girders or a box-girder system.
For shorter span lengths, slab decks can also be found: they are assembled from precast
prestressed concrete sections. Finally, a major typological feature that determines the
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global behaviour of the bridge is whether the deck is simply supported or continuous
(no free rotations of the pier-deck connections).
3.2.2.7 Energy Dissipation Systems
Existing bridges may be retrofitted through the application of energy dissipation systems
at the interface between the pier cap and the deck. These devices can consist of friction
dampers, viscous dampers or active dampers, but the objective remains the same, i.e.
generating large hysteresis cycles in order to reduce the amount of inertial forces, while
staying within the specified range of deformations.
3.3 Identification of Component Failure Modes
As observed in Chapter 2, each of the aforementioned bridge components is potentially
vulnerable to various types of hazard loadings: therefore these local damage mechanisms
(i.e. component failure modes) need to be identified and organized for each of the hazard
types considered (i.e. earthquake, ground failure and flood). The possible damage states
that correspond to each component are identified with a literature review, before being
reviewed and summarized in a multi-hazard table of component failure modes.
3.3.1 Component Failure Modes from Earthquakes
This section reviews some of the recent studies that describe damage states and corre-
sponding limit values for various bridge components exposed to seismic hazard.
3.3.1.1 HAZUS Technical Manual for Earthquakes [FEMA, 2003]
In the HAZUS framework [FEMA, 2003], the following damage states are identified
for bridges, which are defined at global level but include clear reference to specific
components and relate them also to repair needs. The HAZUS damage scale contains
five damage states, with DS1 representing the Intact/No damage State:
• DS2 (Slight/minor damage): Minor cracking and spalling at the abutment piles,
cracks in shear keys at abutments, minor spalling and cracks at hinges, minor
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spalling at the columns (damage requires no more than cosmetic repair) or minor
cracking to the deck.
• DS3 (Moderate damage): Any column experiencing moderate (shear cracks) crack-
ing and spalling (column structurally still sound), moderate movement of the abut-
ment (< 2 inches), extensive cracking and spalling of shear keys, any connection
having cracked shear keys or bent bolts, keeper bar failure without unseating,
rocker bearing failure or moderate settlement of the approach.
• DS4 (Extensive damage): Any column degrading without collapse – shear fail-
ure - (column structurally unsafe), significant residual movement at connections,
or major settlement of the approach, vertical offset of the abutment, differential
settlement at connections, shear key failure at abutments.
• DS5 (Complete damage): Any column collapsing and connection losing all bearing
support, which may lead to imminent deck collapse, tilting of substructure due to
foundation failure.
3.3.1.2 Study by Nielson [2005]
Nielson [2005] had proposed another damage scale, for which a qualitative description
of each of the four damage states at the component-level is provided in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Description of proposed limit states for bridge components, from Nielson
[2005].
Component Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Steel Generation of Severe Complete fracture of Unseating
bearings cracks in the deformation of the bolts (toppling or
concrete pier anchor bolts sliding of bearings)
Elastomeric Noticeable Possible deck Necessary girder Unseating
bearings deformation realignment and retention and
dowel fracture deck realignment
Columns Yielding Cracking Spalling Reinforcement
(piers) buckling
Abutments Half of first First Ultimate Twice
yielding point yielding point deformation the ultimate
deformation
A set of prescriptive limit states for different bridge components is also specified (see
Table 3.2): the way these values are chosen is based on prescriptions by an analyst (i.e.
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performance objectives), with the necessity to define these prescriptions at levels that
would be noticeable during a physical inspection of the bridge.
Table 3.2: Quantitative limit states for bridge components, from Nielson [2005].
‘High’ and ‘Low’ refer to the height of the bearing profile.
Component Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Concrete column (curvature ductility) 1.0 1.58 3.22 6.84
High - steel fixed bearing – long. [mm] 6 20 40 255
High - steel fixed bearing – trans. [mm] 6 20 40 255
High - steel rocker bearing – long. [mm] 50 100 150 255
High - steel rocker bearing – trans. [mm] 6 20 40 255
Low - steel fixed bearing – long. [mm] 6 20 40 255
Low - steel fixed bearing – trans. [mm] 6 20 40 255
Low - steel sliding bearing – long. [mm] 50 100 150 255
Low - steel sliding bearing – trans. [mm] 6 20 40 255
Elastomeric fixed bearing – long. [mm] 30 100 150 255
Elastomeric fixed bearing – trans. [mm] 30 100 150 255
Elastomeric expansion bearing – long. [mm] 30 100 150 255
Elastomeric expansion bearing – trans. [mm] 30 100 150 255
Abutment – active [mm] 4 8 25 50
Abutment – trans. [mm] 4 8 25 50
The limit states are specified with absolute values, which are based on the characteristics
of specific bridges (e.g. width of the column cross-section, dimensions of the pie cap,
etc.). In the case of columns, the use of curvature ductility (i.e. yield curvature is
defined as the curvature corresponding to the yielding of the first reinforcement bar) as
the damage measure is a way to ensure that the proposed limit states may be used for
other bridge geometries. On the other hand, limit states for bearings or abutments are
entirely based on specific geomtries, therefore they should be applied with caution to
other bridge types.
In addition to these presciptive limit states, Nielson [2005] has also used a more sub-
jective approach, where the outcome of a survey conducted on bridge inspectors and
operators has been analysed in order to quantify so-called descriptive damage states.
Both prescriptive and descriptive values are then fed into a Bayesian updating process,
which enables the derivation of limit state distributions (i.e. updating of the presciptive
limit states based on the data points provided by the expert survey). This step leads to
the quantification of a standard deviation βDS, which represents the uncertainty associ-
ated with the definition of the damage state threshold.
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3.3.1.3 SYNER-G Project [Crowley et al., 2011, Tsionis and Fardis, 2014]
The FP7 SYNER-G project (2009-2013) proposes a review of existing fragility curves for
roadway and railway bridges. The available fragility functions are harmonized according
to two damage states, i.e. yielding and near collapse.
Damage measures have been defined for piers and elastomeric bearings only. Damage to
piers is assessed based on the value of peak chord rotation demand at the member end
(at the yield and near collapse damage states), and member peak shear force demand
(at the near collapse damage state).
Regarding bearings, shear strain deformation and unseating are adopted as criteria for
the near collapse damage state. Experimental data [Bousias et al., 1990] suggest an
ultimate shear deformation of γ = 156%. Unseating occurs when, in any direction, the
displacement of the deck relative to the pier exceeds half of the bearing length.
The review of available fragility functions in the literature has enabled to compare
the different existing limit states for piers and elastomeric bearings (see Table 3.3 and
Table 3.4 respectively). A large variability is observed between the different proposed
limit states: some references propose absolute drift values, while others use measures
that are relative to yield curvature or rotation. These values depend greatly on the pier
type and the definition that is given to the damage states, thus generating epistemic
uncertainty on the estimation of the limit state value, as discussed later.
Figure 3.11: Deflection of a cantilever beam and associated measures (δ represents
the top displacement, θ the rotation and Φ the curvature), which are taken at the most
critical location of the beam.
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Table 3.3: Review of proposed limit states for bridge piers, from Tsionis and Fardis
[2014]: the various EDPs used are defined in Figure 3.11.
EDP Reference Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Drift ratio δ/h Banerjee and Shinozuka [2008] 1.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5%
Kim and Shinozuka [2004] 0.7% 1.5% 2.5% 5.0%
Li et al. [2012] 1.5% 2.6% 4.3% 6.9%
Yi et al. [2007] 0.7% 1.5% 2.5% 5.0%
Curvature Φ Avsar et al. [2011] Φy - - Φu
Cardone et al. [2011] Φy 0.5Φu - Φu
Choi et al. [2004] Φy 2.0Φy 4.0Φy 7.0Φy
Jeong and Elnashai [2007] Φy - - -
Nielson and DesRoches [2007] 1.3Φy 2.1Φy 3.5Φy 5.2Φy
Padgett and DesRoches [2009] 9.4Φy 17.7Φy 26.1Φy 30.2Φy
Zhang et al. [2008] Φy 2.0Φy 4.0Φy 7.0Φy
Rotation Θ Qi´ang et al. [2012] Θy 2.0Θy 6.0Θy 11.0Θy
Saxena et al. [2000] Θy 2.0Θy 6.0Θy 11.0Θy
Shinozuka et al. [2000] Θy - 2.0Θy -
Yi et al. [2007] Θy 1.3Θy 2.6Θy -
Displacement δ Monti and Nistico [2002] 0.5δu - 0.7δu δu
Table 3.4: Review of proposed limit states for bridge bearings, from Tsionis and
Fardis [2014]. When two values are present, the left one corresponds to fixed bearings,
and the right one to expansion bearings.
EDP Reference Slight Moderate Extensive Complete
Shear deformation of Moschonas et al. [2009] 20% 150% 200% 500%
elastomeric bearings Zhang et al. [2008] 100% 150% 200% 250%
Displacement δ [mm] Choi et al. [2004] 1/− 6/50 20/100 40/150
Ghosh and Padgett [2010] 6/37 20/104 40/136 187/187
As seen in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.11, the limit states for piers may be based on a wide
range of EDPs. Drift ratios are expressed as absolute values: such limit states are very
dependent on the detailing of the pier section and on its initial stiffness and ductile
capacity, which make these values quite specific to the type of piers studied. Rotation
and curvature metrics, on the other hand, are based on yield values that are usually
defined by the yielding of the first reinforcement bar within the pier [Nielson, 2005].
Therefore such measures may have a wider application to different types of piers; even
though some disparities may observed for heavier damage states (e.g. 30 times vs 5 times
the yield curvature for complete damage), thus highlighting the influence of the pier’s
ductile capacity on its seismic behaviour. Finally, it should be noted that displacement-
or drift-based EDPs may also be useful for the estimation of shear failure, while rotation
or curvature metrics constitute the most reliable indicators for flexural failure.
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3.3.1.4 Study by Cardone [2014]
In conducting a direct displacement-based seismic assessment of Italian bridges [Car-
done, 2014], the following performance levels (PL) are proposed by the author, also
providing reference to functional consequences:
• PL1: Very limited structural damage has occurred. The structure retains nearly
all of its pre-earthquake strength and stiffness, and although some minor structural
repairs may be appropriate, these generally do not require any traffic interruption.
• PL2: Significant damage to some structural elements has occurred but large mar-
gin against partial or global collapse still remains. Although the damaged struc-
ture is not at imminent collapse risk, it would be prudent to implement structural
repairs. This may require traffic interruptions or the installation of temporary
bracing systems. The overall risk of life-threatening injury as a result of structural
damage is expected to be low.
• PL3: Severe damage to some structural elements has occurred but some margin
against either partial or global collapse still remains. The structure may be tech-
nically repairable but costs would be very high and the closure of the bridge for
a long time is inevitable. Injuries may occur during the earthquake; however, the
overall risk of life-threatening injury as a result of structural damage is expected
to be low.
• PL4: The structure continues to support gravity loads but retains no margin
against collapse. Extensive structural damage has occurred that potentially im-
plies significant degradation in the stiffness and strength of the lateral-force re-
sisting system and large permanent lateral deformations. Aftershock could induce
structural collapse. Significant risk of injury exists and the structure may not be
technically repairable.
According to Cardone [2014], the deformation limit states for each of the bridge compo-
nents (see Table 3.5) are consistent with each other: it is assumed that one component
reaching a given damage state corresponds to the equivalent performance level of the
bridge system. This is further explained in the following:
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Piers:
Damage states for piers depend on the expected collapse mechanism: either ductile
collapse mechanism due to the formation of plastic hinges, or brittle shear failure. In
the case of flexural failure, the pier top yield and ultimate displacements, respectively
dy and du, can be estimated by assuming an elastic perfectly plastic moment-curvature
relationship. If shear failure is possible, the displacement dsh is set to correspond to
the intersection between the flexural behaviour of the pier and its shear strength (see
Figure 3.12).
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Figure 3.12: Possible failure modes for piers and corresponding limit values, according
to Cardone [2014].
Abutments:
The emphasis is put here on the longitudinal response of seat-type abutments on piles,
which represent a typical abutment type in Italian bridges. The behaviour of the abut-
ment depends on the gap between the deck extremity and the abutment back-wall. Until
the gap is closed, the deck’s inertia forces are mainly soliciting the bearings. After gap
closure, the deck is in direct contact with the abutment back-wall and can mobilize the
passive backfill pressure. Therefore the following damage states can be defined for the
deck-abutment subsystem:
• DS1: deck longitudinal displacement is equal to dgap (gap width, usually ranging
from 20 to 50 mm in Italian highway bridges), which corresponds to joint closure.
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• DS2: deck longitudinal displacement is equal to dy,ab, which corresponds to the
attainment of the passive resistance of the backfill soil. Typical values of dy,ab
range from 80 to 120 mm.
• DS3: deck longitudinal displacement is equal to dy,ab + 2/3(du,ab − dy,ab), where
du,ab corresponds to the ultimate displacement of the abutment-backfill system.
Experimental studies by Stewart et al. [2007] propose du,ab = dgap+0.10hw, where
hw is the back-wall height.
• DS4: deck longitudinal displacement is equal to du,ab.
Shear keys:
Shear keys located at the abutments of bridges are generally designed to provide trans-
verse restraint to the deck during service load and moderate earthquakes. In the case of
strong earthquakes, shear keys are designed as sacrificial elements to protect abutment
walls and piles from damage. This implies that the shear keys should break off before
damage occurs in piles and abutment walls. Two damage states are proposed:
• DS1: deck displacement in the transverse direction is equal to dgap,t, corresponding
to joint closure.
• DS3: deck displacement in the transverse direction is equal to du,sk, correspond-
ing to shear key failure, either by sliding shear mechanism or by strut-and-tie
mechanism.
Fixed bearings:
Fixed bearings that are based on steel hinges or dowel steel bars experience an elastic
behaviour until collapse, which is characterized by either attainment of shear strength
or premature failure of anchor bolts:
• DS2: displacement is equal to dfix (ratio between shear strength and elastic
stiffness), corresponding to the collapse of the device or of the anchor bolts.
• DS3: displacement is equal to dfix + 2/3(duns − dfix), where duns is the displace-
ment corresponding to deck unseating from pier cap or lintels.
Chapter 3. Bridge failure modes and their functional consequences 62
• DS4: displacement is equal to duns.
Pendulum, sliding or roller bearings:
The cyclic behaviour of these bearings is governed by the frictional resistance between
sliding/rolling surfaces. These types of bearings are not designed to absorb seismic
displacements and their displacement capacity is generally quite low. Sometimes, sliding
and roller bearings present a stopper, after reaching their displacement capacity, to
prevent deck unseating. On the other hand, pendulum bearings may be subjected to
vertical instability. The following damage states are then proposed for sliding and roller
bearings:
• DS1: displacement is equal to dmax, corresponding to the displacement capacity
of the bearing under non-seismic conditions (traffic loads, temperature changes,
shrinkage, creep, impact forces, etc.).
• DS2: displacement is equal to dmax + 1/3(duns − dmax), where duns is the dis-
placement corresponding to deck unseating from pier cap or lintels.
• DS3: displacement is equal to dmax + 2/3(duns − dmax), where duns is the dis-
placement corresponding to deck unseating from pier cap or lintels.
• DS4: displacement is equal to duns.
For pendulum bearings, the proposed damage states are:
• DS1: displacement is equal to dmax, corresponding to the displacement capacity
of the bearing under non-seismic conditions (traffic loads, temperature changes,
shrinkage, creep, impact forces, etc.).
• DS2: displacement is equal to dlim, where dlim is the horizontal displacement
corresponding to vertical instability (e.g. 50 − 60% of the effective height of the
pendulum).
• DS3: displacement is equal to dlim + 1/3(duns− dlim), where duns is the displace-
ment corresponding to deck unseating from pier cap or lintels.
• DS4: displacement is equal to duns.
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Neoprene pads:
Neoprene bearings exhibit a visco-elastic behaviour and can experience different failure
mechanisms: rubber shear failure for bolted neoprene pads; slipping between neoprene
and concrete surfaces, and roll-over mechanism for unbolted neoprene pads.
Bolted neoprene pads exhibit a linear visco-elastic behaviour up to shear strains of the
order of 200 − 300%, usually. Therefore, the proposed limit states are expressed as a
function of the shear strain amplitude of rubber.
Unbolted neoprene pads with small rubber thickness and/or low load pressure usually
experience a slipping failure mechanism. Beside large residual displacements, slipping
can also produce damage to bearings, through tearing of rubber, distortion of steel
reinforcement and heating generated by sliding. A linear visco-elastic behaviour followed
by a pure friction behaviour is expected for such a mechanism. Therefore the proposed
limit states are the following:
• DS1: displacement is equal to dfr, corresponding to the attainment of the friction
resistance.
• DS2: displacement is equal to dfr+1/3(dpad−dfr) where dpad is the pad dimension
in the motion direction.
• DS3: displacement is equal to dpad.
• DS4: displacement is equal to duns.
The roll-over mechanism may occur with unbolted neoprene pads with large rubber
thickness and/or high load pressure: the free edges of the bearing rotate and the origi-
nally vertical surfaces of each side come in contact with horizontal surfaces at both top
and bottom. Then, horizontal displacement beyond this point can only be achieved by
slipping. It is assumed that the peak horizontal force associated with a roll-over mecha-
nism is attained for a displacement of the order of dpad/2. Therefore the proposed limit
states are the following:
• DS1: displacement is equal to dpad/3.
• DS2: displacement is equal to dpad/2.
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• DS3: displacement is equal to dpad.
• DS4: displacement is equal to duns.
Table 3.5: Proposed global limit states for bridges and corresponding component
damage states, from Cardone [2014].
Component Failure mode DS1 DS2
Piers Flexural dy dy + 1/2(du − dy)
Shear - -
Abutment dgap,l dy,ab
Shear keys dgap,t -
Fixed bearings - dfix
Steel pendulum dmax dlim
Sliding bearings dmax dmax + 1/3(duns − dmax)
Neoprene (unbolted) Friction/slipping dfr dfr + 1/3(dpad − dfr)
Roll-over dpad/3 dpad/2
Neoprene (bolted) dγ=150% dγ=200%
Component Failure mode DS3 DS4
Piers Flexural dy + 2/3(du − dy) du
Shear dsh 1.1dsh
Abutment dy,ab + 2/3(du,ab − dy,ab) du,abs
Shear keys du,sk -
Fixed bearings dfix + 2/3(duns − dfix) duns
Steel pendulum dlim + 1/3(duns − dlim) duns
Sliding bearings dmax + 2/3(duns − dmax) duns
Neoprene (unbolted) Friction/slipping dpad duns
Roll-over dpad duns
Neoprene (bolted) dγ=300% duns
3.3.2 Component Failure Modes from Ground Failures
Information on the failure of bridges due to ground failures is rather scarce: most bridge
piers are designed with deep footings and foundations, which prevents the immediate
failure of piers due to shallow ground deformations.
However, in the case of deep landslides or slope failures that generate ground displace-
ment below the depth of the pier footing, it is then possible to witness significant differen-
tial displacements at the deck level. One famous example is the Peace River suspension
bridge in Canada, which collapsed in 1957 due to a deep landslide that occurred beneath
the bridge abutment, at the level of the shale bedrock.
A more common failure mode involves the bridge abutment: when the backfill soil behind
the abutment has not been well compacted during the construction phase, earthquake
shaking can induce substantial differential settlements and pavement damage on the
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approach to the abutment. However, abutment backfill subsidence does not result in
very extensive damage. This phenomenon is known as the highway ‘bump’ [Helwany
et al., 2007, Puppala et al., 2009] and is mainly due to the difference in foundation
quality between the abutment and the approach slab, with the bridge system usually
experiencing considerably less vertical settlement than the adjacent pavement. Werner
et al. [2006] propose a damage scale based on the extent of approach-fill settlement in
inches:
• No damage: settlement < 1 inch, no repairs needed.
• Slight damage: settlement between 1 and 6 inches, repair consists of mud jacking
(coring holes and pumping in grout) and then ramping up.
• Moderate damage: settlement > 6 inches, temporary repairs involve building
up a ramp, and permanent repairs can be done during off hours (assuming only
small-moderate settlement and no fault rupture).
Another common damage mode is the impact of debris that may have been generated
by an upstream landslide, with the potential to damage the piers and the deck or to
obstruct the water channel. On the other hand, several examples of earthquake-induced
liquefaction leading to bridge damage have been mentioned by Dickenson et al. [2002]
and Bartlett [2014], such as the 1964 Alaska, 1964 Niigata, 1989 Loma Prieta, 1991
Costa Rica or 1995 Kobe earthquakes: most of the identified failure modes consist in
the deformation of bridge embankments or the settlement or tilting of pile foundations,
potentially leading to deck unseating in bridges with shallow foundations. The review
by Bird and Bommer [2004] of the effect of earthquake-induced ground failures has
described two main damage mechanisms: lateral spreading resulting to the failure of
slopes or free face (e.g. at bridge abutments) or the vertical settlement of approach
embankments. Finally, Dickenson et al. [2002] come up with the same conclusions (i.e.
lateral spread on slopes and ground settlement at bridge approaches), even though some
pile failure modes are also mentioned (e.g. buckling, plastic hinge or excessive rotation).
3.3.3 Component Failure Modes from Floods
This section reviews some of the recent studies that describe damage states and limit
values for various bridge components exposed to flood hazard.
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3.3.3.1 HAZUS Technical Manual for Floods FEMA [2005]
According to the HAZUS Flood Model [FEMA, 2005], bridges are not considered as
highly vulnerable to inundation mechanisms. However, pier foundations can be strongly
affected by erosion or scour and the bridge deck is also susceptible to be dislodged by
the hydraulic pressure. Therefore the following failure modes can be considered:
• Scour on pier / abutment foundations: the impact on the overall bridge stability
may be different whether the deck is simply supported or continuous. Most bridge
failures occur with simple spans, therefore HAZUS recommends that the expected
damage for continuous span bridges should be taken to be 25% of that for simple
span bridges.
• Overtopping and hydraulic pressure applied on deck.
Scour vulnerability grades are defined for bridges from excellent to critical conditions,
which depend on the current state of the foundations, the scour level or the existence of
scour countermeasures [Pearson et al., 2002].
3.3.3.2 American Lifeline Alliance Report [ALA, 2005]
The American Lifeline Alliance report [ALA, 2005] on local road systems is based on the
analysis of several case-studies. This has led to the identification of some of the most
common failures modes for roadway bridges:
• Local scour at piers and abutments with and without permanent structural dam-
age;
• Downcutting of streambeds, which may affect bridge abutments/piers and under-
cut culvert inlets and outlets;
• Washout of gravel low-water crossings;
• Deposition of bed load that restricts the hydraulic capacity of crossings;
• Debris accumulation that may contribute to backup of water and damage to ad-
jacent properties;
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• Shifting of bridge decks due to pressure of rising floodwaters;
• Shifting or migration of waterway channel alignment.
However, some of these damage mechanisms are mostly applicable to minor roads with
low clearance crossings, and they are not really consistent with highway bridges, which
are the main focus of this study.
3.3.3.3 Study by Lin [2012]
Lin [2012] has identified four main types of bridge failure modes due to scour:
• Vertical failure: it is mainly due to inadequate vertical bearing capacity of the soil
and it can manifest through four different failure modes:
– Undermining of footing base;
– Penetration of friction pile;
– Undermining of pile tip;
– Buckling of pile.
• Lateral failure: it is due to the reduction of the lateral restraints of pier founda-
tions, which may lead to three different failure modes:
– Pushover failures of piers: significant scour depths reduce the lateral resis-
tance capacity of the soil and the pier, which alters the pushover capacity of
the bridge, while lateral loads due to water flow and accumulation of debris
tend to increase;
– Structural hinging of piles: it occurs when the transverse loads applied to the
piers trigged excessive bending moments at the base of the piers;
– Kick-out failures of foundations: if the scour excavates most of the depth of
the pier foundations, the lateral loads may dislodge the foundations from the
remaining soil cover. This failure mode is especially frequent in the case of
shallow foundations.
• Torsional failure: it may occur when skewed flows (i.e. flows with an angle of
attack) produce eccentric loads and lead to torsional deformation of piers and
piles;
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• Bridge deck failure: it occurs when the flow height reaches the deck level and
washes out the deck (i.e. overtopping), especially in the case of simply-supported
deck spans. It could be argued that this failure mode is more generic to fluvial
flood and not limited to scour failure.
A summary of the different failure modes observed over 36 case-study bridges in New
Zealand, United States and Canada is detailed in Table 3.6 [Lin, 2012].
Table 3.6: Review of failure modes of 36 scour failures, from Lin [2012].
Failure modes Number Percentage
Vertical failure 11 30%
Buckling 2 5 %
Not identified 9 25 %
Vertical failure 14 39%
Structural hinge 5 14 %
Pushover failure 4 11 %
Not identified 5 14 %
Torsional failure 1 3%
Bridge deck failure 1 3%
Others 5 14%
Not identified 4 11%
Total 36 100%
3.3.3.4 Railway Bridge Failure during Flood in the UK and Ireland [Benn,
2012]
The study by Benn [2012] compiles historical events of railway bridge failures due to
scour: 69 events have been recorded between 1845 and 2012 and they are summarized
in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Failure classification of 69 water-related failures to railway structures, from
Benn [2012].
Failure modes Number Percentage
Pier scour 23 34%
Abutment scour 14 20%
Floating debris 10 14%
Other debris 10 14%
Embankment scour 8 12%
Channel modification (e.g. dredging) 4 6%
Total 69 100%
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3.3.4 Summary of Component Failure Modes
The previous sections have identified a wide range of potential failure modes for all bridge
components and hazard types. Even though various studies propose different limit state
values and different engineering demand parameters, the qualitative description of the
damage states or failure modes is mostly comparable between the literature references
that have been considered. Therefore the component failure modes that have been
described above may be summarized and organised in Table 3.8, for all hazard types.
Table 3.8: Summary of the component failure modes identified for bridges.
ID Component Sub-type Failure mode Damage Description
‘Severity’
Earthquake hazard
1 Pier - Bending DS1 - Minor cracking/spalling
- Yielding
DS2 - Cracking/spalling
(still structurally sound)
DS3 - Column degrading without
collapse (structurally unsafe)
DS4 - Column collapsing
- Reinforcement buckling
2 Pier - Shear DS3 - Brittle shear failure
3 Pier - Tilting DS4 - Tilting of substructure
due to foundation failure
4 Abutment - Piles DS1 - Minor cracking/spalling
DS2 - First yielding point
DS3 - Ultimate deformation
- Vertical offset
5 Abutment - Backfill DS1 - Gap closure
DS2 - Passive resistance of
backfill soil is reached
DS4 - Ultimate displacement
of the backfill system
6 Shear keys - Transverse DS1 - Gap closure
loading - Minor cracks
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Table 3.8: (continued)
ID Component Sub-type Failure mode Damage Description
‘Severity’
DS2 - Extensive cracking/spalling
DS3 - Failure
DS4 - Deck unseating
7 Bearing Fixed - DS2 - Shear strength reached
DS4 - Deck unseating
8 Bearing Steel - DS1 - Bearing capacity under
pendulum non-seismic conditions
DS2 - Vertical instability
DS4 - Deck unseating
9 Bearing Sliding/ - DS1 - Bearing capacity under
roller non-seismic conditions
DS4 - Deck unseating
10 Bearing Bolted - DS1 - 150% of rubber
neoprene shear strain amplitude
DS2 - 200% of rubber
shear strain amplitude
DS3 - 300% of rubber
shear strain amplitude
DS4 - Deck unseating
11 Bearing Unbolted Friction/ DS1 - Friction resistance
neoprene slipping is reached
DS3 - Pad dimensions
are reached
DS4 - Deck unseating
12 Bearing Unbolted Rollover DS1 - 1/3 of pad dimensions
neoprene are reached
DS2 - 1/2 of pad dimensions
are reached
DS3 - Pad dimensions
are reached
DS4 - Deck unseating
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Table 3.8: (continued)
ID Component Sub-type Failure mode Damage Description
‘Severity’
13 Bearing Elastomeric - DS1 - Noticeable deformation
w/ dowels DS2 - Possible deck realignment
and dowel fracture
DS3 - Girder retention and
deck realignment
DS4 - Deck unseating
14 Deck - - DS1 - Minor cracking
- Curvature limits reached
DS4 - Deck collapse
Ground failure hazard
15 Foundations - Slope - - Differential displacements
failure leading to deck collapse
16 Abutment - Subsidence/ - - Settlement of soil under
approach settlement approach embankment
Flood hazard
17 Pier - Local - - Scour depth (below/
foundations scour within/above footing)
18 Pier - Streambed - - Piers are affected
foundations downcutting - Culverts are undercut
19 Abutment - Local - - Scour depth (below/
foundations scour within/above footing)
20 Abutment - Streambed - - Abutments are affected
foundations downcutting - Culverts are undercut
21 Deck - Overtopping - - Shifting of deck due
to hydraulic pressure
22 Waterway - Debris - - Reduction of flow capacity
accumulation - Backup of water flow
23 Waterway - Channel - - Shifting/migration of
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Table 3.8: (continued)
ID Component Sub-type Failure mode Damage Description
‘Severity’
modification waterway channel alignment
In Table 3.8, the field describing the damage ‘severity’ represents the global damage state
(i.e. at the level of the bridge system) that is usually considered to be reached when the
given component is damaged through the mentioned failure mode. This classification
directly results from the analysis of the qualitative damage scales that have been defined
for bridges in the literature. It appears that this information is mostly available for
failure modes that are related to seismic hazard, while the current state of the art
does not provide well-defined damage scales for ground failures or floods. Therefore
it is necessary to harmonize the component damage states by considering functional
consequences at the level of the bridge system. This step should lead to:
• the verification of the consistency of the seismic damage scale, by identifying com-
ponent damage states that may induce disproportionate functional consequences;
• the definition of system failure modes for ground failures and floods, which may
be use to create a consistent damage scale for these hazards.
3.4 Quantification of Functional Consequences
Once the physical damage states are defined and estimated through the application of
fragility function curves, they need to be translated into functionality measures in order
to properly estimate the effect of the damaged network elements on the global system
performance, through the use of elaborate traffic models.
3.4.1 Loss Metrics
Functionality measures have to be useful for the subsequent network analysis, depend-
ing on the various global metrics that are studied, such as the amount of traffic, the
additional delay, the travel distance between two locations or the possibility to conduct
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emergency operations (e.g. Modaressi et al. [2014]). To this end, the following loss
metrics are proposed to characterize the functional state of a given network element:
• Functional Loss (FL): loss of functionality induced by the damage to the ele-
ment. It can have various effects on the normal operation conditions: reduction
of the speed limit, closure of a proportion of lanes, reduction of the vertical load
capacity. Speed limit and number of lanes are key parameters to estimate the
flow capacity of a road section, which is an essential component of network anal-
ysis models. Finally, the reduction in load capacity can provide indications on
the type of traffic that will be allowed through the road section (e.g. personal
cars, trucks, emergency vehicles, etc.). These specific functionality measures are
commonly used to quantify the flow capacity of a road segment in traffic analyses
[Zhou and Taylor, 2014], and they present the merit of enabling the computation
of both connectivity- or capacity-based performance indicators [Argyroudis et al.,
2015].
• Duration of intervention (Du): the duration of the repair operations until the
element is functional again.
• Cost of intervention (Co): the cost of the repair operations, generally expressed
as a percentage of the replacement cost.
• Functional Loss during Intervention (FLI): the additional functional loss
that is induced by the repair operations.
These four loss metrics will serve different purposes, namely (i) the quantification of
the direct costs thanks to Co, (ii) the quantification of indirect costs (i.e. consequences
of traffic disruption) thanks to FL and Du, and (iii) the elaboration of time-dependent
restoration strategies thanks to FL, Du and FLI.
3.4.2 Expert-based Survey
In order to efficiently quantify these loss metrics, it is necessary to consider the physical
damage states at the component level, since it has been seen that each component type
has very specific failure mechanisms when exposed to different hazard types. Therefore
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it is proposed to associate these loss metrics to each of the component failure modes
summarized in Table 3.8.
To this end, it is proposed to build these loss metrics by using expert judgement. This
decision is motivated by the lack of available empirical data in literature for infrastruc-
ture failure events, especially in the European context. Moreover, detailed accounts of
failures are required, since the objective is to quantify the consequences of damaged
components and not only the global state of the bridge: a thorough survey of past
events has revealed that only extreme events (e.g. collapsed bridges) are accurately doc-
umented, while less severe events that may lead to modest traffic disruption do not get
recorded [Middleton and Imhof, 2009]. Therefore these reasons have led to the adoption
of an expert elicitation effort, due to its ability to produce information when empirical
information is lacking.
Expert elicitation procedures have been the object of rigorous methodological devel-
opments throughout the last decade [Aspinall, 2006, 2010]: Cooke’s rational method
[Cooke, 1991] has been proven to be an efficient and mathematically sound way to
reconcile apparently disparate experts’ recommendations. It is based on the following
steps:
1. All experts are invited to provide a best estimate and a credible interval (i.e.
5%-95% confidence bounds).
2. Seed questions are designed in order to rate the ‘quality’ of the experts. Two
objective metrics can be defined: (i) calibration score, representing statistical ac-
curacy; and (ii) information score, which represents the extent of the proposed
interval compared to a reference uniform distribution.
3. Based on the experts’ score, a weighting is applied to the various results.
4. The different intervals proposed by the experts are pooled (i.e. weighted average)
in order to build a reconciled distribution of the variable that is investigated.
The main merit of Cooke’s method resides in the integration of the uncertainties that are
generated by the various experts’ contributions, instead of reaching a poentially biased
consensus. However great care should be taken when selecting the experts and assessing
their contributions, which should be achieved by the seed questions.
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Therefore a survey form has been sent to infrastructure managers and experts within
the INFRARISK consortium, with the objective to quantify the four loss metrics that
correspond to each component failure mode (see Appendix C. Three groups of experts
have provided answers to the survey:
• Group 1 (three people). Five years of engineering experience on geotechnical works
on transport networks, both design and contractual. Furthermore, relevant liter-
ature was consulted: Zezere et al. [2008], Klose [2015], Transport Research Board
guidelines, etc.
• Group 2 (around a demi-dozen of people). Experts from various fields were
solicited: geotechnical engineering, linear infrastructure, materials (pavements),
structures (bridges), underground construction. They work in technical depart-
ments providing support to construction sites worldwide, from Australia or Chile
to Canada, the United States or the United Kingdom. The range of experience
of the different persons varies from a minimum of ten years to probably thirty or
more.
• Group 3 (two people). About twenty years of experience in inspection, assessment
and maintenance of infrastructure elements. Replies were solely based on own
experience and expert judgement, without the use of any documentation or specific
case studies assessed.
All groups of experts pointed out the difficulty to provide accurate answers for ‘generic
cases’, since the loss metrics may vary greatly depending on the type of bridge (e.g.
size, importance in the network, construction method, etc.). Another issue lies in the
harmonization of the answers within each group, some proposed values varying greatly
between the experts. Therefore all the answers are provided in the form of lower and
upper bounds, in order to account for epistemic uncertainties. The results of the func-
tionality loss assessment survey are summarized in Appendix D.
However, unlike what is recommended in Cooke’s method, no seed questions have been
submitted to the experts, thus preventing the use of weights in the answers. Unfortu-
nately, this strong limitation is imposed by the modest amount of experts that have
taken part in the study. An alternative approach could have consisted in weighting the
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answers based on the experience and the size of each group, however the limited number
of answers could not justify such a refinement. An extended group of experts could not
be mobilised due to the difficulty to find experts whose knowledge spans all hazard types
and the necessity to keep these developments within the project’s consortium.
3.4.3 Derivation of Probabilistic Functionality Models
The intervals of functionality loss values proposed by the different groups of experts are
reconciled by building a probabilistic functionality model for each type of loss metric. An
empirical cumulative distribution function can be assembled for each component damage
state, as shown in Figure 3.13, using equal weights. This construction corresponds to
the ‘pooling’ step that has been mentioned in Cooke’s method.
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Figure 3.13: Construction of a probabilistic functionality model based on the expert-
based survey, by assigning an equal weight to all experts’ answers.
As illustrated in the hypothetical example in Figure 3.13, the pooling step may be
summarised through the following steps:
• Three experts A, B and C propose an interval for the functionality loss induced
by the occurrence of damage state DSi to a given component.
• An empirical cumulative distribution function of the functionality loss is built by
averaging the intervals provided by the experts and by converting them into a
cumulative distribution function.
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• For a given damage state DSi, the induced functionality loss can then be obtained
by sampling a standard uniform variable and reading the corresponding value on
the X-axis of the curve.
These probabilistic functionality models can then be used to sample the functional losses
that are induced by a given failure mode at the component level. However, the tables in
Appendix D reveal that most of these failure modes can only be associated with one or
two values, which is not sufficient to get a profile of the cumulative distribution function
of losses with good resolution (i.e. most of the component-level functionality loss curves
would be step functions, if plotted).
Therefore, for illustration purposes, it is proposed to build the probabilistic functionality
loss models at the scale of the global damage states due to seismic risk. As explained
in the previous section, most system-level damage scales for seismic risk are defined
so that they are consistent across the various component damage states, e.g. a global
damage state DS1 (i.e. slight or minor damage) is reached if at least one of the bridge
components is in damage state DS1 (e.g. yielding of pier reinforcement, gap closure
at bearings or abutments, etc.). The component failure modes in Table 3.8 follow the
same logic in the way the damage states are enumerated from DS1 to DS4. Therefore,
for a given global damage state, all corresponding component-level functionality loss
metrics are assembled as shown in Figure 3.13. Hence, this assumption enables to build
functionality models for global damage states DS1 to DS4, for each of the functionality
loss metrics.
The choice to build functionality loss curves for global damage states (and not for com-
ponent failure modes) is motivated by several points:
• More data on loss metrics are available, since all the component failure modes
that are included in the given global damage state are considered. Therefore the
functionality loss curves may be derived with a higher resolution.
• These global functionality loss models are more easily comparable to some of the
loss values that are provided in the literature, since they are all based on global
damage states.
• The derived functionality loss models may be used to check the consistency of
the corresponding damage scale: a high dispersion in the cumulative distribution
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function would imply that the global damage states are poorly constrained, thus
demonstrating the necessity to work at the level of component failure modes in
order to refine the functionality analysis.
The corresponding probabilistic functionality loss curves for seismic risk are presented
in Figures 3.14 to 3.19.
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Figure 3.14: Duration of repair operations given seismic global damage states DS1
to DS4.
Except in the case of the repair duration and cost metrics, most of the functionality loss
models are very coarse and some of them are even not computable (i.e. FLI for DS3 and
DS4). This is due to the lack of sufficiently constrained data that have been gathered
from the expert-based survey. Therefore these curves should be seen as a first attempt
at developing the concept of functionality loss curves, while additional data should be
used to better constrain the proposed models.
While comparing the functionality loss curves across damage states, it can also be ob-
served that there is no clear difference between some damage states. For instance, the
downtime durations due to DS3 and DS4 are almost identical, or the functional loss
expressed in lane closure due to DS2 may be more severe than the one due to DS3.
This exemplifies the limitations of the use of global damage states and global fragility
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Figure 3.15: Functional loss (expressed in proportion of closed lanes) given seismic
global damage states DS1 to DS4.
functions. While damage states may be structurally consistent between components,
their respective failure or damage mechanisms may induce a wide range of functional
consequences that do not necessarily remain consistent at the system level.
Finally, it should be noted that the functional loss models present some inconsistencies.
When the bridge has reached damage states DS3 or DS4 (i.e. extensive damage or
collapse), the speed reduction model in Figure 3.16 only shows a reduction of around
20%-25%, while the proportion of closed lanes is 100% according to Figure 3.15 (i.e.
total closure of the bridge). Therefore some care should be taken when interpreting
the proposed functionality models. The proportion of closed lanes appears to be the
primary functional loss metric to considered, while the speed reduction may be seen
as a secondary measure that can be used to update the speed limit of the remaining
lanes. As a consequence, the influence of the speed reduction model is more significant
for lighter damage states (i.e. DS1 and DS2) that do no require the closure of most
lanes. One may also wonder whether the correlation between functional loss and repair
duration is not lost when the component failure modes are directly agggegated into
global damage states. In their present form, the functionality loss models may sample
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Figure 3.16: Functional loss (expressed in speed reduction) given seismic global dam-
age states DS1 to DS4.
high functional losses with short repair times, which are not necessarily consistent with
the initial outcomces of the expert-based survey.
Due to the aforementioned reasons, it is shown that the derived functionality loss mod-
els, which are based on global damage states, are neither accurate nor useful for a
performance assessment of the road network. Therefore it is recommended to consider
functionality losses for component-level events and to assess their joint probabilities of
occurrence at the level of the bridge system, as it will demonstrated in Chapter 5.
3.4.4 Comparison with existing models
Even though the shortcomings of the previously-derived functionality loss curves have
already been demostrated, it remains interesting to compare them with some function-
ality scales that are found in existing loss models. To this end, a literature review is
conducted in order to extract functional loss values or downtime durations from past
case-studies. In the case of bridges subjected to seismic risk, the following references
provide information on the induced losses:
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Figure 3.17: Functional loss during intervention (expressed in proportion of closed
lanes) given seismic global damage states DS1 to DS4.
• Werner et al. [2006] propose values of traffic capacity, repair costs and durations
for three damage states of bridge approach fill (i.e. three levels of soil subsidence),
as summarized in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9: Functionality and repair model for damages to bridge approach fill, from
Werner et al. [2006].
Damage state Traffic capacity Repair cost Repair duration
D1 – settlement ≤ 1 inch 100% 0% −
D2 – settlement ≤ 6 inch 0% 12% 1 day
D3 – settlement > 6 inch 0% 55% 4 days
• In the framework of the SYNER-G project, the work from Argyroudis and Kaynia
[2014] based on REDARS approach [Werner et al., 2006] provides functional losses
in terms of lane closure for four global damage states at the system level, as
summarised in Table 3.10.
• In the HAZUS recommendations [FEMA, 2003], restoration curves for highway
bridges are proposed in order to show the evolution of functionality with time.
However, the present approach, which is based on probabilistic functionality curves,
is not compatible with deterministic restoration curves. Still, the HAZUS curves
can provide two useful data points, which are summarised in Table 3.11:
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Figure 3.18: Functional loss during intervention (expressed in speed reduction) given
seismic global damage states DS1 to DS4. No values are available for DS3 and DS4.
Table 3.10: Functionality levels for bridge systems, from Argyroudis and Kaynia
[2014].
Damage state Functional loss
D1 open
D2 partially open
D3 closed
D4 closed
– the remaining capacity immediately after the event gives the functional loss;
– the moment when the capacity is fully restored again gives the repair duration.
Table 3.11: Functionality and repair model for highway bridges, adapted from HAZUS
[FEMA, 2003].
Damage state Functional loss Repair duration Repair cost
D1 25% 1 day 1%− 3%
D2 70% 7 days 2%− 15%
D3 95% 130 days 10%− 40%
D4 100% 370 days 30%− 100%
These few data points from the considered literature references enable ‘literature-based’
functionality models to be built, by using the same technique as in Figure 3.13. Finally,
a direct comparison can be made between the expert-based functionality models and
the literature references (see Figures 3.20 to 3.23).
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Figure 3.19: Cost of repair operations given seismic global damage states DS1 to
DS4.
The insufficient number of data points and the coarseness of some of the functional
models (e.g. step functions) make it very difficult to draw definite conclusions on the
relevance of the proposed functional models. Still, most of the loss metrics are within the
same range as the literature-based values, especially the cost model for global damage
states in Figure 3.23. However, the repair duration model for global damage states in
Figure 3.21 does not seem to be consistent with the values that have been extracted from
the HAZUS restoration curves: the downtime duration appears to be overestimated
for low damage states (DS1 and DS2) and underestimated for heavier damage (DS3
and DS4). This is partly due to the fact that the proposed duration model does not
evolve much from DS1 to DS4, the values being stuck around 20-50 days. Globally, it
appears that the proposed models tend to underestimate the losses for heavier damage
states. This may constitute a limitation of the proposed approach, which is based on
the individual component failure modes: the extensive damage or the global collapse of
a bridge usually involves multiple components that are in a joint failed state, while the
proposed approach considers that only one component may be damaged, thus leading
to reduced losses or restoration times.
Chapter 3. Bridge failure modes and their functional consequences 84
0 20 40 60
0
0.5
1
Du [days]
F(
Du
)
 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.5
1
FL [speed reduction in %]
F(
FL
)
0 10 20 30
0
0.5
1
Co [% of replacement cost]
F(
Co
)
Proposed model
Werner et al. (2006)
Figure 3.20: Comparison of the functionality models for subsidence of bridge approach
fill (failure mode #16-DS1).
3.5 Conclusion
A general presentation of the most common structural components of bridges has led to
the inventory of typical damage states for the identified components. These component
damage states are based on potential failure modes that are specific to the type of
hazard loading and the type of component. Table 3.8 has been assembled to summarise
the component failure modes for earthquakes, ground failures and floods. A total of 23
failure modes, each having two or more damage states (i.e. 49 damage states in total),
are described for 10 bridge components.
Since these component damage states are not always easily reconciled in terms of damage
‘severity’, functionality loss metrics are introduced in order to quantify their impact on
the bridge system. To this end, the results of the expert-based survey have led to the
development of probabilistic loss models at the component level. In the case of seismic
hazard, the aggregation of functionality losses according to conventional damage scales
has led to poorly constrained loss models, thus demonstrating the inaccuracy of global
damage states at the system level. Moreover, the loss models proposed here should be
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Figure 3.21: Comparison of the repair duration models for global damage states to
bridges.
adopted with caution, due to the relatively small amount of data that has been gathered:
further involvement of infrastructure managers is necessary to refine these models.
The identification of all component damage states constitutes the first step of the pro-
posed method, while the probability of occurrence of theses damage events must then be
quantified for the different hazard types. The derivation of theses component fragility
curves will be the object of the next Chapter.
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Figure 3.22: Comparison of the functional loss models for global damage states to
bridges.
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Figure 3.23: Comparison of the cost models for global damage states to bridges.
Chapter 4
Derivation of Hazard-specific
Component Fragility Curves
4.1 Introduction
The vulnerability or the susceptibility of transport infrastructure elements to extreme
loading scenarios, such as natural hazard events, can be quantified through fragility
curves, which have become a popular tool, particularly in seismic risk analyses. These
probabilistic tools may be applied to other hazard types such as ground failures or
floods. Since a given infrastructure element usually comprises a wide range of structural
or non-structural components, the same damage mechanism or engineering demand pa-
rameter usually cannot be applied to all components. The same rationale can also be
developed for the different hazard types, which generate various types of loadings on
each component. As a result, the component- and hazard-specific damage mechanisms
that have been identified in Chapter 3 need to be associated with a set of component
fragility functions, as shown in Figure 4.1.
The derivation of hazard-specific component fragility curves is demonstrated through
a single bridge model, which is fully detailed in Section 4.2. A given bridge system
is selected as the test-structure for the application of all fragility derivation methods.
First, fragility curves for earthquake-induced damage are derived in Section 4.3, where
non-linear dynamic analyses are performed on the finite element model of the bridge.
87
Chapter 4. Derivation of hazard-specific component fragility curves 88
Figure 4.1: Decomposition of a bridge system into component types and related haz-
ards. For each couple of hazard loadings and components, potential damage mechanism
are identified and corresponding fragility curves are derived.
Fragility curves for ground failure are then presented in Section 4.4, where the proba-
bility of reaching circular slope failure at the abutments is quantified through the limit
equilibrium approach. Available fragility curves for the subsidence of backfill soil are
also discussed. Then, Section 4.5 details the adopted procedure for the derivation of
fragility curves for flood-induced scour, while also existing models for deck unseating
due to hydraulic pressure are considered. While the latter sections address the fragility
assessment for various single hazard, Section 4.6 will consider potential cases of multi-
risk interactions, which lead to the derivation of damage-dependent fragility functions.
Finally, in the case of seismic hazard, Section 4.7 investigates the accuracy of simpli-
fied assessment methods such as DDBA for the prediction of component-level damage
states, in an attempt to check whether such methods are applicable for a fast fragility
assessment at a larger scale (i.e. road network comprised of dozens of bridges).
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4.2 Proposed Bridge System
The model of a hypothetical yet realistic bridge is developed, assuming as reference for
structural and geometrical properties the archetype bridge already studied by Nielson
[2005]. It is a multi-span simply-supported concrete (MSSSC) bridge composed of two
seat-type abutments and two piers with three cylindrical reinforced concrete columns.
Deck displacement is restrained by elastomeric bearings (i.e. alternation of expansion
and fixed devices) in the longitudinal direction. Several additional features have also
been integrated to the original model [Nielson, 2005], in order to account for the effect
of multiple hazards (see Figure 3.1):
• Shear keys have been added at the pier caps in order to model the constraints and
determine the bridge response in the transversal direction.
• At each bridge extremity, an embankment approach is added in order to simulate
the transition between the plain roadway segment and the bridge and to evaluate
the effect of ground failure.
• Foundation elements have been added at the pier footings in order to properly
model the effects of scour.
All other components follow the geometry of the MSSSC bridge described by Nielson
[2005]. The deck consists of three independent spans that are supported by two piers,
which are in turn composed of three RC cylindrical columns. The middle span has a
length of 24.4 m, while end spans are 12.2 m long, thus resulting in a total bridge length
of 48.8 m. The deck comprises a row of eight concrete girders across its width (i.e.
15 m): each of these girders is connected to the pier cap through an elastomeric bearing.
Expansion and fixed bearings are alternating between each row in order to ensure a
proper relative movement of the independent deck spans.
4.3 Fragility Curves for Earthquakes
As stated in the literature review in Chapter 2, a wide range of analytical methods
and levels of analysis are available for the seismic fragility assessment of bridge systems.
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This section is devoted to the definition of the model for seismic analyses. Moreover,
the effect of previous damages due to potential floods is taken into account to derive
damage-dependent fragility curves.
For the purpose of deriving the fragility curves, non-linear dynamic analyses on the
bridge model are carried out with a set of selected records. The various assumptions
that have been adopted for this approach are discussed in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Bridge Model for Seismic Analysis
The seismic inputs are successively applied to the bridge system along the longitudinal
and transversal directions, in order to assess the fragility of the bridge for all axes of
loading. In the longitudinal direction, ten components are considered (i.e. piers P1 and
P2, abutments A1 and A2, fixed and expansion bearings B1 to B6), as well as in the
transversal direction, except that the bearings are then replaced by the shear keys (i.e.
Sh1 to Sh6), as shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Bridge components considered in the seismic analysis. Grey circles rep-
resent fixed bearings, while empty ones are expansion bearings.
The MSSSC bridge has been modelled with the OpenSees platform [McKenna et al.,
2000], using the same dimensions and constitutive models that are provided in Nielson
[2005]. The following classes of elements have been used in OpenSees to model the
various types of components.
4.3.1.1 Modelling of Piers
Beams and columns in the piers are modelled by dispBeamColumn elements, which follow
a displacement-based formulation with a distributed plasticity along the whole length.
The cyclic moment-curvature relation of the pier system (i.e. three columns and one
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transverse beam) for both longitudinal and transversal loadings is represented in Fig-
ure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Moment-curvature cyclic response of piers in both loading directions.
4.3.1.2 Modelling of Bearings
Elastomeric bearings are modelled by ZeroLength spring elements: a parallel assembly
of different constitutive laws is required in order to jointly model the Coulomb friction
behaviour and the shear behaviour of the steel dowel that acts as a restraint. Expansion
and fixed bearings are distinguished by the position of the steel dowel, which allows for
more or less free movement, as shown in Figure 4.4. The weight of the deck has also an
effect on the friction behaviour through the normal reaction, which induces a difference
between the middle span and the end spans.
4.3.1.3 Modelling of Shear Keys
Additional shear keys are also added in order to account for the possibility of transversal
movement of the deck spans. They are modelled according to a sliding friction shear
mechanism. First, the deck slides on the pier cap according to a friction Coulomb law
until the shear key is reached (i.e. gap closure). Then, the capacity of the shear key is
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Figure 4.4: Cyclic response of bearings for all deck spans.
engaged until it ruptures through a shear mechanism. Once the shear key has failed, it is
assumed that the deck keeps on moving freely until unseating. The assumed constitutive
law for the shear keys is represented in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Force-displacement relationships for shear keys located at end and middle
spans. The weight of the deck spans has a significant role on the friction behaviour.
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4.3.1.4 Modelling of Abutments
Abutments are modelled by ZeroLength spring elements: a parallel assembly of differ-
ent constitutive laws is required in order to jointly model the passive behaviour (i.e.
compression of the backfill soil and resistance of the abutment piles) and the active be-
haviour (i.e. only the abutment piles are solicited when the abutment is in tension). This
asymmetry of the initial stiffness and strength between the active and passive behaviour
is highlighted in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Cyclic response of abutments.
4.3.1.5 Modelling of Pier Foundations
Additional pier foundations are also explicitly modelled, unlike the assumption that has
been adopted in the original model. Pier foundations are assumed to be anchored down
to a depth of 8 m: the group of pile foundations, as described by Nielson [2005], is
approximated by an equivalent elastic beam, which is connected to the ground through
a set of Winkler p-y springs in order to model the soil resistance (see Figure 4.7).
A Winkler spring is located every 0.3 m between the altitudes 0 m and −8 m, in order
to model the lateral resistance of the soil, as suggested by Prasad and Banerjee [2013].
Each spring is associated with a p-y curve expressing the soil resistance p at a depth h
as a function of lateral pile deflection y:
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Figure 4.7: Schematic view of the equivalent pile foundations and the Winkler springs.
p (y) = A · pu · tanh
(
k · h·
A · pu · y
)
(4.1)
where A is a modification factor to account for cyclic and static loading (A = 0.9), k is
the initial modulus of subgrade reaction (k = 10 000 kPa), obtained from API [2000].
The ultimate soil resistance pu depends on the depth h, whether the foundations are
deep or shallow:
pu = min [(C1 · h+ C2 ·Dpile) · γ · h ; C3 ·Dpile · γ · h] (4.2)
where C1, C2 and C3 are coefficients that can be determined using the API [2000]
guidelines (C1 = 1.9; C2 = 2.65; C3 = 28), γ is the volumic mass of the soil, and Dpile
is the equivalent diameter of the pile foundations.
Starting from a group of piles, an equivalent single pile has to be defined, as shown in
Figure 4.7. The equivalent bending stiffness EIeq for rocking motion can be computed
according to Yin and Konagai [2001], which enables to access the equivalent diameter
Dpile = 1.1 m. Finally, the p-y curves for the studied bridge model are computed for a
few depths (see Figure 4.8).
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Figure 4.8: Force-deflection relations (p-y curves) for the soil surrounding the pile
foundations, for different depths h.
4.3.1.6 Modelling of Deck
Deck spans are modelled by elasticBeamColumn elements: the deck is usually assumed
to remain in the elastic range, due to its high rigidity with respect to bearings and piers.
The whole deck width can be represented by a single linear element, since the movement
of the deck span is transmitted to the whole width of the pier through rigid elements
(i.e. common assumption).
4.3.2 Dynamic Properties
A modal analysis of the bridge system is performed, which results in a fundamental
period of 0.64 s in the longitudinal direction, while the mode in the transversal direction
is found for a period of 0.47 s: these period are in excellent agreement with the ones that
have been computed by Nielson [2005], thus validating the dynamic properties of the
bridge system in the elastic range. The deformed shapes for these modes are represented
in Figure 4.9.
For validation purposes, the modal analysis has been carried out on the original model
from Nielson [2005], without the addition of shear keys and the explicit modelling of pier
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Figure 4.9: OpenSees finite element model of the MSSSC bridge. The pink lines rep-
resent the deformed shape of the bridge according to the first two vibration modes, thus
allowing to visualize the zero-length springs that represent the bearings and abutments.
foundations. If these two features are added to the finite element model, the first mode
is found at 0.67 s and the second one at 0.49 s: these modal values for the modified
bridge are very close to the ones from the original model, while the slightly less stiff
structure can be explained by the way the pier foundations are now modelled.
4.3.3 Seismic Input
The generation of the ground-motion suite follows the magnitude-distance criteria that
are prescribed by Nielson [2005], in order to be consistent with the seismotectonic context
of the area where the bridge has been modelled (i.e. Central Southern United States).
Due to the constraints imposed on the ground motions as well as the large number of
data points required by the fragility derivation method, the selection of natural records
from European or worldwide databases [Ambraseys et al., 2004, PEER, 2010] would
prove to be a very demanding task.
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To this end, it is proposed to generate synthetic records using a stochastic procedure
developed by Pousse et al. [2006], which is an extension of the method of Sabetta and
Pugliese [1996]. This procedure is based on the definition of a magnitude, an epicentral
distance and an EC8 soil class: using the criteria in Table 4.1 and proposed by Nielson
[2005], 72 ground motions are then generated for each of the four selected soil classes
(i.e. EC8 classes A to D), thus amounting to a total of 288 ground motions. In Gehl
et al. [2015], it has been shown that several hundreds of ground motions are sufficient
to achieve a satisfying estimation of the fragility parameters. The distribution of the
PGA, SA(T1) and SA(T2) parameters, with T1 = 0.67 s and T2 = 0.49 s, is represented
in Figure 4.10 for the generated ground motions.
Table 4.1: Magnitude-distance criteria for the selection of the ground motion suite
[Nielson, 2005].
Epicentral distance [km] Magnitude Weighting
10 5.5 2
6.5 2
20 5.5 1
6.5 1
7.5 2
50 5.5 1
6.5 1
7.5 1
100 7.5 1
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Figure 4.10: Distribution of the PGA, SA(T1) and SA(T2) parameters obtained from
the generated records.
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4.3.4 Derivation of Component Fragility Curves
Fragility curves for each component and for each loading direction (i.e. longitudinal and
transversal) are then derived, using the following damage states (see Table 4.2):
• Piers: yielding (D1) and ultimate deformation (D2) of the columns;
• Abutments: yielding of the abutment piles in tension (D1), i.e. active behaviour;
• Bearings: restraint failure (D1) and deck unseating (D2);
• Shear keys: shear key failure (D1) and deck unseating (D2).
Table 4.2: Limit states for the component damage states. φy is the yield curvature
corresponding to the yielding of the first steel reinforcement in the pier sections. The
values for piers are based on Nielson [2005]. For the other components, the values are
based on the constitute laws (yield points or unseating limits).
Components EDP Longitudinal direction Transversal direction
D1 D2 D1 D2
Piers Curvature 1.29φy 5.24φy 1.29φy 5.24φy
Abutments Displacement 0.0192 m − 0.0192 m −
Fixed bearings Displacement 0.0125 m − 0.1866 m −
Expansion bearings Displacement 0.0345 m 0.1866 m − −
Shear keys Displacement − − 0.0255 m 0.1866 m
The Generalized Linear Model regression with a probit link function (see Appendix B) is
used to derive the seismic fragility curves, based on the components’ responses from the
288 records applied to both directions. Such a regression model enables collapse states
to be easily integrated. Moreover, the responses of some components (e.g. bearings)
reveal significant threshold effects, which cannot be appropriately modelled by a cloud
regression. The resulting fragility curves are presented in Figure 4.11.
A first analysis of the derived component fragility curves can lead to several observations:
• Due to the alternation of fixed and expansion bearings, the bridge is asymmetric
along the longitudinal direction, a characteristic that is highlighted by the differ-
ences between the fragility curves (e.g. B2 versus B5, or B3 versus B4). Conversely,
the bridge is symmetric along the transversal direction due to the use of identical
the shear keys: as a result, the transversal fragility curves are the same for the
components taken two-by-two (e.g. Sh1 versus Sh6, or Sh3 versus Sh4).
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Figure 4.11: Fragility curves for the bridge components in both loading directions.
• In some cases, the fragility curve cannot be derived due to convergence issues
of the GLM regression (e.g. damage state D2 of components B3 or B4): no
data points have reached damage state D2 for these components, which may then
be interpreted as components that are very unlikely to fail within this range of
loading conditions. This issue constitutes both a drawback and a merit of the
GLM regression: this statistical method tends to yield unstable values when data
points are scarce, while the regression on a cloud would still be able to provide
stable fragility estimates; however, it can be argued that the GLM regression
prevents the modeller from using erroneous results, since the statistical model fails
before proposing poorly constrained estimates.
• The component fragility curves enable the visualisation of the most vulnerable
components within the bridge system: for instance, in the longitudinal direction,
both piers tend to fail (damage state D2) before deck unseating is reached. How-
ever, for a given IM, the damage probabilities provided by the component fragility
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curves must be considered as marginal probabilities, while the joint probabilities
can only be assessed if the correlation matrix between component responses is
estimated (see Figure 4.12) and system reliability methods are applied (see Chap-
ter 5).
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Figure 4.12: Correlation matrix of the component responses under seismic loading.
The value of the correlation factors is given by the color map.
The correlation structure between the component responses is needed to quantify the
probability of occurrence of the union or the intersection of given events, at the level
of the bridge system. This statistical dependence is induced by the common cause
failure that may be generated by the earthquake shaking, which is applied to all bridge
components at once. Therefore, components that have a similar dynamic behaviour
within the bridge system are highly correlated, such as the response of the two piers
in the longitudinal direction (see Figure 4.12). Conversely, due the discontinuous deck
spans in the studied bridge, some bearings on different locations of the bridge may
move independently from one another, even when subjected to the same ground motion:
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this is illustrated by the correlation matrix, which shows for instance that the response
of bearing B1 is almost orthogonal – in terms of uncertainties – with the response of
bearings B2 to B4 (i.e. correlation factor close to zero).
4.4 Fragility Curves for Ground Failures
This section describes the methods that have been adopted to derive fragility curves for
component failure modes due to ground failures, as identified in Table 3.8.
4.4.1 Fragility Curves for Slope Failure (Failure Mode #15)
Slope failure may affect abutments, however the depth of the foundations of well-designed
bridge abutments usually prevents superficial landslides from having an effect on the
abutment itself. Still, in the case of deep-seated circular landslides that generate ground
displacements below the depth of the abutment footing, it is possible to have significant
differential displacements that may lead to bridge collapse. Hence circular slope failure
is considered as the relevant failure mechanism for abutment foundations, characterized
by a single damage state D1.
There is currently no fragility model available for bridge systems subjected to slope
failure. The wide range of possible configurations regarding the bridge system and its
soil environment makes it difficult to derive fragility functions that may be applied to a
given typology. Therefore the derivation of fragility functions should be case-dependent,
since a careful analysis of the bridge – soil configuration is usually required (e.g. soil
conditions, near-surface geology, slope grade, position of foundations, etc.).
Slope fragility curves may then be developed for a given case-study, by using proba-
bilistic slope stability analyses [Wu, 2013, 2015]. To this end, the factor of safety FS
of potential sliding surfaces can be estimated with the limit equilibrium method (i.e.
Bishop’s simplified method). The surface is subdivided into a number n of vertical slices
and the factor of safety FS is then expressed as the ratio of resisting versus destabilizing
moments of all the slices (see Figure 4.13):
FS =
∑n
i=1
1
Fα
· [ci · bi + tanφi · (Wi − ui · bi)]∑n
i=1Wi · sin θi +Kh ·Wi · LiR
(4.3)
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where Kh is the horizontal seismic coefficient expressed as a function of PGA [Noda
et al., 1975]:
Kh =
1
3
·
(
PGA
g
)1/3
(4.4)
The factor Fα is expressed as:
Fα = cos θi +
tanφi · sin θi
FS
(4.5)
Since the factor FS is present on both sides of the equations, a small iteration process
is required in order to converge to the final FS value after a few steps.
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Figure 4.13: Slice equilibrium method for the estimation of the factor of safety for
circular slope failure. The black shape is a simplified view of the studied bridge and its
foundations.
Fragility functions for slope instability (D1) are then derived following the method pro-
posed by Wu [2015]: for each increasing value of PGA, the reliability index of logFS > 0
is estimated using a Mean-Value First-Order Second Moment (MFOSM) method:
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βFS =
logFS (µXi)√∑n
i=1
(
∂logFS
∂Xi
)2 · σ2 [Xi] + 2∑ni,j=1 (∂logFS∂Xi ) · (∂logFS∂Xj ) · ρ · σ [Xi] · σ [Xj ]
(4.6)
The partial derivative of logFS is approximated around its central value, by evaluating
the slope between logFS at plus/minus one standard deviation. The input random
variables Xi are the cohesion and friction angle of each soil layer, while a correlation
factor of ρ = −0.4 is assumed between them [Wu, 2013]. The search algorithm for
the probabilistic critical surfaces proposed by Hassan and Wolff [1999] is used in order
to ensure that the minimum reliability index is found for each combination of the soil
parameters and each proposed surface, based on the distribution of the factor of safety
with respect to the value 1. An additional constraint is introduced by the location of
the abutments foundations, since the critical surface is unlikely to generate any bridge
failures if it intersects with the bridge abutment foundations. Therefore the critical
surfaces that are found with the limit equilibrium method have to be deep enough, so
that the ground displacement is unhindered by the abutments foundations, as it is shown
in Figure 4.13. Finally, the reliability index is converted into the probability of failure Pf
and the points [PGA ; Pf ] are fitted into a fragility curve with a lognormal cumulative
distribution function, through a straightforward optimization process that identifies the
fragility paramters by minimizing the sum of squared errors with the discrete Pf points.
Using the soil parameters summarised in Figure 4.13, The fragility curve for the col-
lapse of abutment foundations due to circular slope failure is derived and presented in
Figure 4.14. The corresponding fragility parameters are the mean α = 12.62 m/s2 and
the standard deviation β = 1.03.
4.4.2 Fragility Curves for Subsidence (Failure Mode #16)
The most common failure mode, i.e. the subsidence/settlement of the backfill soil, may
be quantified by performing a finite element analysis in order to estimate the permanent
strain of the supporting soil, when subjected to a ground motion time history at the
base. Therefore an approach that is similar to the derivation of analytical fragility curves
for embankments [Argyroudis and Kaynia, 2014, 2015] may be used. Moreover, fragility
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Figure 4.14: Derivation of the fragility curve for abutment foundations exposed to
slope failure.
curves for the backfill of bridge abutments are proposed in Argyroudis and Kaynia [2014],
for a bridge with a vertical retaining wall, with varying heights and EC8 soil types. The
resulting fragility curves express the probability of exceeding three damage states as a
function of PGA (i.e. earthquake-induced ground failure).
The proposed fragility curves for the subsidence of the bridge backfill soil are presented
in Figure 4.15 while the corresponding fragility parameters are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Proposed fragility parameters (mean and standard deviation) for the sub-
sidence of the bridge backfill soil, from Argyroudis and Kaynia [2014].
Damage states α
[
m/s2
]
β
D1 - Subsidence ≥ 0.03 m 1.96 0.90
D2 - Subsidence ≥ 0.15 m 4.41 0.90
D3 - Subsidence ≥ 0.30 m 9.13 0.90
4.5 Fragility Curves for Floods
This section describes the methods that have been adopted to derive fragility curves for
component failure modes due to fluvial floods.
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Figure 4.15: Proposed fragility curves (mean and standard deviation) for the subsi-
dence of the bridge backfill soil, from Argyroudis and Kaynia [2014].
4.5.1 Fragility Curves for Scour (Failure Mode #17)
Fragility curves for bridges with respect to scour are less common than for seismic ground
motion, however a few references are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Available bridge fragility curves for flood hazard, in the case of scour.
Reference Typology Intensity Measure
Alipour et al. [2012] Multi-span multi-column RC bridge Scour depth
Tanasic´ et al. [2013] Multi-span continuous RC bridge Soil cover height at the pier
Pearson et al. [2002] Generic bridges Scour vulnerability grade and
water height
The fragility curves proposed by Alipour et al. [2012] may not be seen as scour fragility
curves per se, in the sense that they do not represent the direct bridge damage with
respect to scour. Instead, scour depth is used as a modifying coefficient to adjust the
parameters of the corresponding seismic fragility curve. Therefore this reference can be
put to better use in the context of combined hazards (i.e. scour and earthquake).
Tanasic´ et al. [2013] have developed actual scour fragility curves that express the prob-
ability of bridge failure as a function of the height of ground that is still covering the
pier foundations (i.e. the complement of the excavated scour depth). The bridge failure
mode is explained by the degradation of the elastic and/or plastic soil parameters. This
phenomenon can either induce:
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• The sinking of the pier foundations, which in turn triggers a pier displacement,
leading to kinematic mechanisms in the bridge.
• The degradation of the bearing capacity of the soil, until it is exceeded by the
contact pressure load at the foundation.
The HYRISK methodology [Pearson et al., 2002] proposes a table of scour probability
failures, which depend on (i) the scour vulnerability grade of the bridge and (ii) the water
height (expressed as a dimensionless depth ratio, i.e. scour depth divided by foundation
depth), as detailed in Table 4.5. The scour vulnerability grades may be qualitatively
described by the scour level with respect to the foundation footings, as illustrated in
Figure 4.16.
Table 4.5: Scour failure probability as a function of scour vulnerability grade and the
dimensionless depth ratio [Pearson et al., 2002].
Scour vulnerability grade Dimensionless depth ratio
0.00− 0.25 0.25− 0.50 0.50− 0.75 0.75− 1.00 > 1.00
0 (Bridge failure) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1 (Bridge closed) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 (Extremely vulnerable) 0.250 0.400 0.550 0.700 0.880
3 (Unstable foundations) 0.140 0.200 0.300 0.450 0.650
4 (Stable, action required) 0.060 0.100 0.150 0.260 0.410
5 (Stable, limited life) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.030 0.100
6 (Unassessed / Unknown) 0.100 0.150 0.225 0.355 0.530
7 (Countermeasure installed) 0.100 0.150 0.225 0.355 0.530
8 (Very good conditions) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.050
9 (Excellent conditions) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.010
footing footing footing
pier pier pier
initial bed
level
initial bed
level
initial bed
level
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.16: Scour levels with respect to bridge footing: (a) below footing (grades 2
and 3); (b) within limits of footing (grades 4 and 5); (c) above top of footing (grades 8
and 9).
No fragility curves for bridge failure due to debris accumulation (i.e. floating debris
which are transported by the flood) are available. However, the detrimental effect of
debris accumulation on the scour depth has been experimentally studied by Lagasse
et al. [2010], for different shapes, sizes and porosity levels of debris masses. Regarding
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analytical models and scour equations [Richardson and Davis, 1995], the effect of debris
accumulation may be approximated by an increased effective pier diameter, especially
if the debris mass is located at the water surface on a single circular pier [Melville
and Dongol, 1992]. Other studies have also demonstrated that debris accumulation
increase flow velocity and bed shear, thus leading to aggravated general scour [Diehl,
1997, Transportation Association of Canada, 2004].
In the present study, only local scour at piers is considered, since the general scour level
(i.e. river bed degradation) is usually less significant than local scour [Barbetta et al.,
2015]. Also, contraction scour may be neglected if we assume that there is no sudden
change in the river bed cross-section. Empirical equations from HEC-18 [Richardson
and Davis, 1995] are used to estimate the local scour depth ys:
ys = 2 ·K1 ·K2 ·K3 ·K4 · y ·
(
D
y
)0.65
· F 0.43 (4.7)
where y represents the flow height, D is the pier width, F is the Froude number and
the Ki parameters are corrective coefficients (see Table 4.6). The Froude number is
expressed as:
F =
v
g · y (4.8)
Since the Froude number is a function of both flow height and flow velocity, a way to
keep the scour depth dependent on a single scalar IM is to combine these quantities into
a new variable, such as the flow discharge Q. Assuming a rectangular river section, Q
can be expressed as a function of velocity v and height y [Alipour et al., 2012], with
river bed width b:
Q = b · y · v = b · y
n
·
(
b · y
b+ 2y
)2/3
· S1/20 (4.9)
where Manning’s roughness coefficient n and slope grade S0 are also specified in Ta-
ble 4.6.
The input parameters in Table 4.6 are then sampled through a Monte Carlo scheme in
order to generate 10 000 couples of values [Q ; ys], for different flow heights y. It is then
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Table 4.6: Parameters used in the scour equations. Some of the probability distribu-
tions are taken from Alipour and Shafei [2012].
Variable Description Distribution Value
K1 Factor for pier nose shape − 1
K2 Factor for flow angle of attack uniform [1; 1.5]
K3 Factor for bed condition normal µ = 1.1; σ = 0.055
K4 Factor for bed material size − 1
n Manning’s roughness coefficient lognormal µ = 0.025; σ = 0.275
S0 Slope grade lognormal µ = 0.02; σ = 0.5
possible to derive ‘scour fragility curves’ that express the probability of reaching a given
scour depth with respect to flow discharge Q.
Three damage states have been defined, based on the effect the scour level has on the
pier initial stiffness and the response of the bridge system under seismic loading (see
Section 4.6):
• ys ≥ 1 m (D1): the first noticeable changes in the bridge’s dynamic properties
begin to appear;
• ys ≥ 3.6 m (D2): significant changes in the bridge response can be observed;
• ys ≥ 5.1 m (D3): the scour depth reaches almost the foundation length and it is
assumed that the pier is not stable enough to support the bridge, as the moment
capacity of the foundation is lost.
These parameters are very specific to the characteristics of the studied bridge. For
instance, the limit states for scour depend directly on the type of foundations that
is considered (i.e. deep or shallow), while the expression of the flow discharge Q as
a function of flow height is only valid for this specific river section. Generic fragility
curves for a set of bridges would require additional parameters representing various
configurations of foundations and river sections.
The fragility curves and parameters for these three damage states are presented in
Figure 4.17 and in Table 4.7, respectively.
4.5.2 Fragility Curves for Overtopping (Failure Mode #21)
It is assumed that the fluvial flood will affect mainly the interaction between the deck
and the piers, by resulting in lateral pressure on the side of the deck. For simplicity,
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Figure 4.17: Fragility curves for pier foundations exposed to local scour.
Table 4.7: Fragility parameters (mean α and standard deviation β) for pier founda-
tions exposed to local scour.
Damage states α
[
m3/s
]
β
D1 - ys ≥ 1 m 2.7 0.55
D2 - ys ≥ 3.6 m 285.8 0.57
D3 - ys ≥ 5.1 m 847.6 0.53
two successive damage states can be considered. The failure of the shear keys (D1) and
the unseating of the deck (D2). The aim is to obtain a fragility curve describing the
probability of reaching these damage states with respect to a flood IM, which can be
represented by water height or velocity or flow discharge). Although there is anecdotal
evidence on the vulnerability of bridges due to hurricanes and storm surges [Kameshwar
and Padgett, 2014, Padgett et al., 2008a], there is a dearth of data in literature to allow
a robust quantification of the impact of fluvial floods on bridge superstructures.
Pending the empirical or analytical development of suitable fragility models, in the
present application it is proposed to use the fragility curve from Kameshwar and Padgett
[2014] for bridge failure due to storm surge. Through a logistic regression, the authors
have built a logit function g representing deck unseating as a function of surge S, bridge
height HB and wave height H, as follows:
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g (S,H,HB) = −2.71−3.47·(HB − S)+1.59·H+0.17·(HB − S)−0.22·(HB − S)2+0.05·H2
(4.10)
It is proposed here to set the coefficients related to wave height equal to 0, in order
to represent the fluvial flood as a very rough approximation (i.e. removal of the wave
effect in the equation). To determine the damage to shear keys (D1), a conservative
assumption could consider failure as soon as the flow height reaches the top of the pier
cap.
Although the aforementioned fragility models are expressed as a function of water height,
it is proposed to convert this intensity measure into flow discharge Q in order to be
consistent with the scour fragility curves (see Equation 4.9 in previous sub-section). The
fragility curves and parameters for these two damage states are presented in Figure 4.18
and in Table 4.8, respectively.
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Figure 4.18: Fragility curves for the shear keys and deck spans exposed to fluvial
flood.
Table 4.8: Fragility parameters (mean α and standard deviation β) for the shear keys
and deck spans exposed to fluvial flood.
Damage states α
[
m3/s
]
β
D1 - Shear key failure 3789.9 0.500
D2 - Deck unseating 4433.1 0.436
Chapter 4. Derivation of hazard-specific component fragility curves 111
4.6 Cascading Effects from Different Hazards
Since one of the objectives of this study is the derivation of multi-hazard fragility func-
tions, it is proposed to demonstrate the ability of the present framework to account for
cumulated effects on the bridge system. Given the hazard types that are addressed in
this work, the effect of concomitant earthquake and flood events on a given bridge is a
known issue that has been addressed by several past studies [Alipour and Shafei, 2012,
Guo et al., 2015, 2016]. By assuming a given time window during which the bridge is
considered to be left unrepaired following a flood event, the cascading effects of fluvial
flood or scour on the subsequent earthquake response can be quantified by the derivation
of damage-dependent fragility curves.
Therefore different bridge models have to be developed, either by removing some Winkler
springs (i.e. to model scour damage) or by removing the shear keys (i.e. to model damage
due to fluvial flood): the successive steps of the proposed approach for the derivation of
damage-dependent fragility curves in the case of flood and earthquake interactions are
detailed in Figure 4.19.
In the present example, a total of six bridge configurations are considered, as shown
in Table 4.9. Three discrete scour levels are defined, which correspond to the different
scour damage states that are defined in Subsection 4.5.1; while the damage state D1∗
corresponds to the failure of shear keys due to hydraulic pressure, thus affecting the
seismic behaviour along the transversal direction.
Table 4.9: Different bridge models considered to account for cumulated damage effects
of flood and earthquake events. The ∗ sign represents models that are only changing
in the transversal direction.
Bridge configuration Scour damage Fluvial flood damage
1 D0 D0
2 D0 D1∗
3 D1 D0
4 D1 D1∗
5 D2 D0
6 D2 D1∗
The thresholds for the different scour damage states described in subsection 4.5.1 are
estimated by performing pushover analyses of the pier for different scour depths, as
shown in Figure 4.20. Significant changes in the shape of the pushover curves are then
used to select scour thresholds for which the scour damage states are defined. The
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Figure 4.19: Proposed steps for the derivation of damage-dependent fragility curves:
(1) selection of discrete scour levels based on the pushover analysis of bridge piers,
(2) contruction of a dataset of ’damaged’ bridge models and (3) derivation of seismic
fragility curves for the altered models.
effect of scour can be clearly seen in the case of the pushover curves in the longitudinal
direction: for levels of scour greater than 1 m the pier is affected by more severe stiffness
degradation, while significant strength reduction is also observed for more than 3.6 m
scour. Scour levels above 5.1 m do not guarantee the structural stability of the system,
so that this value is considered as the limit state to assume pier collapse due to scour.
The seismic fragility curves are then derived for each scour damage state by uniformly
sampling the scour depth that is bounded by two consecutive scour thresholds. The
evolution of the mean parameters of the damage-dependent fragility curves is presented
in Figure 4.21 for all bridge components.
The resulting fragility parameters in Figure 4.21 show that scour globally tends to raise
the seismic vulnerability of shear keys, except for the ones that are in the middle of
the bridge (i.e. Sh3 and Sh4). Regarding piers, the removal of Winkler springs relaxes
the connection at the pier base, which has the effect of lowering bending moments and
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Figure 4.20: Pier pushover curves for different scour levels. Green lines represent less
than 1 m scour (i.e. scour damage state D0), the yellow lines scour between 1 m and
3.6 m (i.e. scour damage state D1) and the red lines scour between 3.6 m and 5.1 m
(i.e. scour damage state D2).
decreasing the failure probability for higher scour levels. Finally, the response of abut-
ments seems to remain stable across the different scour depth. Similar observations have
been made when fragility curves are computed for the components in the longitudinal
direction. When shear keys are removed (i.e. fluvial flood D1), the seismic fragility
slightly increases for lower damage states, while this effect becomes more significant
for further damage states (i.e. the absence of restraints favours the occurrence of deck
unseating).
It should be noted that a perfectly symmetric shape of the bridge and the river bed is
assumed, so that the probabilities of reaching the different scour levels are equal at each
pier location. Also, in order to limit the number of bridge configurations, it is assumed
that the scour events have a joint occurrence across the different piers: this assumption
tends to be conservative, since a bridge for which all pier foundations are subjected to
scour will experience a more altered seismic response than a bridge for which only a
portion of the piers are affected. The study of all possible configurations should still
deserve dedicated effort in order to refine the global failure probabilities, but this is out
of the scope of the present example.
Chapter 4. Derivation of hazard-specific component fragility curves 114
0 10 20
P1
P2
A1
A2
Sh1
Sh2
Sh3
Sh4
Sh5
Sh6
α [m/s2] − D1
 
 
Fluvial Flood − D0
0 10 20
P1
P2
A1
A2
Sh1
Sh2
Sh3
Sh4
Sh5
Sh6
α [m/s2] − D1
 
 
Fluvial Flood − D1
0 10 20
P1
P2
A1
A2
Sh1
Sh2
Sh3
Sh4
Sh5
Sh6
α [m/s2] − D2
Fluvial Flood − D0
0 10 20
P1
P2
A1
A2
Sh1
Sh2
Sh3
Sh4
Sh5
Sh6
α [m/s2] − D2
Fluvial Flood − D1
Scour D0
Scour D1
Scour D2
Figure 4.21: Evolution of the mean seismic fragility parameter α for both EQ damage
states D1 and D2 and all components in the transversal direction, depending on the
initial state of the bridge in terms of scour and fluvial flood damage.
4.7 Evaluation of Simplified Seismic Assessment Methods
The non-linear time-history analyses that have been conducted in Section 4.3 for the
derivation of component fragility curves present the drawback of inducing long computa-
tion times and potential numerical convergence issues, especially when large bridges are
considered. Therefore there is a need for an assessment procedure that yields accurate
estimates while being simple enough for a systematic application to a large portfolio of
bridges. Parallel to the non-linear displacement-based static methods, Sadan et al. [2013]
and Cardone [2014] have introduced a direct displacement-based assessment (DDBA)
procedure, which is a direct development of the displacement-based design approach by
Priestley et al. [2007]. This method is based on the evaluation of the static capacity of
an equivalent linearised bridge system (i.e. through the estimation of the secant stiffness
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and the equivalent damping ratio) for a given target level of deformation of the bridge,
referred to as Performance Displacement Profile (PDP) (see Figure 4.22).
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Figure 4.22: Main principles of the DDBA procedure.
The DDBA method only requires the definition of the capacity curves of the bridge
components, a task that may be carried out without the use of a dedicated finite element
model: the identification of the seismic demand corresponding to a given performance
target may therefore be completed in a fraction of the time that would be required for
non-linear dynamic analyses. However concerns have been raised on the accuracy of the
DDBA when predicting structural responses for large non-linearities and for a variety
of bridge systems, since comparisons have only been carried out for a limited number of
bridge types [Cardone, 2014, Sadan et al., 2013].
Therefore the accuracy of the DDBA method is investigated for a set of bridge systems
that represent distinct typologies, especially in terms of deck continuity and pier-to-
deck connection. The DDBA and non-linear dynamic results are compared in terms
of fragility curves at the component and system levels, since this measure has direct
consequences on the damage assessment of the infrastructure components in the case of
a risk analysis.
4.7.1 The Direct Displacement-Based Assessment Method
The DDBA is initiated by defining a target deformation level for a given bridge com-
ponent (e.g. pier or bearing). An iteration procedure is then carried out to update
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the modal properties of the structural system corresponding to the target deformation,
by using the secant stiffness formulation. Cardone et al. [2011] have shown that the
obtained displacement pattern of the bridge could be used to derive a fragility curve, if
the target deformation is considered as a damage threshold: the input design demand
spectrum is scaled and over-damped in order to account for the energy dissipation by
the hysteretic cycles in the non-linear range, finally providing the intensity measure that
corresponds to the target deformation. Updating the modal properties mainly serves the
purpose of updating the equivalent properties of the single degree-of-freedom structure,
in order to obtain response spectrum values. However, the following points could still
be improved within the DDBA procedure:
• The standard-deviation of the median value of the fragility curve (i.e. dispersion)
is arbitrarily chosen because a normalized design spectrum is used as input, rather
than a suite of natural records.
• In order to estimate the spectrum scaling factor that will reach the target de-
formation, an inverse capacity spectrum method is used, where the coordinates
of the performance point are derived from an equivalent single-degree-of-freedom
approximation.
• Finally, while the DDBA iteration process starts from a target deformation level
in order to estimate the corresponding intensity measure, the possibility to di-
rectly compute the bridge response from an input demand spectrum should be
investigated.
Therefore it is proposed to use a set of natural ground motion records as input to the
DDBA procedure, instead of a design demand spectrum: this modification enables to
obtain a distribution of performance points for different levels of seismic intensity, thus
accounting for the record-to-record variability. This variant of the DDBA procedure is
named EMA (Effective Modal Analysis), and its main steps are defined in Figures 4.23
and 4.24.
It is observed that the main drawback of the EMA approach, as initially conceived, is
the requirement to predefine a target deformation level (i.e. limit state) and to carry
out the analysis for each component: for instance, in the case of a bridge system with
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Figure 4.23: Main steps of the EMA approach for simplified seismic fragility assess-
ment.
n components and m damage states each, a total of n ·m EMA analyses will have to
be performed in order to obtain the fragility parameters for all components. Moreover,
the input records have to be scaled in order to match the seismic level that corresponds
to the target deformation: a lot of care is usually required in the scaling process, so
that the selected ground motions keep consistent properties (e.g. frequency content)
over a given range of seismic intensity. Finally, the EMA approach is based on the
estimation of equivalent properties (e.g. spectral coordinates of the performance point)
of the single degree-of-freedom (SDOF) structure, so that it may be compared to the
seismic demand spectrum: this approximation, present in the original DDBA approach,
may also constitute a source of error.
Based on these observations, the EMA procedure is modified to obtain a more direct
method: dirEMA, for direct Effective Modal Analysis (as shown in Figure 4.25). As
opposed to the EMA approach, unscaled ground motion records are used as inputs in
the dirEMA procedure, while the structural response is directly quantified as a result.
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Figure 4.24: Physical illustration of the main steps in EMA.
This is achieved by reorganising the iteration cycle, which now includes the update of
equivalent damping at each loop. Using this approach, all the component responses are
obtained through only one run of the dirEMA algorithm and there is more flexibility in
the choice of the input records, which can be either unscaled (e.g. ‘cloud’ analysis) or
scaled (e.g. multi-stripe analysis or Incremental Dynamic Analysis).
Both EMA and dirEMA methods only require a limited amount of information in order to
define the bridge system, i.e. the mass matrix, the connectivity between structural nodes,
the constitutive model with hysteresis (i.e. in order to estimate equivalent damping)
for each component and a set of acceleration time-histories. The outcome is then the
structural response of the bridge components for a given ground motion if dirEMA
is used, or the PGA level corresponding to the desired deformation level of a given
component if EMA is used.
4.7.2 Definition of Bridge Typologies for Fragility Assessment
The simplified approaches that have been detailed in the previous sub-section may now
be benchmarked for a selection of representative bridge types. The focus is put here on
RC girder bridges that are typically found along road highways. A first distinction can
be made regarding the deck, which can be either continuous or comprised of a set of
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Figure 4.25: Main steps of the dirEMA approach for simplified seismic fragility as-
sessment.
independent spans. Then, the deck can be connected to the pier cap through various
bearing devices (i.e. simply-supported deck) or it can be directly connected to the
pier (i.e. monolithic connection), thus preventing relative movement for all degrees of
freedom. Finally, depending on the bridge configuration, the large rigidity of the deck in
the longitudinal direction and the possibility (or not) of relative displacement between
the deck and the piers, seismic analysis of the bridge in the longitudinal direction may
be straightforward (i.e. only one degree-of-freedom), while the deformation of the deck
in the transversal direction always allows relative displacements between the pier caps.
As a result, five generic bridge layouts are proposed, as illustrated in Figure 4.26.
Figure 4.26: Bridge typologies considered in the benchmark study.
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Variants of the five generic models are also developed, depending on the configuration
of the expansion and fixed bearings (see Figure 4.27): this enables the sampling of a
wide range of bridge layouts, from very rigid systems (i.e. only fixed bearings) to very
flexible ones (i.e. only expansion bearings).
Figure 4.27: Layout of the bridge models considered in the study. White (respectively
grey) circles represent expansion (resp. fixed) elastomeric bearings.
The mechanical properties and structural characteristics of the MSSSC girder bridge by
Nielson [2005] have been used to define the five generic models, with the same RC pier
and deck properties. Regarding the bearings, simplified stiffness models are proposed
in order to facilitate the application of the dirEMA and EMA approaches: bilinear or
trilinear models are used, in order to model the Coulomb friction law of the elastomeric
bearings. In the case of fixed bearings, the stiffness model proposed by Cardone [2014]
has been used, as shown in Figure 4.28. The equivalent bilinear stiffness model of the
piers is obtained by fitting the pushover curve that has been derived through a non-linear
static analysis on the OpenSees platform. Specific masses and kinematic conditions are
added to the pier caps in order to simulate their behaviour when integrated to the bridge
system.
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Figure 4.28: Stiffness models for expansion (left) and fixed (middle) bearings, and
piers (right).
4.7.3 Secant Stiffness and Damping models
The execution of the EMA and dirEMA methods require the updating of the system’s
secant stiffness and damping ratio in the inelastic range. For each bridge component,
a secant stiffness function with respect to the ductility ratio is easily derived from the
models in Figure 4.28, by computing the ratio of the actual force that would be generated
by the component in the non-linear range (i.e. according to the stiffness model) over the
actual deformation of the component.
The initial damping ratio ζ0 that is used in the elastic range has to be completed by an-
other damping type ζhys, which represents the energy that is dissipated in the hysteretic
cycles of the components, which are not accounted for by the secant stiffness model. The
accurate estimation of hysteretic damping ζhys is an essential step, since it influences
the level of the global damping and the amplitude of the structural response. Equa-
tions to determine ζhys have been proposed throughout various literature references and
they can be distinguished between mainly analytical (equivalent damping) and empirical
(substitute damping) methods.
According to the equivalent damping method by Jacobsen [1930], the additional viscous
damping ζhys can be estimated by equating the energy of a viscously damped oscillator
with the hysteretic energy of the non-linear oscillator for a steady state cycle at a given
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ductility level [Judi et al., 2000]. Several studies [Blandon and Priestley, 2010] propose
a review of equivalent damping relations, which are summarized in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Equivalent damping models for different types of structural elements, as
a function of the ductility ratio µ. r represents the strain-hardening ratio, T is the
effective period and the variables a, b, c, d and N represent some regression coeffi-
cients. α and β are parameters of Takeda’s hysteretic model (i.e. coefficient of stiffness
degradation and reloading curve).
Structural model Equivalent damping
Perfectly-plastic bilinear ζhys =
2
pi · (1−r)·(µ−1)µ−r·µ+r·µ2
[Rosenblueth and Herrera, 1964]
Takeda model ζhys = 0.2 ·
(
1− 1√µ
)
[Gulkan and Sozen, 1974]
Elastic and Coulomb slip elements ζhys = 0.0587 · (µ− 1)0.371
[Iwan, 1980]
Takeda model (α = 0.5 and β = 0) ζhys =
1
pi ·
(
1− 1−r√µ − r ·
√
µ
)
[Kowalsky, 1994]
Steel members ζhys =
1.5
µ·pi · (µ− 1)
[Priestley, 2003]
Concrete frames ζhys =
1.2
pi ·
(
1− 1√µ
)
[Priestley, 2003]
Concrete columns and walls ζhys =
0.95
pi ·
(
1− 1√µ
)
[Priestley, 2003]
Hysteretic model ζhys =
a
pi ·
(
1− 1
µb
)
·
(
1 + 1
(T+c)d
)
· 1N
[Blandon and Priestley, 2010]
The method referred to as substitute damping, initially introduced by Gulkan and Sozen
[1974] after a series of experimental and analytical studies, assumes that the ground mo-
tion energy that is input into a given structure corresponds to the one that is dissipated
by an elastic system with viscous damping. Therefore, by equating the earthquake input
energy with the dissipated viscous energy, the substitute damping, which includes both
elastic and hysteretic damping, can be expressed as:
ζsub = ζ0 + ζhys =
Tsub ·
t∫
0
ag(τ) · v(τ) · dτ
4pi ·
t∫
0
v2(τ) · dτ
(4.11)
where Tsub is the effective period corresponding to the secant stiffness at maximum
response, ag is the ground motion acceleration, v is the relative velocity of the structure
and t is the duration of the ground motion. It is then possible to apply this equation to
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various structural components and to derive corresponding substitute viscous damping
models.
First, in order to choose the most appropriate formulation for this study, a series of
different elastic perfectly-plastic models are subjected to a set of ground motions (see
selection in Section 4.3.3). The substitute viscous damping is then evaluated with Equa-
tion 4.11 for each input ground motion (see Figure 4.29 left), using the outputs of the
OpenSees dynamic analyses. It is found that the results are stable for different config-
urations of the element’s stiffness or yield strength. Therefore a regression of the form
ζhys = a · (µ− 1)2 + b · (µ− 1) is proposed, as used by Paulotto et al. [2007]. The
substitute damping model can then be expressed as:
ζsub = ζ0 + ζhys = ζ0 − 0.00211 · (µ− 1)2 + 0.0772 · (µ− 1) (4.12)
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Figure 4.29: Left: Outputs of the OpenSees analyses and fitted model for the substi-
tute viscous damping. Right: Comparison of the various damping models for perfectly-
plastic bilinear components. Since the model from Blandon and Priestley [2010] is
period-dependent, different sample periods are shown. The dotted red lines represent
the 95% confidence bounds of the regression parameters.
The regression equation is compared with other equivalent damping models from the
literature (see Figure 4.29 right). Overall, a good agreement on the general damping
level can be found. However, the damping functions not do present the same shape: all
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equivalent damping models seem to overestimate damping for small ductility ratios (i.e.
in the range 1-10) and overestimate it for larger levels, as if the regressed equivalent
damping models were not accounting for some physical characteristics of the structural
element. To validate this, the response of a perfectly-plastic bilinear system is computed
in OpenSees for the series of ground motions (see Subsection 4.3.3). The results are
compared with the ones obtained with the EMA procedure. Table 4.11 compares the
errors of the responses. The comparison between different damping models shows a
significantly better performance of the substitute damping model, while the period-
dependent model by Blandon and Priestley [2010] still yields more accurate results than
the model by [Rosenblueth and Herrera, 1964].
Table 4.11: Performance of different damping models when applied to a perfectly-
plastic bilinear element. SSElog represents the sum of squared errors between the log-
arithm of the responses.
Damping model SSElog
Substitute viscous damping 0.0492
Bilinear model [Rosenblueth and Herrera, 1964] 0.0890
Steel members [Priestley, 2003] 0.0702
Hysteretic model [Blandon and Priestley, 2010] 0.0725
The better performance of the substitute damping may be due to the fact that this model
has been empirically developed using the ground motion suite. It can also be observed
from Figure 4.29 that the substitute damping curve crosses all the equivalent damping
models for different ranges of ductility: this observation raises some interrogations on
the validity range of the equivalent damping equations, since they seem to coincide
with the substitute damping model, but only for narrow ranges of ductility. Finally,
Table 4.11 shows that the choice of the hysteretic damping model is not critical for the
EDP response, since the error rates remain within the same order of magnitude.
4.7.4 Derivation of Component Fragility Curves
Once that the modelling assumptions are specified, it is proposed to derive fragility
curves at the component level, with either the simplified methods (i.e. EMA and di-
rEMA) or the non-linear dynamic analyses on a finite element model. Each of the
bridge models from Figure 4.27 is subject to the same acceleration time-histories that
are presented in Subsection 4.3.3. For each of the bridge components that are likely to
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sustain any damage (i.e. RC piers, fixed and expansion bearings), the seismic response
is recorded and compared to the limit state thresholds proposed by Nielson [2005] and
summarized in Table 4.12. Only slight and moderate damage states are considered in
this example, since most components have not reached further damage states under the
selected range of ground motions (i.e. moderate seismicity): thus, due to the scarcity of
data points for heavier damage states, stable estimates for the corresponding fragility
parameters cannot be guaranteed.
Table 4.12: Median values for prescriptive limit states, as proposed by Nielson [2005].
Component Slight Moderate
Pier (longitudinal) – Curvature / Top Displacement [mm] 0.0039 / 52 0.0062 / 70
Pier (transversal) – Curvature / Top Displacement [mm] 0.0116 / 60 0.0183 / 74
Fixed elastomeric bearing – Deformation [mm] 30 100
Expansion elastomeric bearing – Deformation [mm] 30 100
The accuracy of the EMA- and dirEMA-derived component fragility curves can then
be quantified with respect to the OpenSees results from non-linear dynamic analyses:
while the direct comparison of both fragility parameters α and β does not necessarily
provide a straightforward visualisation of the ‘error rate’, it is proposed instead to use
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance, which measures the largest absolute difference
between two distribution functions (see Figure 4.30). This metric has previously been
used by Gehl et al. [2015] for the comparison of fragility curves: it has the ability to
directly express the maximal error in terms of probability of damage, which is a quantity
that can be easily interpreted in practice. For instance, a K-S distance of 0.1 between
two fragility means that, over the support of the probability distribution, the highest
gap between the two probabilities of damage is 10%, which is deemed satisfactory given
the uncertainties and assumptions at play.
A quick analysis of Figure 4.30 reveals the following points:
• Globally the performance of both dirEMA and EMA methods is not satisfying
and many fragility curves result in a K-S distance that is superior to 0.5: in other
words, for some PGA values, the difference between the approximate probability of
damage and the OpenSees one is exceeding 0.5, which represents a non-negligible
bias.
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Figure 4.30: K-S distance between the OpenSees component fragility curves and
the dirEMA (in red) and the EMA (in green) results, for the 16 bridge models (see
Figure 4.27). Except for models IVa and Va, all bridges are symmetric and only half of
the components are represented.
• While there is no overall significant difference between the performance of dirEMA
and EMA methods, the dirEMA procedure seems to be slightly more accurate.
This observation confirms that dirEMA could be used instead of EMA, since the
former method is less time consuming than the latter while allowing the use of
unscaled records.
• For simpler bridge models with lower numbers of in-series components (i.e. bear-
ings), such as models I to III, the simplified approaches show reasonable accuracy.
On the contrary, bridge models IV and V with simply-supported independent deck
spans present the highest prediction errors, because components located towards
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the middle of the bridge are less restrained and they are more influenced by the
response of adjacent components.
• Bridge models with only expansion bearings appear to lead to more accurate re-
sults, due to their simpler stiffness model (i.e. bilinear curve), as opposed to fixed
bearings.
Finally, it should be noted that the definition of the K-S distance yields an absolute
measure, which proves difficult to interpret when trying to check whether the fragility
curves are overestimating or underestimating the damage probabilities. However, it
globally appears that the fragility mean α is slightly higher when applying the simplified
approaches, i.e. an underestimation of damage occurrence with respect to non-linear
dynamic analyses.
4.7.5 Discussion
Starting from the previously derived component fragility curves, fragility curves at the
system level (see Figure 4.31) are derived by using the system reliability method devel-
oped by Song and Kang [2009]: it is assumed that the component damage states are
consistent with each other, so that the system damage state (e.g. slight) occurs as soon
as one of the components has reached such damage state (i.e. in-series system).
A first observation can be made on the satisfying performance of the dirEMA and EMA
methods when considering the system fragility curves: it appears that the significant
errors observed for the component fragility curves does not propagate to the same ex-
tent at the system level. This is explained by the various failure modes (i.e. individual
component events) that may lead to a given system damage state: if some of the compo-
nent fragility curves are inaccurately predicted but do not cause global system failures,
their impact on the probability of damage at system level is dramatically reduced (i.e.
because they are not the first to reach that damage state, the system damage state is
not highly depedent on these components).
The simplified models perform especially well for the slight damage state, which can
be expected as it relies mostly on elastic behaviour, while some biases start to appear
at the moderate state: in general, both dirEMA and EMA approaches tend to provide
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Figure 4.31: Fragility curves of the bridge system for slight (dotted lines) and mod-
erate (solid lines) damage states. Curves derived from OpenSees, dirEMA and EMA
are represented in blue, red and green respectively.
slightly non-conservative results. The performance of both simplified methods is roughly
equivalent, even though the dirEMA approach seems to give slightly better predictions
for the moderate damage state. However, it should be stressed that the two simplified
methods are conceptually different in the way they make use of the input ground motions:
the dirEMA procedure directly uses the dataset of records (i.e. same approach as the
OpenSees analyses), while the EMA approach requires the scaling of each record for each
limit states. This difference in the treatment of the record-to-record variability may also
explain why the fragility curves developed through dirEMA tend to be closer to the
OpenSees results. Finally, the models containing a high proportion of fixed bearings
(e.g. Ib, IIb, IVb, IVc) generate the highest prediction errors, as opposed to expansion
bearings that are associated with a simpler stiffness model.
To conclude, it has been shown that the use of natural ground motions as input to
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the procedure of Cardone et al. [2011] is feasible in practice and that it leads to the
quantification of the standard deviation β, instead of requiring the selection of an ar-
bitrary value. A variant – dirEMA – of the DDBA method has also been proposed,
where the structural response is directly estimated from an unscaled ground motion,
through an iteration loop. An empirical comparison of the simplified approaches with
non-linear dynamic analysis, for a variety of bridge models with different types of deck
and pier-to-deck connections, leads to the following conclusions:
• The performance of the dirEMA procedure is globally equivalent to the EMA
approach over the different bridge models, which enables to validate the use of
dirEMA as a viable alternative to the more cumbersome EMA method.
• The use of the system reliability method for the assembly of the component fragility
curves results in much smaller error rates at the system level, since some bridge
components do not participate to the predominant failure mode.
• The accuracy of the simplified methods decreases when moderate damage states
are considered: once a given level of ductility ratio is exceeded for a component,
the estimation of the deformation in the non-linear range becomes more and more
subject to modelling errors (e.g. equivalent damping, number of hysteretic cycles,
etc.). However, moderate damage is usually difficult to predict as the system is
in hybrid condition. Once significant damage is reached, it can be expected that
differences may be lower, as they depend less on hysteretic behaviour and more on
the failure of one dominant component and the way collapse is defined.
• The simplified approaches perform better when a reduced number of components
are assembled in series, as opposed to models IV and V. Both EMA and dirEMA
procedures tend to be less accurate when mainly fixed bearings are present: this
observation is linked to the complexity of the stiffness and damping models that
describe each component, which may be the source of initial errors in the esti-
mation of the component’s response. Therefore special care should be devoted to
the definition of the component behaviour, especially regarding the selection of a
relevant equivalent damping relation for each component type.
• The failure of the simplified approaches to accurately predict the specific response
of individual components prevents the use of these methods in the present study,
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where the derivation of component fragility curves and the identification of joint
failure modes are essential steps. Therefore the use of non-linear time-history
analyses is advocated for the derivation of seismic fragility curves in the rest of
the study, even though they come at the cost of higher computational loads.
4.8 Conclusion
This Chapter has detailed the derivation of component fragility curves for the different
hazard-specific failure modes. All computations have been applied to a generic bridge
model, for which characteristics of the waterway and surrounding soil are assumed;
the emphasis is put on the methodological developments, in order to provide relevant
modelling tools for real-life applications.
It has been shown that the most accurate way to derive seismic fragility curves is to
perform non-linear time-history analyses on a finite-element model. Simplified methods
that are inspired from DDBA might provide accurate results for system-level fragility
curves and specific bridge types (e.g. continuous decks): however these methods fail
to deliver accurate component fragility curves, which are crucial elements within the
proposed method. Moreover, the nature of some simplified approaches, such as EMA,
prevents the computation of the correlation matrix between components: again, the
correlation structure is required to determine the joint probability of occurrence of the
damage events. Therefore the use of these simplified analysis approaches is not advisable
in the present context, where the quantification of low-probability high-consequence
events is one of the main objectives (i.e. the use of such simplified methods would
generate large discrepancies, especially when damage events have to predicted around
the tails of the fragility curves).
Regarding other hazard types, the concept of fragility is less advanced, which explains
the scarcity of available analytical methods. Therefore the probability of soil subsidence
is quantified through literature-based fragility curves, while static equilibrium equations
are used to assess the probability of slope failure. On the other hand, fragility curves
for scour are based on empirical equations for which the parameters are probabilistically
sampled.
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One of the challenges that has not been addressed is the multiplicity of fragility deriva-
tion methods for the different hazard types (see Figure 4.32). Some approaches include
the variability of modelling parameters, while others account for the uncertainty on
hazard loading (i.e. earthquakes), which hinders the harmonisation of all uncertainty
sources. Such a standardisation is not always possible between the hazard types consid-
ered, since it would require models of equal ‘quality’ that may be used with sufficient
data (e.g. similar ‘completeness of empirical data or measurements for each hazard
type), in order to propagate the same level of uncertainty through each fragility curve.
However, the fact that each hazard type is treated within different fields, with differ-
ent philosophies with respect to risk assessment, makes this harmonization a pending
issue. If this harmonisation cannot be achieved, then there is the risk that some fragility
curves will not account for all sources of uncertainty. As a result, the estimated loss
distributions would lead to an over- or under-estimation of extreme events, which would
be problematic when comparing losses between single hazard types.
Finally, once these component fragility curves have been derived, they must be assembled
in order to compute joint occurrences of some damage events, with the ultimate goal of
estimating functionality losses at the level of the bridge system: this further step will
be the object of Chapter 5.
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Figure 4.32: Summary of the fragility derivation methods considered for the combi-
nations of components and hazards.
Chapter 5
Derivation of Hazard-harmonized
System Fragility Curves
5.1 Introduction
Unlike residential buildings where the estimation of physical damage states is of paramount
importance to predict potential losses of life, infrastructure elements of physical systems
(e.g. bridges in a road network) are mainly characterized by the function they have
to fulfil in order to ensure the system’s performance [Modaressi et al., 2014]. There-
fore fragility models for infrastructure objects should be directly linked to functionality
states, so that accurate probabilistic assessments of the downtime or reduced function-
ality of infrastructure systems can be carried out. Moreover, since spatially distributed
infrastructure systems such as road networks may be exposed to a variety of natu-
ral hazards [Deng et al., 2015], the direct reinterpretation of loss in terms of decreasing
functionality levels allows for a harmonization of the potential impacts between multiple
hazard types, without being hindered by the analysis of specific and often irreconcilable
failure mechanisms. The critical role of the relationship between bridge damage and
functionality loss has already been highlighted by Padgett and DesRoches [2007], who
use the outcomes of a Web-based survey in the U.S. to define damage states in terms
of restoration of functionality. In parallel, Mackie and Stojadinovic [2006] have used
bridge column damage to identify the induced repair cost and loss of vertical load ca-
pacity, which are essential metrics for the post-earthquake evaluation of highway bridges.
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To this end, the component fragility curves that have been derived for each hazard type
and for each specific failure mechanism (Chapter 4) and the associated functionality
losses (Chapter 3) are assembled in order to specify system failure modes. By relating
different functionality levels to the various component damage states, the corresponding
system fragility curves can then be assembled in order to express the probability of
occurrence of specific failure modes that correspond to similar levels of functionality
loss.
The quantification of the probability of failure of a given system may constitute a direct
application of reliability analysis methods. Reliability engineering represents the field
that studies dependability in the lifecycle management of a product, i.e. the ability
of a system or component to function under given conditions for a specified period of
time. Therefore reliability analysis has mainly emerged as a discipline in manufactur-
ing industries (e.g. car industry), before being applied to civil engineering structures
subjected to various loadings [Lemaire et al., 2005]. In the reliability theory, a system’s
or component’s reliability is represented by a limit state function g, which is usually
defined as the difference between the resistance R (i.e. capacity) and the load S (i.e.
demand):
g (R,S) = R− S (5.1)
Therefore the probability of failure Pf corresponds to the probability of the resistance
R being exceeded by the load S (i.e. the component or the system enters the failure
region defined by the limit state function):
Pf = Pr (R ≤ S) = Pr [g (R,S) ≤ 0] (5.2)
If it is assumed that R and S follow a Gaussian distribution, the margin variable Z =
R−S is also Gaussian, with mean µZ and standard-deviation σZ [Benjamin and Cornell,
1970]. The probability of failure is then given by:
Pf = Pr (Z ≤ 0) = Φ
(
−µZ
σZ
)
(5.3)
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where Φ is the standard normal probability density function. Therefore the probability
of failure is completely characterised by the factor βc = −µZ/σZ , which is called the
reliability index.
In the case of system comprising a set of components, statistical tools such as reliability
block diagrams or fault trees may be used to facilitate the calculation of the probability
of failure of the whole system (see Subsection 2.1.2.2). More recently, matrix-based
system reliability methods [Song and Kang, 2009] have proven their ability to tackle
the problem at hand, especially regarding the issue of statistical dependence between
components, as detailed in Section 5.2. However, their application to large structural
systems with numerous components should be investigated in detail, in order to ensure
that such approaches are suitable for the systematic analysis of a wide range of systems,
especially in a multi-hazard context where more than one loading may be applied.
As an alternative, the Bayesian Network (BN) methodology, which has been introduced
by Bensi et al. [2011] in the context of seismic risk, may be used in both the hazard and
fragility assessment steps, thus potentially providing a seamless risk analysis framework
(see Section 5.3). Siraj et al. [2015] have also introduced BNs for the fragility assessment
of high-voltage transformers with respect to seismic risk, while accounting for various
failure modes. However, although some BN formulations have been proposed for risk
or fragility assessments, there are relatively few examples of their applications to real-
world systems. Therefore Section 5.4 discusses the applicability of an efficient BN-based
procedure for fragility assessment and its potential merits with respect to the matrix-
based system reliability method.
Two applications are then presented in order to demonstrate the capabilities of the
proposed BN approach. First, a fragility assessment is conducted on a bridge system
that is exposed to multiple hazard events, namely earthquakes, ground failures and
floods, thus taking advantage of the modularity of the method (see Section 5.5). While
several studies have developed multi-hazard fragility functions for bridges, especially
regarding the joint effect of scour and seismic hazard [Alipour et al., 2012, Prasad and
Banerjee, 2013], it is anticipated that the proposed BN approach can provide a more
generic framework with the possibility to integrate additional failure mechanisms and
cumulated damage models. Secondly, Section 5.6 focuses on the fragility assessment of
the same bridge system for single seismic hazard. The BN structure is slightly modified
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in order to directly express the probabilistic distribution of functionality losses with
respect to the seismic intensity, thus generating harmonized functionality curves.
5.2 The Matrix-based System Reliability Method
The matrix-based system reliability (MSR) method has been formalized by Song and
Kang [2009] and Kang et al. [2008]. Its main principles constitute a robust framework
for system failure analysis and hence they also represent the underlying assumptions of
the BN application method developed here.
Specifically, it is assumed that for a system with n components, each component i has ki
states. The sample space is composed of m =
∏n
i=1 ki events ej=1..m, mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive (MECE). Therefore, a given system event can be associated
with a vector c of length m, whose jth element is a binary variable indicating whether
the MECE event ej is a part of the system event or not. Hence, if the probability pj of
the occurrence of ej can be quantified, the probability of the system event Esys can be
directly expressed as a vector product, using the MECE property:
P (Esys) =
∑
j:ej⊆Esys
pj = c
t · p (5.4)
In the present context, the MSR method is applied to a structural system, which com-
prises components that are statistically dependent on each other, due to the common
loading that is applied to them (e.g. acceleration time-history). To account for this
condition Kang et al. [2008] have introduced a set of common source random variables
(CSRVs), represented by vector x, so that the component failures conditional on x are
statistically independent, using the theorem of total probability. Equation 5.4 can be
written as:
P (Esys) =
∫
x
P(Esys|x) · f(x) · dx =
∫
x
ct · p(x) · f(x) · dx (5.5)
where f(x) is the joint probability density function of the CSRVs contained in vector x.
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Song and Kang [2009] have introduced a correlation model based on the Dunnett-Sobel
class of variables [Dunnett and Sobel, 1955] U and V, which are used to rebuild the
covariance matrix of the failure events. Using a reliability analysis for each component
i, the component failure can be expressed as the condition Zi ≤ −βi, where Zi is a
standard normal variable and βi represents the component reliability index. Therefore
the variable Zi can be expressed as the following:
Zi =
√√√√1− k∑
j=1
r2ij · Vi +
k∑
j=1
rij · Uj (5.6)
where Vi and Uj are independent and identically distributed standard normal variables,
k is the number of CSRVs that are required depending on the complexity of the problem
and the correlation structure (i.e. the dimension of CSRV vector x), and ril is a Dunnett-
Sobel coefficient that is used to emulate the correlation coefficient between variables Zi
and Zl:
ρil =
k∑
j=1
rij · rlj if i 6= l (5.7)
The coefficients rij can be found through an optimization routine, with the objective of
minimizing the difference between the observed correlation matrix of the Zi variables
and the matrix assembled from the correlation coefficients estimated in Equation 5.7.
Depending on the type of problem and the required accuracy level, either a single CSRV
(i.e. k = 1) may be enough or several ones may be necessary in order to achieve a
satisfying Dunnett-Sobel model: the effect of the Dunnett-Sobel fitting error on the
system failure probability has been studied by Kang et al. [2012] for various system
configurations.
Moreover, if the structural system is assumed to work in-series, as it is the case here,
a system failure event is defined by the failure of at least one of n components. The
corresponding system fragility curve can be expressed as the following, if lognormal-
based fragility curves for component failures are used:
Psys (IM) = 1−
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(x) ·
n∏
i=1
1− Φ
 log IM−logαiβi + ri1 · x√
1− r2i1
 · dx (5.8)
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where IM is the intensity measure (i.e. loading parameter), φ is the standard normal
probability density function, Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
ri1 is the Dunnett-Sobel coefficient (when the number of CRSVs k = 1) and αi and βi
are the fragility parameters for component i (i.e. median and standard deviation of log).
It should be noted that Equation 5.8 is valid for k = 1 and that the use of additional
CSRVs would require the computation of double or triple integrals, and so on. The whole
MSR procedure is available in a Matlab-based code [The MathWorks, 2013], namely the
FERUM (Finite Element Reliability Using Matlab) toolbox [Der Kiureghian et al., 1999].
5.3 General Principles of Bayesian Network Modelling
As an alternative to the MSR method, a formulation of the problem with Bayesian
Networks (BNs) is investigated, in order to verify the capabilities of this alternative
in terms of computational efficiency and flexibility (i.e. ability to treat a wide range
of systems). The BN theory has already been thoroughly detailed in the context of
the seismic risk analysis of infrastructure systems [Bensi et al., 2011], where BNs are
used to model spatially distributed seismic demand, as well as component and system
performance. In the present study, the emphasis is put on the Bayesian graphs that are
necessary to assess the fragility of structural systems such as bridges.
5.3.1 General Definitions
A BN takes the form of a directed acyclic graph (DAG), which comprises edges and nodes.
Nodes are classified as parents or children depending on the direction of the edges. A
node without any parents is referred to as a root node (see example in Figure 5.1).
Each node represents an event that may take different states (e.g. survival or failure
for a node representing an infrastructure component). The probability of each state is
given by a conditional probability table (CPT), which represents the probabilities given
the states of the parents (see Table 5.1): in the case of a root node, the CPT becomes a
table of marginal probabilities (e.g. assumed probability distribution for a given input
variable). It can be noticed that the CPT grows exponentially with the number of
parents, which usually generates computational issues when large BNs are solved.
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Figure 5.1: Example of a BN with 5 nodes (C1 and C2 are root nodes).
Table 5.1: Example of the CPT defining node C3, assuming binary states for C1,
C2 and C3.
C1 C2 C3 CPT
0 0 0 Pr (C3 = 0|C1 = 0,C2 = 0)
1 0 0 Pr (C3 = 0|C1 = 1,C2 = 0)
0 1 0 Pr (C3 = 0|C1 = 0,C2 = 1)
1 1 0 Pr (C3 = 0|C1 = 1,C2 = 1)
0 0 1 Pr (C3 = 1|C1 = 0,C2 = 0)
1 0 1 Pr (C3 = 1|C1 = 1,C2 = 0)
0 1 1 Pr (C3 = 1|C1 = 0,C2 = 1)
1 1 1 Pr (C3 = 1|C1 = 1,C2 = 1)
An inference is performed on the BN when one or more nodes are observed (i.e. evidence
is entered by specifying a given state) and when the probabilities of the other nodes are
updated. In the case of a forward analysis, evidence may be entered at the root nodes
and the updated distributions can be estimated at the child nodes (e.g. distribution of
infrastructure losses given the occurrence of some natural hazard events). Conversely, a
backward analysis consists in the inference of the root nodes based on the observation
of a given child node (e.g. updated distribution of the occurrence rate of some natural
events given the observation of a given loss level).
5.3.2 The Junction-Tree Inference Algorithm
The junction-tree algorithm allows to perform an exact inference on the BN, which
results in exact probability distributions at the nodes of interests. The algorithm is
based on the following steps (see Figure 5.2), while the construction of a junction tree
is demonstrated in Appendix F:
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Figure 5.2: (a) Junction-tree algorithm applied to the BN example and (b) corre-
sponding junction-tree containing the cliques.
1. Moralization of the BN: all edges are represented as undirected links, and all the
parents of a same node are linked by a new undirected edge, if they were not
previously linked.
2. The moral graph is used to successively remove nodes until the whole graph is
eliminated.
3. When a given node is removed, its adjacent nodes are connected through additional
undirected edges (i.e. fill-in edges), if they were not previously linked. Then a
clique is formed by the eliminated node and all its adjacent nodes.
4. Another node is eliminated, and so on. . . A new clique is generated only if it is
not a sub-group of previous cliques.
5. Once all nodes have been eliminated, all the successive cliques form the junction
tree.
6. The potential (i.e. joint probabilities) of each clique needs to be computed. Once
this operation is complete, the junction tree may be used for any inference of the
BN.
It appears that the elimination order in the moral graph has a major influence on
the computational load of the inference, since the early or late removal of some nodes
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may generate non-optimal clique sizes, which may lead to an intractable number of
probabilities to be evaluated. However, it has been shown that the determination of
the optimal elimination order is an NP-hard problem [Franchin and Laura, 2014, Wen,
1990]. In practice, BN software such as the Bayes Net toolbox [Murphy, 2007] propose a
partial optimization, whereby the next node that will generate either the least amount
of fill-in edges or the smallest clique size is chosen: however, this method may still lead
to elimination orders that lead to local optimal solutions only. Different elimination
strategies have been studied by Kjaerulff [1990], depending on the topological structure
of the BN.
5.4 Application of Bayesian Networks to the Reliability
Assessment of Bridge Systems
This section describes the use of BNs to assemble component fragility curves into fragility
functions at the system level. A comparative analysis is also proposed with respect to
the matrix-based system reliability method.
5.4.1 Bayesian Network Structure
Define a BN that starts from the node(s) representing the hazard(s) loading and ends
up with the node(s) representing the system event(s). The upstream part of the BN is
composed of the following nodes (see Figure 5.3):
• root node(s) IM representing the hazard(s) loading applied to the n components;
• root node(s) U1 ... Uk representing the standard normal variables that are com-
mon to all components (k represents the number of CSRVs used to emulate the
correlation structure), as introduced in Equation 5.6;
• root nodes V1 ... Vn representing the standard normal variables that are specific
to each component (n represents the number of components in the system), as
introduced in Equation 5.6;
• nodes C1 ... Cn representing the component failure events.
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Figure 5.3: Bayesian Networks accounting for statistical dependence between com-
ponent failures (one CSRV on the left, two CSRVs on the right), for a system with six
in-series components.
As proposed in Bensi et al. [2011], Dunnett-Sobel classes can be modelled in BNs by
creating root nodes (i.e. U and V) with a conditional probability table containing the
discretised standard normal distribution. In the case that only one CSRV is needed, a
component-event node Ci has three parent nodes, namely IM, U1 and Vi. For each
combination of sampled values {im;u1; vi}, the failure event of component i is expressed
as the following condition:
(
zi =
√
1− r2i · v2i + ri · u1
)
≥ − log im− logαi
βi
(5.9)
Using the corresponding probability density of values vi and u1, the final failure prob-
ability of component i can be calculated through Bayesian inference for any values of
im.
The downstream part of the BN deals with the estimation of the system failure event,
starting from the component events. Due to memory limitations in the size of the
CPTs, a single system-level node SYS being the child of all component nodes (i.e.
converging structure) is not recommended nor computationally realistic. A system with
n components would result in a CPT of 2n+1 elements, assuming only binary states
for the failure events. In the case of spatially distributed network systems, Bensi et al.
Bensi et al. [2013] have introduced elaborate modeling strategies to build BNs based
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on the identification of minimum link sets or cut sets. In the present study, however,
the system considered is a single bridge structure that results from the assembly of
structural components: it is expected that the definition of the system failure modes
will result in much simpler formulations, which can be modelled through a few basic BN
layouts, as detailed below. In practice, a bridge system may experience different system
failures modes: it is likely that a given system failure mode is only related to a subset
of components (e.g. only piers), while another system failure mode depends only on
other types of components (e.g. superstructure elements). Then, each of these subsets
of components corresponds to an in-series sub-system, for which a set of intermediate
nodes can be defined in order to gradually reduce the number of parent nodes and the
size of the CPTs, via two different strategies (see Figure 5.4):
• Layout 1: the component-event nodes are associated two by two, generating a layer
of n/2 (or [n− 1] /2 if n is an odd number) intermediate nodes Ini. The nodes on
this first layer are again linked two by two, and so on, until only two nodes are
left to define the SYS node.
• Layout 2: the first two component-event nodes create a first intermediate node
In1, which is in turn linked to the next component-event node in order to define
another intermediate node In2, and so on, until there are no component-event
nodes left. The last intermediate node then becomes the SYS node. This layout
corresponds to a chain-like BN topology, which has been acknowledged as more
computationally efficient than a converging structure [Bensi et al., 2013].
Multiple system failure modes for a given bridge are then assembled as shown on the
left of Figure 5.5, which presents the case of a system with two failure modes, one being
based on the state of the first three components, the other being based on the remaining
components. This example shows the assembly of the two failure modes, which are in
turn composed of a chain structure corresponding to the layout 2 of Figure 5.4. It is
crucial to represent all possible system failure modes on the same BN structure, since
this will enable the computation of the joint probability of occurrence of these failure
modes, instead of only their respective marginal probability distribution. Finally, the
SYS node assembles the different system failure modes into a unique indicator, which
quantifies for instance the functional losses endured by the bridge system: the CPT
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Figure 5.4: Two possible layouts for intermediate nodes, for a system with six in-
series components. Each of the intermediate nodes represents an intermediate state of
the partial combination of the components, in order to limit the computational load.
of this node may be built as a Boolean table representing the hierarchy or even the
combination of the different failure modes in the case they have a joint occurrence. Its
definition is entirely subjected to the modeller’s definition of the system failure modes
and their consequences in terms of induced functionality levels.
In the case where the bridge components may enter multiple damage states, each of
these component damage states have to be considered as a potential contributor to one
of the system failure modes. For instance, piers in a slight damage state may be part of
a given failure mode (e.g. yielding of substructure elements), while piers a in collapse
state may induce a different one (e.g. full failure of the bridge). Such a model is shown
on the right of Figure 5.5, where intermediate component nodes with a binary output are
inserted in order to decompose the states of the initial component nodes. Three states
are assumed for each of the six components (i.e. ‘intact’,‘DS1’ and ‘DS2’), so that each
Ci node generates two child nodes Ci1 (i.e. with states ‘intact’ and ‘D1/D2’) and Ci2
(i.e. with states ‘intact/D1’ and ‘D2’). This intermediate step enables the treatment of
each component damage state as individual contributors to the different system failure
modes. It also has the merit of harmonizing the formulation of the various intermediate
nodes, which can all be described with binary states.
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Figure 5.5: BN structure for components with multiple damage states (left), and BN
structure for a system with two failure modes (right).
The simple non-exhaustive configurations developed above demonstrate the capabilities
of the BN formulation, namely:
• the capacity to deal with a large number of components, especially through the
use of intermediate nodes;
• the flexibility in the BN construction, which allows to account for multiple damage
states and multiple system failure modes;
• the simultaneous computation of the joint probability of all failure modes, which
can represent a significant gain in computation time.
As a result, the proposed BN procedure has been implemented into a Matlab-based code
using the Bayes Net toolbox [Murphy, 2007]. The elementary configurations presented in
Figures 5.3 to 5.5 can all be generated using straightforward algorithms: they may hence
be used as bricks to automatically generate BNs for more complex systems, provided that
the necessary input parameters are specified (i.e. number of components, correlation
matrix between the component events, fragility parameters and damage states of the
components, number of failure modes, component events for each failure mode, number
of CSRVs). Currently, only up to two CSRVs have been implemented, mainly due to
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the huge computational burden more CSRVs would represent, without a significant gain
in accuracy: each time another CSRV is added, the size of the CPT of each Ci node
is multiplied by the number of discrete states of the CSRV root node, which leads to
an exponential increase in the CPT size. Moreover, the Bayes Net toolbox includes a
junction-tree algorithm, which allows for exact inference of the events’ probability.
The formulation and computation of such a BN, as it is implemented in the Bayes Net
toolbox, are detailed in Appendix F.
5.4.2 Performance of the Bayesian Network Structure
The performance of the BN approach with respect to the MSR method is compared in
terms of accuracy and computation time. To this end, a hypothetical system with n in-
series components is designed and the system fragility curve is assembled for increasing
values of n (up to 60). Different configurations are tested, by varying the number of
CSRVs (i.e. one or two) or the BN layout (see Figure 5.4).
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Figure 5.6: Computation time for various modelling strategies of a system with in-
series components (left) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance between the BN- and the
MSR-based system fragility curves (right).
The computation time is compared with the MSR method in Figure 5.6 left, using a
personal computer with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 processor and 16 GB RAM. It can be
seen that the computation time has almost a linear growth rate when the BN approach is
used, even when 60 components are considered. The addition of a second CSRVs tends to
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Table 5.2: For different system sizes, composition of the largest clique in terms of
node types, and number of elements in the clique potential.
] of Nodes in Size of
components largest clique potential
10 [9 C, 2 U, 1 IM] 369 664
11 [10 C, 2 U, 1 IM] 739 328
12 [11 C, 2 U, 1 IM] 1 478 656
13 [12 C, 2 U, 1 IM] 2 957 312
14 [9 C, 2 U, 1 IM] 369 664
double the computational load, even though the overall time remains reasonable. With
two CSRVs, differences between the two BN layouts are also observed: layout 2 seems
more efficient for most of the values of n, however there are periodic values where the
computation time is dramatically increasing. Some details of the junction tree algorithm
are presented in Table 5.2 for different numbers of components: it can be seen that the
size of the largest clique potential is directly related to the computation time. As the
number of component nodes included in the largest clique increases, the potential size
is multiplied by the number of states of the extra component (i.e. binary states in the
present case). For the system with 14 components, it appears that the elimination order
is slightly different, leading to a final clique containing only 9 component nodes, as for
the system with 10 components. This phenomenon is due to the fact that the junction-
tree algorithm used in Bayes Net is not able to evaluate all possible elimination orders
(i.e. an NP-hard problem [Wen, 1990]): a sequential ordering algorithm is used, which
eliminates the node that generates the lightest clique weight and considers the minimum
amount of added edges in case of tied nodes. Therefore, for some specific n values, the
elimination algorithm may find non-optimal solutions that have the effect of lengthening
the computation time. While the Bayes Net toolbox has been used here, other software
might propose more elaborate elimination order algorithms, which may consider for
instance 2 or 3 node elimination steps at a time: however such algorithms would come
at the cost of heavir computations, without necessarily delivering the optimal elimination
sequence.
Finally, it appears that the MSR method using the FERUM toolbox is at first insensitive
to the number of components, until around 25 components: then, the computation time
starts to exponentially increase until the program fails due to memory overflow. This
issue is due to the manipulation of the event vector c, which has to contain 2n elements:
it could be argued, however, that a multi-scale reliability analysis Der Kiureghian and
Chapter 5. Derivation of hazard-harmonized system fragility curves 148
Song [2008] may be used in order to decompose the problem into a set of sub-systems.
One of the main drawbacks of the BN formulation is the CPTs that require the use
of discrete variables: therefore continuous variables have to be discretized beforehand,
while the level of resolution of the discretization will influence the size of the correspond-
ing CPTs and, consequently, the computational load. In the present context, continuous
variables Vi and Uj have been broken down into 19 discrete segments, in order to ap-
proximate the continuous standard normal distribution. System fragility curves derived
from n in-series components are used to check the accuracy of the BN method with
respect to the MSR approach, which is based on a more refined numerical estimation of
the integral in Equation 5.8. To this end, arbitrary component fragility curves are built
by randomly selecting means µi in the [0.5; 5.0] m/s
2 interval and standard deviations
σi in the [0.3; 1.0] interval, while the elements in the correlation matrix are selected from
the [0.5; 0.95] range. These parameters have been chosen so that they represent the val-
ues that are generally used for seismic fragility curves: their actual values are not that
essential for this hypothetical test, since the objective is to compare the computation
time and the accuracy between the MSR method and the Bayesian formulation. System
fragility curves are compared by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance as an
accuracy indicator: this metric represents the maximum difference between two fragility
curves over the whole range of IM .
The results of this accuracy test are displayed in Figure 5.6 right: they show that the K-
S measure oscillates around 0.01, which represents a very satisfying level. Whether one
or two CSRVs are used does not make a significant difference, even though the results
with two CSRVs tend to be more stable. Finally, a slight increase of the K-S distance
with the number of components can be observed, but the values remain reasonable even
for a large number of components.
5.5 Application: Multi-risk Fragility Functions for a Bridge
System
This section applies the BN framework to the multi-risk fragility analysis of the bridge
system that has been introduced in Chapter 4, following the work by Gehl and D’Ayala
[2015, 2016]. The component fragility curves that have been previously derived are
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directly used here, while the corresponding fragility parameters are summarized in Ap-
pendix E.
5.5.1 Multi-Hazard Context
The considered bridge system is subjected to multiple loading mechanisms due to earth-
quake (EQ), ground failure (GF) and flood (FL) events. These three hazard events have
been identified by Deng et al. [2015] as the main natural causes of bridge collapses in
the United States in the 1990s. They have been chosen because they may affect a wide
range of bridge components (see Tables 3.8 and 5.3) through various failure mechanisms:
• Earthquakes affect most of the structural components of the bridge: abutments,
piers, bearings, shear keys. Deck unseating may occur if large enough deformations
are recorded for either bearings or shear keys in the longitudinal and transversal
directions, respectively.
• Fluvial floods are the source of hydraulic forces that may damage shear keys or even
dislodge deck spans in extreme cases [Padgett et al., 2008a], while flood-induced
scour may excavate pier foundations.
• Ground failures are likely to affect the approach embankment, as the difference in
foundation depth and soil between the embankment and the bridge usually leads
to vertical settlement [Puppala et al., 2009]. Deep-seated circular landslides may
lead to the failure of abutment foundations.
Table 5.3: Bridge components and corresponding hazard types to which they are
susceptible.
Component EQ FL GF
Pier foundation X
Pier X
Bearing X
Deck X
Abutment foundation X
Abutment X
Embankment X
Shear key X X
Using the event taxonomy proposed by Lee and Sternberg [2008], the three hazard
types considered here offer the opportunity to analyse combined events, i.e. a single
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event triggering multiple loading mechanisms such as an EQ event triggering a GF
event, as well as subsequent events, i.e. unrelated single events triggered by different
sources and possibly separated in time, such as a FL event followed by an EQ event.
Therefore a flexible fragility model needs to be developed, where different hazard loading
configurations can be taken into account, specifically:
• fragility to a single FL event;
• cumulated fragility to combined EQ and GF events;
• cumulated fragility to subsequent FL and EQ events (plus triggered GF event, if
any).
In this multi-hazard context, the modularity of the BN approach can prove to be very
useful to combine the hazard-specific damage probabilities for each component, so that
multi-hazard system-level fragility functions can be derived.
5.5.2 Definition of system failure modes
According to the above discussions (see section 3.4), it is proposed to define a set of
functionality loss levels and to associate them with specific system damage events, in
order to identify the various damage configurations that may lead to similar consequences
in terms of bridge closing time or repair operations.
These metrics represent the ultimate objective of the proposed BN approach, since they
enable to evaluate the bridge performance in terms of functionality, regardless of the
component damage event or sequence of hazard events that led to it. Therefore this
framework is able to harmonize a system-level fragility function across multiple hazard
types. Instead of speaking in terms of ‘system damage states’, which implies a clear
hierarchy in the severity of the damage states, it is more appropriate to refer to ‘system
failure modes’, which allows for consideration of either intersecting or disjoint sample
spaces, as explained in the remainder of this section and as illustrated in Figure 5.7.
In particular this approach decouples the direct correlation between severity of hazard
event and magnitude of consequence, which is implicit in the damage state definition.
Identifying different failure modes which may or may-not occur concurrently with dif-
ferent probability levels, allows to investigate the direct effect on functionality of low
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probability events, with modest independent intensity, but high consequences. There-
fore, based on simple considerations on the severity of each component damage state and
on the corresponding functionality loss levels they might induce, a rationale is proposed
here in order to identify homogeneous system failure modes:
• Failure mode F1 corresponds to slight damage only to approach embankments
(D1), as such damage would not have a significant impact on the bridge function-
ality, even though repair operations would be eventually necessary. This failure
mode may correspond to a functionality loss level FL1, implying slight repairs but
no closing time;
• Failure mode F2 corresponds to minor structural damage to bridge components
(i.e. the occurrence of any of piers, abutments, bearings and shear keys in damage
state D1 due to earthquake, approach embankments in damage state D2 due to
ground failure, damaged shear keys D1 due to fluvial flood). This class of failure
mode may correspond to a functionality loss level FL2, implying moderate repairs
with a short closing time;
• Failure mode F3 corresponds to a deck unseating event that induces long term
closure of the bridge, even though temporary deck spans could be installed if the
substructure components have not collapsed (i.e. deck unseating D2 due to fluvial
flood, bearings and shear keys in damage state D2 due to earthquake). This failure
mode may correspond to a functionality loss level FL3, implying extensive repairs
with a prolonged closing time.
• Failure mode F4 corresponds to substructure components that have collapsed, thus
inducing the total failure of the bridge system (i.e. piers and abutments in damage
state D2 due to earthquake, scour damage state D3 at pier foundations, slope
failure D1 beneath abutment foundations). This failure mode may correspond to
a functionality loss level FL4, implying irreparable damage (e.g. full collapse of
the bridge system).
These failure modes are summarized in Table 5.4, where all the in-series component
damage events are detailed for each mode. They are also qualitatively represented as
Venn diagrams in Figure 5.7 in order to demonstrate that they do not follow a clear
hierarchy unlike regular damage states. The objective of such a representation is to
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Figure 5.7: Venn diagrams qualitatively representing four failure modes and how they
are assembled in order to specify the four functionality levels (grey area). F3 appears
to be nested inside F2 because a quick analysis of the component failures leading to
these failure modes reveals that the occurrence of F3 necessarily implies the occurrence
of F2.
emphasize the difference between the failure modes Fi and functionality levels FLi: a
failure mode corresponds to a set of specfic events that have occurred within the system,
while the functionality level is linked to the consequences of this failure mode. Since a
low impact failure mode, such as F1, is very likely to occur whenever an heavier failure
mode such as F2 is reached, the Venn diagrams are here to show how the functionality
levels are computed in the case of disjoint or intersecting damage states. Corresponding
functionality loss levels, on the other hand, show a gradation in the repair costs and
closing time. Therefore it can be argued that, when two failure modes have a joint
occurrence, the most severe functionality loss level is assumed (see right of Figure 5.7).
Table 5.4: Component damage states from the different hazard events leading to
the four failure modes. For simplification purposes, only the component classes are
displayed, and not the specific instances (e.g. only the component class bearing B is
mentioned, to which six components belong in the actual model, while the number of
them actually failing is not explicitly referred to). The x and y letters represent the
component responses in the longitudinal and transversal directions, respectively. De
represents the deck, Em the approach embankment, Pf the pier foundation and Af the
abutment foundations.
Failure mode FL EQ GF
F1 - - Em(D1)
F2 De(D1) Px(D1), Py(D1), Ax(D1), B(D1), Sh(D1) Em(D2)
F3 De(D2) B(D2), Sh(D2) -
F4 Pf(D3) Px(D2), Py(D2) Af(D1)
Finally, it should be noted that the proposed failure modes and functionality loss levels
are mostly based on few literature references detailing usual causes of bridge failures
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[Deng et al., 2015, Doll and Sieber, 2011, Lebbe et al., 2014] or post-disaster accounts
[Elnashai et al., 2010]. Thanks to the expert-based survey aimed at quantifying func-
tional consequences from component damage states (see section 3.4), this qualitative
rationale may be refined in order to obtain estimate of the expected functionality losses,
downtime durations or repair costs. Due the lack of sufficient data to derive accurate
functionality loss models, a more qualitative approach is adopted here, where rough loss
estimations are proposed for each failure mode for the sake of the demonstration. As a
result, estimated bounds for functional consequence metrics are proposed in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Estimation of approximate loss metrics for the four failure modes identified,
according to the INFRARISK expert-based survey. Du refers to duration of repair
operations, FL to functional loss, FLI to functional loss during intervention and Co
to cost of repairs.
Failure mode Du FL FLI Co
F1 - - - -
F2 1-90 days 0%− 25% (speed) 0%− 10% (speed) 0%− 20%
F3 60-120 days 100% closed lanes 75% closed lanes 20%
F4 90-150 days 100% closed lanes 100% closed lanes 20%− 100%
Regarding failure mode 1 (i.e. slight subsidence of abutment approach), it is difficult
to quantify the functional losses due to the very low damage extent: a 100% remaining
functionality with very fast repair operations (e.g. less than a day) might be assumed.
5.5.3 Bayesian Inference for the Joint Derivation of System Fragility
Functions
Once the component fragility curves and the system failure modes have been fully de-
scribed, it is possible to build the corresponding BN by using the various algorithms
described in section 5.4. A simplified graph of the BN is shown in Figure 5.8, where
components are represented by their class, as explained in Table 5.4. The actual BN
that has been solved with the Bayes Net toolbox contains each of the components of the
bridge model and results in 64 nodes and 140 edges.
Numerical seismic analyses of the bridge system (i.e. non-linear time history analyses)
enable to obtain a straightforward correlation matrix of the component responses, how-
ever this is not the case for floods and ground failures. It can however be assumed that
flood- and earthquake-related failures are statistically independent, therefore a correla-
tion factor of 0 is used between the damage events that are induced by different hazard
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Figure 5.8: Global Bayesian Network for the bridge system exposed to seismic and
flood loadings.
types. Therefore the correlation matrix is only built for earthquake-related events and
it is assembled from 20 elements (i.e. 10 bridge components in each direction, longitu-
dinal and transversal): the correlation values displayed in Figure 4.12 are used here for
damage events of seismic origin. One limitation of the BN construction in Figure 5.8 is
that the correlation coefficients ri do not evolve with the different bridge configurations
representing initial flood damage, since it may be expected that changes in the dynamic
properties of the bridge system will alter the component responses and therefore the
correlation matrix. However it has been observed that the changes are not significant
for the present case-study: in cases for which the evolution of the correlation matrix
would be too important to be neglected, additional BN nodes could still be added in
order to represent the possible values of ri.
In order to better explain the BN structure in Figure 5.8, the series of events leading to
the ‘deck unseating’ failure mode F3 can be summarized as follows (see Figure 5.9):
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• Deck unseating F3 occurs if one of the bearings (or shear keys) exceeds a given
deformation level (damage state D2) in the longitudinal (or transversal) direction
(i.e. component events B2 or Sh2), or if the deck (i.e. component event De2) is
directly upset by the fluvial flood (i.e. hazard event FL);
• Bearing (or shear key) deformation is triggered by seismic loading (i.e. hazard
event EQ) and may be modified by the state of the pier foundations (i.e. compo-
nent event Pf12);
• Piers foundations (i.e. component event Pf) are altered by scour due to fluvial
flood (i.e. hazard event FL);
• The seismic response of shear keys in the transversal direction is also influenced by
the damage to shear keys by deck tranversal discplacement (i.e. component event
De1) due to fluvial flood (i.e. hazard event FL).
Figure 5.9: Simplified Bayesian Network summarizing the chain of events potentially
leading to deck unseating.
For comparison purposes, a simplified event tree with deck unseating as a potential
outcome is also proposed in Figure 5.10. Such a graphical representation may be useful
to understand the chain of events that may lead to deck unseating, however it suffers
from many shortcomings when compared to the BN formulation:
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Figure 5.10: Simplified event tree summarizing the chain of events potentially leading
to deck unseating.
• The fact that the damage events must be represented in a sequential manner in the
event tree may compel the modeller to adopt arbitrary choices that have no bearing
on reality. For instance, in the case of seismic loading, the damage to bearings is
considered before the damage to shear keys, while the opposite configuration could
have been chosen as well. Therefore there is a risk that such an event tree might
be misinterpreted as a temporal sequence of events.
• The logical relations between damage events is not as obvious as in the case of the
BN formulation, where the presence of an edge necessarily implies an dependence
between two nodes. In the event tree, it becomes unclear whether the occurrence of
a given event will have an influence on the probability of occurrence of a subsequent
event. For instance, it has been demonstrated that the damage of pier foundations
due to scour will alter the seismic behaviour of other components, however both
options (i.e. scour effect or not) are represented the same way in the event tree.
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The probabilities of seismic damage to bearings should then be explicitely be
written on the event tree, in order to show that they are not the same depending on
the scour damage. Conversely, shear keys damaged by flood should have no effect
on the seismic behaviour of longitudinal bearings, therefore the same probabilities
have to be repeated for some branches of the event tree.
• The correlation structure between the damage event (especially for the seismic
loading) is not explicit in the event tree, even though it is implied by the event
probabilities (i.e. the joint probability of no damage to bearings and damage
to shear keys, P
(
BEQ, SHEQ
)
= P
(
BEQ
) · P (SHEQ|BEQ), can be found from
the event tree). However, as seen in Figure 5.5, the BN may be built so that
it computes the joint occurrence of all four failure modes, while such a feature
would only be accessible through an overcomplicated event tree that would lead
to cumbersome computations.
For each selected combination of values [PGA ; Q], the BN algorithm performs an
inference in order to estimate the probability of occurrence of each of the failure modes.
As a result, it is possible to express a system fragility function with respect to both
seismic and flood intensity measures (see Figure 5.11). The output of the BN inference
can be represented as fragility surfaces that express the failure probabilities with respect
to two statistically independent intensity measures. If either an FL event or an EQ
(triggering a GF) event has to be considered separately, the corresponding probabilities
of functional damage can be evaluated just by reading the function values along the
corresponding horizontal axis.
It can be seen that the effect of fluvial flood is mainly significant for heavier damage
states, such as full collapse (i.e. F4). This observation is in line with the fact that
pier foundation scour or shear key removal have the greatest influence on the seismic
response of bridge components for damage state D2. The [PGA ; Q] space where deck
unseating (i.e. F3) is the most likely to occur corresponds to very specific values of the
intensity measures: this is another interesting feature of the proposed BN approach,
since it enables to capture low probability failure modes that may only occur under
narrow ranges of combination of uncorrelated hazard events’ intensities. Although the
joint probability is low, the range of intensity of both hazards is relatively modest and
hence their probability of occurrence commensurable to the life span of the structure and
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Figure 5.11: Multi-hazard fragility functions for the four functionality levels, ex-
pressed as a function of Q (flow discharge) and PGA (peak ground acceleration).
comparable in intensity to their reference design value: hence the functionality losses
can be severe as they are unexpected. Such a result is very useful when low-probability
high-consequence events need to be identified, since it highlights the potential occurrence
of uncommon failure modes due to joint or cascading events, which may not have been
foreseen during the design of the bridge.
The proposed BN-based approach has proven its ability to isolate system failure modes
that are defined by specific damage events at the component level. The choice to convert
the four failure modes into four functionality levels (see Figure 5.7), which constitute
MECE events, has led to fragility functions that are directly applicable to multi-risk
analyses, since the functionality levels may be directly sampled from the four fragility
surfaces in Figure 5.11. Finally, these fragility functions may be referred to as hazard-
harmonized or even hazard-independent, since they are based on a unique functionality
scale, whatever the hazard type considered. Morevoer, the same fragility model may be
used for any hazard type, thus greatly simplifying multi-risk assessment procedures.
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5.6 Application: Functionality-driven Fragility Functions
for Seismic Risk
This section presents a more quantitative application of the proposed BN approach,
i.e. the component loss models from Section 3.4 are directly fed into the Bayesian
analysis with the objective of deriving probabilistic functionality curves for the bridge
system. This concept is demonstrated through the same bridge model that has been
presented in Section 5.5, except that initial intact conditions are assumed (i.e. seismic
fragility assessment only): as seen in Chapter 3, loss models are the most constrained
for earthquake-related damages, while the effects of other hazards on functionality loss
would require more investigations before being used in quantitative models.
5.6.1 Proposed BN Formulation
As discussed before, the proposed BN is based on the basic layouts presented in Fig-
ures 5.3 and 5.4. The main difference lies in the addition of a layer of functionality
nodes that convert the physical damages into functionality metrics (see Figure 5.12).
Out of the various metrics that have been considered, only two are selected here for
more clarity, i.e. (i) the repair duration and (ii) and the functional loss expressed either
in speed reduction or in lane closure. These two metrics are essential for the evaluation
of restoration scenarios or the application of traffic models to the road network.
For each loss metric, the component-level events are assembled into a system event S1
or S2 through intermediate nodes Ii that form a chain structure. Both loss metrics at
the system level are finally converging towards a final node SYS, which is mainly used
to compute the joint probability of occurrence of various repair durations and levels of
functional loss.
Finally, the components are considered to be able to take multiple damage states or
functionality states: the number of potential damage states corresponds to the ones
defined in Table 3.8, while a discretisation of the continuous loss variables is performed
(e.g. repair duration is divided into 10 time invervals). In the chain structure, the
rule for the aggregation of multi-state components is based on the assumption that the
maximum of the loss induced by each component is kept at each step. Other assumptions
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Figure 5.12: BN formulation for the quantification of functional consequences, for
a bridge system with six structural components. Dui nodes represent repair duration
and Fli the functional loss induced by each component.
could be made, such as performing the sum of each component-induced loss instead of
taking the maximum. However, the maximum value makes more sense when dealing
with functional losses: the component event that is the most penalising for the system
performance takes precedence. In the case of repair duration, it might be argued that
intervention times are more likely to be aggregated: however, it is very likely that repair
operations are performed at the same time for all structural components, thus resulting
in a repair duration that is not necessarily much higher than the one required for the
worst hit component.
5.6.2 Component Fragility Curves
In order to associate the component damage states with the component loss models, the
same component failure modes as the ones detailed in Table 3.8 must be selected. In
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the present example, the type of components present in the bridge system (e.g. piers,
abutments, elastomeric bearings and shear keys) leads to the selection of failure modes
#1, 4, 5, 6 and 13. The shear failure of piers is not included, since a preliminary analysis
has shown that the piers in this example are only damaged through flexural behaviour.
A series of pushover analyses is then performed on the structural model of each com-
ponent type (while adopting the same kinematic conditions as if the components were
connected to the bridge system), in order to identify the specific limit states that should
correspond to the qualitative descriptions of the failure modes (see Table 5.6):
• Piers: the four limit states are determined by using the Bayesian updated limit
scale proposed by Nielson [2005], which is based on ratios of the yield curvature.
• Abutments: the successive knees of the stiffness model are taken as limit states for
both active and passive behaviours, as they correspond roughly to the description
of the damage states. Along the transversal loading direction (Y ), only piles are
solicited and no passive behaviour is taken into account.
• Shear keys: the first damage state, corresponding to gap closure, is identified by
the deformation level that starts to activate the actual RC key. Since a pure shear
failure model is used in the example, second and third damage states occur for the
same deformation level, i.e. when the RC key fails. Finally, the last damage state
is described by deck unseating, which corresponds to a deformation that exceeds
the dimensions of the elastomeric pad in the Y direction.
• Bearings: the first damage state (i.e. noticeable deformation) is reached when the
bearing is deformed up to the acceptable limit (i.e. steel dowel reached). The
second damage state actually corresponds to the same limit state in the present
case, since it corresponds to possible dowel fracture (i.e. the dowel’s resistance
is beginning to get solicited). The third damage state corresponds to definite
dowel fracture, which can be easily spotted in the pushover curve. Finally, the last
damage state is described by deck unseating, which corresponds to a deformation
that exceeds the dimensions of the elastomeric pad in the X direction.
The component fragility curves are then derived by following the same procedure detailed
in Subsection 4.3 and they are detailed in Figure 5.13.
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Table 5.6: Proposed limit states for the selected component failure modes along both
loading directions. Damage ‘severity’ refers to the conventional damage states that are
used at the level of the bridge system (see Table 3.8).
Damage ‘Severity’
ID Component Failure mode EDP DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4
1 Pier Bending Section curvature 0.005 0.008 0.014 0.020 (X)
0.015 0.024 0.041 0.061 (Y )
4 Abutment Piles Deformation in 7.6 25.4 200.0 − (X)
tension [mm] 7.6 25.4 200.0 − (Y )
5 Abutment Backfill Deformation in 19.2 25.4 − 192.0 (X)
compression [mm] − − − − (Y )
6 Shear key - Deformation [mm] − − − − (X)
25.0 25.5 25.5 406.0 (Y )
13 Fixed - Deformation [mm] 10.5 10.5 12.5 152.0 (X)
bearing − − − − (Y )
Expansion - Deformation [mm] 10.5 25.0 34.5 152.0 (X)
bearing − − − − (Y )
The component fragility curves provide a first indication on which components are the
most vulnerable and, therefore, the most likely to contribute to the functional losses.
For instance, the component failure modes that are the most likely to occur at lower
intensity levels are the minor cracking of abutment piles (i.e. active behaviour) and the
deformation of bearings at the end spans. On the other hand, piers and bearings at the
middle span appear to be less vulnerable in this specific bridge configuration.
5.6.3 Loss Models
The results of the expert-based survey of functional consequences (see Section 3.4) are
used to build a loss model for each component failure mode. The intervals of loss values
proposed by the different groups of experts may be reconciled by building a probabilistic
functionality model for each type of loss metric: an empirical cumulative distribution
function is then assembled for each component damage state, as shown in Figure 5.14,
using equal weights (‘pooling’ step in Cooke’s method). Unlike what has been carried
out in Section 3.4 for global states with the same damage ‘severity’, Figure 5.14 details
loss models at the component level. Therefore the resulting models are much coarser
than the ones from Section 3.4, since the expert-based data points are decomposed into
specific component failure modes (i.e. less data to use in the pooling step).
For heavier damage states the lane closure metric takes precedence, while the speed
reduction metric may only be used when there is no lane closure (i.e. lighter damage
states). The functionality loss models are very coarse and it can be seen that most
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Figure 5.13: Component fragility curves for the bridge components in the X (solid
lines) and Y (dashed lines) loading directions.
of them are only steps functions, since intervals of values have not been proposed by
all experts. Therefore, pending a refinement of the functionality loss models, these
values should only be considered for illustrative purposes, i.e. the demonstration of the
proposed method.
5.6.4 Derivation of Probabilistic Functionality Curves
Once the component fragility curves are derived and the Dunnett-Sobel variables are
identified, the BN can be assembled according to the formulation presented in Fig-
ure 5.12. For the considered bridge example, 22 components are considered (i.e. 12
components in X-direction, 10 in Y -direction), resulting in a global BN containing 133
nodes and 196 edges. All Bayesian nodes IM, U, Vi and Ci have exactly the same
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Figure 5.14: Expert-based repair duration (left) and functional loss (right) models
for each component failure and damage state identified in Table 5.6.
structure and CPTs as the ones described in the BN for multi-hazard fragility assesse-
ment (see Appendix F). Intermediate and output nodes Ii, Si and S have CPTs that are
constructed as Boolean tables, in order to assemble the component-level losses up to the
level of the bridge system. Finally, nodes Dui and Fli are characterized thanks to the
loss models detailed in Figure 5.14: discrete levels of functional consequences are selected
(e.g. ten states for repair duration, as shown in Figure 5.15), so that the probabilities
of sampling the various states can be used to build the CPTs of these nodes.
During the initialisation of the junction tree, the largest generated clique potential is
comprised of 10 450 000 elements, which still leads to reasonable computation times
(i.e. one inference operation is performed in around 2.6 s on an Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7 processor with 16 GB RAM). Therefore the Bayesian analysis may directly quantify
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Figure 5.15: Probabilities of sampling discrete repair duration intervals, given the
occurrence of the component failure modes.
the probability of exceeding these functionality loss levels given the seismic intensity, as
shown in Figure 5.16.
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Figure 5.16: Probabilistic functionality curves for repair duration (left) and functional
loss (right).
As expected, these probabilistic functionality curves reveal that the losses increase with
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the seismic intensities. Minor losses (e.g. short repair times or slight traffic disruption)
appear to be induced by really low intensity levels, which is mostly due to the abutment
piles reaching damage very quickly. It should also be noted that the composition of
various fragility curves does not necessarily lead to cumulative lognormal distributions:
this observation prevents the use of simple statistical parameters to represent these
curves, which have then to be expressed as tabulated values. In the case of repair
duration curves, the shape of the longer duration curves (i.e. 120 and 135 days) tends
towards a uniform cumulative distribution, as opposed to a lognormal distribution: this
particular feature might be explained by the type of component failure modes that
generate such levels of downtime duration, and by their specific fragility parameters (i.e.
especially if the mean parameters cover a wide range of values).
Finally, the curves in Figure 5.16 provide the marginal distributions for each loss metric
taken separately, while the application of restoration strategies for a road network would
require the joint knowledge of both the functional state and repair time of the elements at
risk. The BN has been formulated in such a way that the repair duration node (i.e. node
S1 in Figure 5.12) and the functional loss node (i.e. node S2) belong to the same clique
during the generation of the junction tree. Therefore it becomes possible to quantify
the joint probability of occurrence of the two loss metrics, as shown in Figure 5.17. This
result is fundamental for the evaluation of the performance of the global road network,
since such a representation enables the sampling of various consistent functionality loss
scenarios (e.g. for PGA = 3 m/s2, probability of 0.346 of experiencing 20% speed
reduction for 45 days, probability of 0.075 of experiencing 50% lane closure for 120 days,
etc.). It should be borne in mind that there is some degree of correlation between the
two loss metrics (i.e. the more severe the loss, the longer the repair time), even though
some component failure modes may lead to complete closure while requiring reasonable
restoration times (see Figure 5.14): therefore this aspect can be correctly captured by
the representation of the joint distribution of both metrics, which is easily accessed
through Bayesian analysis. It should be noted that the proposed BN-based approach is
flexible enough to add the functionality layer to the physical damage and to compute
the joint probabilities of various metrics; while such an analysis would not be achievable
through more conventional methods such as matrix-based system reliability, which is
not primarily designed to treat such problems with multiple output variables.
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Figure 5.17: Joint distribution of the repair time and functional loss for different
seismic intensity levels.
5.6.5 Bayesian Inference
Aside from deriving probabilistic functionality curves, the proposed BN formulation can
also be used to quantify the respective role of each component in the functional state
of the bridge system. Bayesian inference offers indeed endless possibilities in terms
of assuming evidence at given nodes and observing the updated probabilities at other
locations of the BN.
For instance, one can assume a given hazard distribution at the location of the bridge (i.e.
annual probability of occurrence), so that the Bayesian analysis can provide the expected
distribution of component damage states (see scenario A in Figure 5.18). On the other
hand, Bayesian inference may also be used to identify which components contribute the
most to the long-term bridge closure. To this end, two additional configurations are
considered:
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• Scenario B: bridge closure for the maximum duration is entered as evidence and
the updated distributions of component damage states and seismic intensity are
observed.
• Scenario C: the updated seismic intensity from scenario B is entered as evidence
and the updated distribution of component damage states is observed.
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Figure 5.18: Distribution of component damage states and hazard levels for different
evidence scenarios. Intact state is represented in blue, D1 in green, D2 in yellow, D3 in
orange and D4 in red. The damage states are defined in Table 5.6.
As expected, there is barely any damage in scenario A, which corresponds to the annual
damage that is expected yearly, for the assumed seismicity level. However there is a
difference between the next two scenarios B and C, even though they are based on the
same hazard distribution: in scenario B the fixed evidence on the functional state of the
bridge directly influences the damage distribution of components (i.e. especially com-
ponents that are likely to generate full closure), while scenario C only provide a damage
distribution with no constraints on the functional consequences. Therefore comparison
between scenarios B and C brings valuable insight on the influence of each component on
bridge closure. For instance, piers in the X-direction appear to be the most influencing
components since their damage distributions change dramatically between scenarios B
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and C. This observation is in line with the significant role of substructure components in
the bridge’s total collapse. The limited influence of piers in the Y -direction also reveals
the coupling with the actual physical vulnerability of components (i.e. these compo-
nents have higher fragility means for heavier damage states). Finally, the changes in
the damage distribution of other components is mostly due to the statistical dependence
between component events (i.e. correlation structure).
5.6.6 Comparison with Global Loss Models
The component-based functionality curves that are presented in Figure 5.16 may be
compared to the more conventional approach that directly convolves the bridge’s global
damage states with tabulated loss curves, such as the HAZUS model [FEMA, 2003]. To
this end, the same component fragility curves that have been derived in Subsection 5.6.2
are used to assemble system fragility curves, which follow the global damage scale with
consistent damage ‘severity’ indices (see Table 5.6). These damage states are then
associated with the repair duration and functional loss curves that have been defined
in Chapter 3 (Figures 3.14 to 3.15): these global loss models are based on the same
expert survey, except that the loss values have been aggregated in order to integrate
the potential contributions from all component damage states. Following this approach,
the global functionality curves are assembled through a simple convolution and they are
presented in Figure 5.19.
Several observations can be made from the analysis of Figure 5.19:
• In the case of repair duration, some curves do not present a monotonic increase (e.g.
duration ≥ 105 days), which shows that the losses are not necessarily more severe
for heavier damage states. This is due to the poorly constrained global loss models
that are created when considering global damage states only: an overlap between
the DS3 and DS4 repair duration curves is therefore observed (see Figure 3.14).
• Longer repair durations never reach a probability of occurrence of 1 for large
seismic intensities. This shows again that the global loss models contain large
uncertainties, thus leading to a poor prediction of expected losses and an under-
estimation of the indirect consequences.
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Figure 5.19: Probabilistic functionality curves for repair duration (left) and functional
loss (right), based on the loss models computed from the global damage states.
• For low seismic intensities, there are non-negligible probabilities of exceeding long
repair durations or full lane closure. The definition of global damage states merges
the contributions from various component types. Therefore a component that has
a high impact on the bridge functionality will contribute to the losses that are
aggregated with the global damage states, even though its component damage
state might only be reached for higher seismic intensities.
Therefore this comparison demonstrates the benefits of using the component-based func-
tionality curves that have been derived here, instead of considering aggregated loss mod-
els based on global damage states. Keeping track of specific failure modes through BN
analysis is necessary in order to refine the functionality analysis.
5.7 Conclusion
This Chapter has presented a BN framework for the construction of system fragility
curves based on specific component damage states. Once the efficiency and accuracy of
this BN approach has been demonstrated with respect to conventional system reliability
methods, the proposed framework has been successfully used to predict the probability
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of occurrence of four failures modes for a bridge system with multi-state components
and multiple hazard loadings. The application of this approach presents several benefits:
• Provided that the appropriate modelling strategies are used, the BN method is
efficient and robust enough to solve large and complex structural systems, whatever
the number of failure modes or damage states.
• Component fragility curves derived for different hazard loadings and different fail-
ure mechanisms, with different methods (e.g. analytical or empirical), may still be
assembled in order to build up a harmonized system fragility function.
• In a multi-hazard context, possible interactions between loading events can be
taken into account by developing damage-dependent fragility curves at the com-
ponent level and then by propagating the beneficial or detrimental effects up to
the system level.
Therefore the BN framework represents a significant step towards the integration of
multiple risks at the vulnerability level, following the recent developments regarding
interactions between hazard events (i.e. triggered or combined hazard events versus
independent ones within a given time window [Selva, 2013]).
A second application has used the quantification of functionality losses at the component
level in order to derive probability functionality curves for a bridge system subjected
to seismic hazard. The necessary change of scale between component and system levels
proves to be instrumental in the refinement of the loss models, which can then be used
to feed subsequent network analysis models. Moreover the integration of component
damage events and resulting functional losses in the same BN enables various inference
operations to be performed, such as the identification of the most critical components
with respect to the functional loss of the bridge, for mitigation or retrofitting purposes.
The BN application to the bridge case study has raised some issues relative to the
treatment of uncertainties for the various component fragility curves, which have been
derived using a wide range of methods and modelling assumptions, as discussed in
Chapter 4. Both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties may be accounted for in some
fragility curves, while others only include the variability of some modelling parameters
and make use of deterministic quantities to evaluate the thresholds for the damage
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states. Ultimately, this aspect will require further enquiry in order to fully harmonize
the multi-hazard fragility model, both in terms of functionality losses and associated
uncertainties. Although this issue is out of the scope of the present work, Chapter 6
dwells on the quantification and propagation of uncertainties that may influence the
assessment of low-probability high-consequence events.
Chapter 6
Uncertainty Treatment
6.1 Introduction
Risk analyses are of probabilistic nature by definition, therefore uncertainty needs to be
integrated into all the steps of the risk assessment process, namely the modelling of the
hazard event(s), the characterisation of the exposure and the response of the vulnerable
exposed infrastructure [Douglas, 2007, Thywissen, 2006]. To this end, the robustness
of various probabilistic models that are proposed or developed in this thesis requires
a clear identification of the various sources of uncertainty in the single risk analyses.
Aleatory uncertainties are related to the inherent variability of a system, which cannot
be sufficiently modelled; while epistemic uncertainties are related to the variability that
could be reduced in theory, but is difficult to fully characterise in practice due to a
lack of knowledge. Following the common classification between aleatory and epistemic
uncertainties [Wen et al., 2003], it is then possible to find out which uncertainty source
contributes the most to the overall variability of the loss distribution at the level of the
infrastructure system. Such studies have been recently carried out in order to compare
uncertainties between single risk analyses from different hazard types, as shown by
Rohmer [2013].
While aleatory uncertainties are commonly viewed as contributing to the true random-
ness of the studied physical phenomenon, they are mostly considered as irreducible.
Conversely, the characterisation and quantification of epistemic uncertainties will pro-
vide indications on which steps of the risk assessment process to focus modelling efforts,
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in order to obtain the greatest improvement in accuracy for the risk curve. For in-
stance, statistical tools such as variance-based sensitivity analysis have been used by
Rohmer et al. [2014] or Gehl et al. [2013b] to quantify the effects of epistemic uncertain-
ties on the seismic risk assessment of buildings. In terms of uncertainty representation,
Pate´-Cornell [2002] and Tyagunov et al. [2014] have proposed to represent aleatory un-
certainties through the shape of the risk curve (i.e. annual probability of exceedance
of a given loss level), while epistemic uncertainties may be represented by confidence
intervals around the median curve (see example in Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1: Representation of aleatory and epistemic uncertainties on a risk curve.
A similar distinction has been introduced by Abrahamson and Bommer [2005] in the case
of seismic hazard assessment; the authors claim that the inherent variability considered
directly in the hazard computation (i.e. aleatory variability) determines the shape of
the hazard curve, while the epistemic uncertainty leads to alternative hazard curves.
However, a caveat should be added to this distinction, since the strict Bayesians argue
that all uncertainty is epistemic, in the sense that what appears as a physical property
of randomness can always be viewed as an uncertain state of knowledge [Der Kiureghian
and Ditlevsen, 2007].
Rather than detailing the issues of general statistical treatment, this Chapter intends
to present uncertainty sources and statistical tools that are very specific to the problem
at hand, namely the quantification of losses to infrastructure in a multi-risk context.
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It presents first a review of the various uncertainty sources along the risk quantifica-
tion process (Section 6.2), for all hazard types considered (i.e. earthquakes, ground
failures and floods). Then, Section 6.3 addresses the issue of uncertainty propagation,
which can be performed through simulation-based methods or reliability approaches (e.g.
event trees, Bayesian Network, etc.). Finally, Section 6.4 explores the quantification of
uncertainty sources through two examples, namely the uncertainty due to the choice of
GMPEs in the seismic hazard assessment and the uncertainty due to the selection of
literature-based fragility curves.
6.2 Sources of Uncertainty in Risk Analyses
In the frame of the MATRIX project, an extensive study of uncertainties by Rohmer
[2013] led to a taxonomy of uncertainty sources, as summarized in Table 6.1. It consists
in a more generic review than the very detailed work performed by Wen et al. [2003]
on uncertainty sources in earthquake engineering. The uncertainty sources follow the
common aleatory/epistemic classification, while further distinctions are made depending
on the reason for the lack of knowledge (i.e. data-, parameter-, model- or science-related).
Table 6.1: Taxonomy of uncertainty sources, according to Rohmer [2013].
Uncertainty type Description
Aleatory Inherent variability (temporal and/or spatial)
Epistemic (data-related) Measurement errors, representativeness of the samples,
bias in the measurement process
Epistemic (parameter-related) Incompleteness and imprecision of observations,
experts’ judgments (vagueness, conflicting views)
Epistemic (model-related) Structure, several choices of ‘good’ models
Epistemic (science-related) Ignorance, indeterminacy, immeasurability, conflicting views
This classification is adopted in the present work in order to enumerate the most common
uncertainty sources that should be taken into account in risk analyses. It should be noted
that the aleatory / epistemic classification is somewhat artificial, in the sense that it is
highly dependent on the type of model that is used. If a model is developed which
includes a large number of parameters to describe a given phenomenon, the associated
aleatory uncertainty may be reduced and translated into epistemic uncertainties. An
example is the use of multivariate fragility functions with respect to seismic hazard.
While a mono-variate fragility curve (e.g. use of a scalar intensity measure – IM – such
as peak ground acceleration – PGA – to represent the ground motion) may be associated
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with a large aleatory uncertainty (i.e. high standard-deviation β), the use of a fragility
function with a vector IM (e.g. spectral acceleration – Sa – at different periods) is likely
to reduce the aleatory uncertainty (i.e. the ground motion is better described), even
though the characterisation of the input IMs may be the source of additional epistemic
uncertainties. Therefore a single-IM fragility curve may be view as a model with a high
aleatory uncertainty, while a vector-IM fragility curve would reduce the part of aleatory
uncertainty. However, using the latter model without the knowledge of the second IM
would lead to larger epistemic uncertainties.
6.2.1 Uncertainties Related to Hazard Assessment
Different uncertainty sources may be identified based on the type of hazard considered,
even though a similar structure can be observed (e.g. uncertainties due to the definition
of the source event, model or parameter uncertainties in the estimation of the hazard
intensities, etc.). Using mostly the inventory proposed by Rohmer [2013], common
uncertainty sources for the hazard assessment are the following:
• Flood hazard assessment:
– Estimation of design rainfall event [epistemic/data-parameter] : Design
rainfall events are usually estimated through historical rainfall records, which
may be subject to measurement errors or incomplete time series.
– Occurrence of rainfall event [aleatory] : Dependence on aleatory meteo-
rological patterns.
– Variation of river geometry over time/space [aleatory] : Aleatory dis-
tribution of riverbed parameters, which may evolve with time.
– Selection of models to estimate flood propagation [epistemic/model] :
Flow discharge may be estimated through a wide range of methods and pre-
diction models.
– Estimation of model parameters [epistemic/parameter] : Physical param-
eters feeding the models (e.g. riverbed gradient, surface roughness, catchment
area...) are usually incompletely characterized.
– Correlation of main channels and tributary flows [aleatory] : The flow
discharge at a given point may depend on the flow upstream, and on different
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(and usually correlated) rainfall events that may affect different tributary
streams and different catchment areas.
• Seismic hazard assessment:
– Estimation of design earthquake event (e.g. parameters of Gutenberg-
Richter law) [epistemic/data-parameter] : Design earthquake events are usu-
ally estimated through historical seismicity, which may be subject to measure-
ment errors or incomplete time series.
– Occurrence of earthquake event [aleatory] : Dependence on aleatory fault
rupture mechanisms.
– Choice of GMPEs [epistemic/model] : Seismic intensity may be predicted
through a wide range of valid ground-motion prediction equations.
– Dispersion of GMPE (intra- and inter- event variability) [aleatory] :
The GMPE provides a distribution of the expected seismic intensity, which
standard deviation is a combination of intra- and inter-event variability (site-
to-site and earthquake-to-earthquake variability, respectively).
– Choice of truncation level for GMPE dispersion [epistemic/model] :
An unbounded aleatory uncertainty model for the GMPE may result in unre-
alistic values when low-probability high-consequence events are investigated.
A truncated aleatory distribution is therefore a more common approach.
– Spatial correlation between hazard intensities [aleatory] : The spatial
correlation of the ground motion field generated by GMPEs is built by us-
ing a correlation distance and the intra-event variability. It is an essential
component of the seismic risk analysis for infrastructure.
– Estimation of the site amplification factor for a specific site [epistemic/data-
parameter-model] : Amplified seismic intensities due to site effects are esti-
mated through the study of the site of interest (e.g. soil class, measure of
shear wave velocity...).
• Landslide hazard assessment:
– Digital Elevation Model [epistemic/data-parameter] : The quality of the
DEM depends on the level of resolution and the way data has been acquired.
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– Failure surface depth [epistemic/model-parameter] : The depth of the fail-
ure surface is an input parameter for the hazard assessment. The way this
parameter is defined and used depends also on the type of model used.
– Soil parameters [aleatory ; epistemic/parameter] : Parameters such as soil
unit weight, soil cohesion or angle of friction may be incompletely character-
ized.
– Slope stability model [epistemic/model] : The type of landslide model con-
sidered will have a great influence on the expected displacements (e.g. infinite
slope mode vs circular slope failure).
– Soil saturation ratio [aleatory ; epistemic/data-parameter-model] : The es-
timation of the soil saturation ratio is usually a complex process which is
dependent on many factors (e.g. climate, water table location, rainfall pat-
tern, etc.).
6.2.2 Uncertainties Related to Damage Assessment
Uncertainty sources that are involved in the estimation of physical damage may be
considered as common to all hazard types, thanks to the harmonization tasks described
in Chapters 3 and 4 (i.e. derivation of component fragility functions for each failure
mode). They are summarized as follows:
• Characterization of the elements at risk (geometry, structural proper-
ties, etc.) [epistemic/data-parameter] : Parameters relative to the physical assets
cannot always be accurately characterized, either due to imprecise measurements
or lack of census data.
• Choice of fragility curves [epistemic/model] : A wide range of fragility curves
may be applied to a given element, depending on the derivation method, the
modelling assumptions, etc.
• Dispersion of fragility curve [aleatory] : The standard deviation that is inherent
to a fragility curve represents the aleatory uncertainty that may be due to the
hazard representation or the physical process leading to the failure of the element.
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• Choice of intensity measure [epistemic/model] : Different intensity measures
may be chosen as hazard descriptors, leading to the choice of different fragility
curves or hazard prediction models. Some damage mechanisms may be more
sensitive to different parameters representing the hazard intensity (e.g. drift- or
acceleration-sensitive components in the case of seismic loading).
• Definition of damage states [aleatory ; epistemic/model] : Physical damage
states are usually defined with a qualitative damage scale, while quantitative phys-
ical measures may be used to actually determine whether the element has reached
the damage state or not. Threshold’s choices are both of epistemic and aleatory
nature.
6.2.3 Uncertainties Related to Loss Assessment
Uncertainty sources that are involved in the estimation of functional losses may be
considered as common to all hazard types, thanks to the harmonization tasks described
in Chapters 5 (i.e. derivation of system fragility functions expressing functional losses).
They are summarized as follows:
• Transformation of damage states into functional losses / direct repair
costs / repair duration [epistemic/model-parameter] : How the physical dam-
age states can be translated in terms of functional consequences depends on the
type of model used and on some input parameters (e.g. size/design of infrastruc-
ture/element).
• Choice of system performance indicator [epistemic/model] : The type of
performance indicator has a significant influence on the way the system’s failure
or survival is perceived (e.g. connectivity-based vs capacity-based performance
indicators).
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6.3 Propagation of Uncertainties: Review of Available Meth-
ods
Once the various sources of uncertainty have been identified, they need to be associ-
ated with a set of probabilistic distributions. The variability of the uncertain sources
can be expressed through many forms, such as analytical probabilistic density functions
(e.g. shape of fragility curves or sigma values characterising GMPEs), empirical distri-
butions (e.g. activity parameters of a given seismogenic area) or expert-based weighting
coefficients (e.g. weighting of various GMPEs, as proposed by Delavaud et al. [2012]).
The final uncertainty, which represents the dispersion of the chosen loss metric at the
end of the risk analysis, can be quantified by estimating how the input uncertainties
propagate up to the final analysis step. Therefore the goal is to generate a probabilistic
distribution of the final loss metric, based on the initial assumptions on the distribution
of the input variables (i.e. choice of models and parameters) and the associated aleatory
uncertainties (see Figure 6.2). In parallel, a sensitivity analysis may also be carried out
in order to rank the respective influence of all uncertainty sources, so that the least
significant ones can be neglected.
X1 X2 Xi Xj Xn.........
?
Y = g(X1, ..., Xn)
Distribution of loss metric Y
Parameter−related Model−related
Epistemic uncertaintiesAleatory uncertainties
Input uncertain variables
Risk analysis:
Sensitivity analysis
Figure 6.2: General principle of uncertainty propagation.
In theory, uncertainty propagation could be performed through an exact analysis, as
mentioned by Wen et al. [2003], by integrating the joint probability density function of
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all uncertain variables over the whole space of solution. However, such an approach is not
feasible in practice, except for linear cases with independent variables. The possibility of
using Second Moment or First-Order Second Moment analyses is also detailed by Wen
et al. [2003], but the use of these methods also requires a linearization of the various
models, which may not be possible in the complex context of risk analyses. Finally,
Monte Carlo simulation techniques are also proposed as a viable alternative to generate
numerous random samples of risk outcomes.
Similarly, the review of single-risk uncertainties within the FP7 MATRIX project [Rohmer,
2013] details three possible approaches for uncertainty propagation, namely Monte Carlo
simulation techniques, logic trees and Bayesian event trees. Their description will be
the object of the sub-sections below.
6.3.1 Monte-Carlo Simulations
A Monte-Carlo simulation consists in the sampling of random realizations of the various
input variables and the estimation of the final risk metric for each run. After a larger
number of runs, a stable estimation of the probabilistic distribution of the outcome can
be constructed. Even though it is very straightforward in principle, the Monte-Carlo
approach may require an almost intractable number of runs to achieve convergence,
especially when extreme risk values (i.e. low probability outcomes) have to be sampled.
However, being robust to the number of input variables (i.e. high-dimensionality) is one
of the main merits of Monte-Carlo methods.
Such issues have been thoroughly investigated and referenced, and variance reduction
techniques have been proposed in order to reduce the number of required runs. Some of
the most common techniques are the following:
• Latin Hypercube sampling (LHS): this sampling technique is used to optimize the
sampling of variables from multi-dimensional distributions (i.e. simultaneous sam-
pling of n various input variables). Each input variable has its value range divided
into m equally probable intervals, and an optimization technique is used in order
to ensure that the m Monte-Carlo samples efficiently cover the n-dimension space
of variables. If n = 2, the variable space becomes a square of m rows and m
columns and the LHS algorithm (Latin Square in two dimensions) selects samples
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so that each row and each column is occupied by one and only one sample (see
Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3: Example of Latin Hypercube sampling in a two-dimension case.
• Importance sampling (IS): this sampling approach alters the original distribution
of the input variable, in order to preferably sample values of interest that would
have a very low probability of being sampled otherwise. For instance, if an input
variable is associated with a normal probability distribution and if the upper tail of
the distribution is of specific interest for the outcome, importance sampling can be
used to ensure that the input variable is preferably sampled from the distribution
tails, for instance, thus artificially raising the proportions of extreme value samples
in the Monte-Carlo runs. As a result, the outcome from each run will also have
to be weighted when estimating the final statistics, based on the ratio between
the original density probability and the one that has been used in the IS. While
this approach is very useful to efficiently explore low probability combinations, it
requires an a priori knowledge of what are the probable values of the input vari-
ables when failure occurs, in order to construct an efficient importance sampling
distribution.
• Adaptive sampling (AS): this sampling method consists in the updating of the
sampling scheme based on the results of the previous runs. For instance, specific
ranges of input variables could be further investigated, if the previous Monte-Carlo
runs have demonstrated a high dependency of the outcomes on a given range of
sampled variables.
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Finally, it should be noted that Monte-Carlo simulation techniques are especially suitable
for complex systems with non-linear behaviour, while being able to treat all types of
uncertainties (i.e. both aleatory and epistemic). The studied system may indeed be
seen as a black box, into which various sampled inputs are fed, and the distribution of
the system’s output (e.g. loss indicators in the case of a risk analysis) is generated from
the Monte Carlo simulations. Therefore there is no need to analytically characterise
the system through closed-from solutions, even though an enhanced knowledge of the
studied system would be preferable in order to select the sources of uncertainty that are
the most influent (see Subsection 6.3.5).
6.3.2 Logic Trees with Monte-Carlo Simulations
Logic trees are an efficient way to represent and model epistemic uncertainties. More
specifically, model-related epistemic uncertainties are very commonly represented with
logic trees, since the associated variables have a discrete or categorical distribution. A
logic tree starts from a source point and branches out into various options (i.e. different
models) over several level depths, from a generic problem definition down to very specific
details (see Figure 6.4).
Figure 6.4: Example of a logic tree structure.
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For instance, logic trees have been used to propagate model uncertainties in probabilistic
seismic hazard assessment, through the selection of different ground motion prediction
equations – GMPEs [Delavaud et al., 2012]. In a logic tree, each branch is associated with
a weight, which is usually estimated through an expert-elicitation process. The same
type of logic tree could also be used for fragility assessment, where different fragility
models could be weighted for a given typology. These weights reflect the analyst’s view
on the plausibility of models, so that they can be seen as prior probabilities. Once model
uncertainties are represented on the logic tree branches with their respective weights,
the remaining epistemic uncertainties (i.e. parameter-related) as well as the aleatory
uncertainties can be propagated by running MC simulations for each branch of the logic
tree. The final probabilistic distribution of the outcome metric is then obtained via a
weighted sum of the results over all the branches (i.e. the branch weights are used as a
probability). For this reason, one important constraint is that logic tree branches must
be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive (MECE), as stated by Bommer and
Scherbaum [2008].
6.3.3 Bayesian Event Trees
Bayesian event trees (BET) have been introduced by Marzocchi et al. [2004, 2010] for
probabilistic volcanic hazard assessment and eruption forecasting. They are similar to
logic trees in structure (i.e. graphical representation of a tree structure with branches, see
Figure 6.5), however they do not serve the same purpose and they contain fundamental
differences with respect to logic trees:
• BETs focus on events (and not just model choices, like in logic trees): each branch
represents a logical step that ensure the transition from an anterior event to a
subsequent event, so that the entire risk analysis can be represented by a chain of
intermediate events and outcomes up to the final outcome.
• BETs are based on conditional probabilities and Bayesian theory, in the sense that
the probability of event n occurring is expressed as the probability of event k given
event k − 1 has occurred, and so forth.
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• Each branch of the BET is associated with a conditional probability, and not just
a weighting coefficient like in logic trees. Therefore the MECE assumption is not
a prerequisite for BETs.
Outcome k−1,1
Outcome k,1
Event kEvent k−1
P(Ek−1,1)
P(Ek−1,2)
Outcome k,2
Outcome k−1,2
θk,2 = P(Ek,2 | Ek−1,1)
P(Ek,2 | Ek−1,1)
P(Ek,1 | Ek−1,1)
P(θk,2)
σ[θk,2]
E[θk,2]
Figure 6.5: Example of a Bayesian event tree structure with uncertain event proba-
bilities.
One of the most notable BET functionalities featured in Marzocchi et al. [2004] is the
way the conditional probability is defined for a given event k. This event probability
P (Eventk|Eventk−1) = θk is not necessarily a single scalar value, as it can also be
associated with uncertainties that represent the difficulty to accurately quantify each
event probability, due to lack of knowledge or field evidence. Therefore each event
probability θk can be associated with a probabilistic distribution (i.e. also referred to as
a ‘probability of probability’, see Woo [1999]):
• The average E [θk] can be seen as the probability due to aleatory uncertainties (i.e.
the pure randomness of the process predicting the event k).
• The standard deviation σ [θk] of the distribution of θk represents the level of un-
certainty that is associated with the estimation of event probability θk: it can
be considered as the epistemic uncertainty, i.e. the variability due the lack of
knowledge on the models and parameters to be used.
Marzocchi et al. [2004] proposed a Bayesian updating process, based on empirical or
historical data, in order to refine the prior distribution of θk: the addition of actual
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observations enables one to obtain a posterior distribution of θk with a greatly reduced
standard deviation σ [θk]. Therefore BETs could be used to represent both aleatory
and epistemic uncertainties. The distribution of θk is obtained by sampling the various
model- and parameter-related uncertainties, while aleatory uncertainties are represented
by the expected value of θk. Finally, with the probabilistic distribution of θk defined
for each branch of the BET, the conditional probabilities can be sequentially computed
in order to estimate the distribution of the final loss metric, which will contain both
aleatory and epistemic uncertainties.
6.3.4 Bayesian Networks
One of the main issues in the probabilistic estimation of infrastructure losses lies in
the high dimensionality of the problem (i.e. each individual element within the system
plays a specific role with respect to the global performance), which usually leads to
an intractable number of potential outcomes. This effect is even more magnified when
epistemic uncertainties are included, since each realisation of a potential input variable
leads to another multiplication of the space of solutions. While Monte Carlo simulations
have been shown to yield rather stable risk estimates after a reasonable number of
samples [Cavalieri et al., 2012], these methods may prove to be insufficient when very
low-probability and high-consequence events are investigated: in this context, it is very
likely that the Monte Carlo methods will overlook such events, thus resulting in an
underestimation of the risk.
For all the reasons detailed above, Bayesian Networks emerge as the most appropriate
tool for infrastructure risk assessment and decision support [Bensi et al., 2013, 2011].
Their main advantage resides in the inference process, which enables to update proba-
bilities of any nodes in the BN after specifying the value or state of a given node (i.e.
evidence): Bayesian inference can work either way, i.e. generating a forward or a back-
ward analysis depending on whether the evidence is entered at the start or the end of the
BN, respectively. Moreover, exact inference algorithms such as junction trees generate
the exact probability distributions for any nodes, while such quantities are usually only
approximated when performing Monte Carlo simulations. This feature is an essential
requirement when extreme events are considered.
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6.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
When a large number of input variables are associated with various uncertainties, the
amount of mathematical constructions and computations that are needed to propagate
all uncertainties can soon become intractable. To this end, sensitivity analyses usu-
ally constitute an efficient way to identify the role of the different uncertainty sources.
According to Rohmer [2013], sensitivity analyses can be used to:
• identify which input factors contribute most to the output uncertainty;
• identify which input factors are insignificant and can then be eliminated to reduce
the dimensions of the problem;
• determine which input factors interact with each other.
The simplest way to assess the influence of the various uncertainty sources consists in
changing one input variable at a time (i.e. ‘one-factor-at-a-time’ analysis). However this
approach does not lead to the identification of the interactions between factors and it is
only valid in the case of a linear problem.
Another way to perform a sensitivity analysis is the First-Order Reliability Method
(FORM), since the sensitivity factors of each input variable are a by-product of the
reliability analysis. However FORM analyses can be applied as long as there is a single
dominant failure mode, or otherwise all failure modes need to be found to avoid gross
underestimation of failure probability. Whilst numerous computation strategies have
been developed in order to bypass these limitations, their application to complex non-
linear problems remains cumbersome.
As an alternative, variance decomposition (i.e. computation of Sobol’ indices) provides
the most informative sensitivity analysis, while being applicable to any kind of problem.
The variance-based global sensitivity analysis (GSA) detailed by Saltelli et al. [2008]
enables to provide the main and total effects associated to each source of uncertainty.
The main effects (i.e. first-order contributions of each parameter, without accounting for
interaction terms) can be used to individually rank the various sources of uncertainties,
while total effects (i.e. second-order indices including contributions from interaction
terms) should be used to identify negligible parameters (i.e. input factors with a low
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main effect and low interactions with other terms) and to measure the level of complexity
of the studied problem (i.e. high differences between total and main effects imply a high
degree of interaction between the uncertainty sources).
An interesting feature of the variance-based global sensitivity analysis is its ability to
combine various types of input factors (i.e. uncertain variables with either continuous or
discrete distributions). The estimation of the Sobol’ indices (i.e. total and main effects)
may be carried out through various algorithms, such as the Monte-Carlo-based Sobol’
algorithm [Saltelli, 2002]: even though this approach is the most complete and the most
versatile form of sensitivity analysis, the associated Monte-Carlo simulations require a
large number of model evaluations. Gehl et al. [2013b] applied variance-based global
sensitivity analysis to the case of uncertainty ranking for seismic risk scenarios. The
large number of intensive model computations led to the development of surrogate meta-
models in order to reduce the computational load. A similar approach has also been used
by Rohmer et al. [2014] for the comparison of the influence of model-related uncertainties
against parameter-related uncertainties in earthquake loss assessment procedures.
6.4 Specification of Quantitative Uncertainty Models
The quantification of some of the aforementioned uncertainty sources is presented through
two examples, which aim at demonstrating how to specify the variability of important
parameters before computing the distribution of losses. The two applications focus
on the epistemic uncertainties due to the choice between different models, which is a
common issue when performing a risk analysis. First, the variability induced by the
availability of multiple GMPEs in the seismic hazard assessment is investigated. Then,
the uncertainty due to the selection of literature-based seismic fragility curves for bridges
is quantified, in the case that no specific fragility model has been developed. These two
examples have been chosen since the study by Rohmer et al. [2014] has shown that
the choice of GMPEs and vulnerability models are among the most influent sources of
uncertainties when performing a seismic risk analysis. A similar work might be carried
out for variables related to flood risk, however the focus is put here on seismic risk, due
to the availability of well established methods and data sets.
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6.4.1 Epistemic Uncertainties due to the Choice of GMPEs
When performing a seismic risk analysis, the assessment of the seismic intensities at
the vulnerable sites constitutes an essential step. The compilation of existing GMPEs
by Douglas [2014] reveals a wide range of potential ground-motion prediction models
that may be applied to a given area. It is interesting to note that the multiplicity of
these GMPEs does not necessarily lead to a more accurate prediction of the seismic
intensities, since the epistemic uncertainties due to the choice among various ground-
motion prediction models are not reduced.
To this end, logic trees have become a popular tool to account for the possible selection
of multiple GMPEs. For instance, in the framework of the FP7 SHARE project [Gia-
rdini and the SHARE Consortium, 2009–2012], logic trees have been designed for the
selection of GMPEs for the definition of the pan-European probabilistic seismic hazard
assessment [Delavaud et al., 2012], through the use of expert judgements and data-driven
rankings. Other GMPE selection exercises have been carried out recently for the Global
Earthquake Model hazards maps [Stewart et al., 2015] or the update of the U.S. national
seismic hazard maps [Petersen et al., 2014]. The merits and issues of this multi-GMPE
approach and alternative methods are discussed in Atkinson et al. [2014].
6.4.1.1 Method Proposed by Atkinson and Adams [2013]
Recently, Atkinson and Adams [2013] have proposed an alternative method that consists
in the definition of three representative GMPEs – lower, central and upper – in order to
express the epistemic uncertainty due to the choice of GMPEs. The three representative
GMPEs are derived from existing median models, such as the ones contained in the
GMPE compendium [Douglas, 2014]. It is shown by Atkinson and Adams [2013] that
the three-equation model is equivalent to the use of multiple GMPEs, provided that
the same range of epistemic uncertainty is sampled. This model still requires a careful
selection of existing GMPEs, in order to ensure that the epistemic uncertainties that are
represented by the three-branch GMPE still capture the variability than can be found
between available GMPEs. The proposed approach presents several benefits:
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• The selection of existing GMPEs to build the representative model can be done
without applying weighting coefficients, which eliminates the subjective expert-
based judgement that is usually associated with the logic tree approach.
• Values are computed for discrete combinations of magnitudes and distances, thus
allowing for a flexible expression of the median and the epistemic uncertainties,
without requiring a given functional form.
• The three-equation representative model can be readily used as an input to the risk
analysis, since the central equation and the upper/lower bounds can be sampled
with appropriate weights (i.e. the relative weights are defined by the Gaussian
probability density function). Since only three possible inputs are sampled, the
associated computational effort is reduced when compared to a logic tree with
more choices of GMPEs.
The successive steps in the construction of the representative GMPEs are summarised
as follows:
1. Selection of a set of n GMPEs that are potential candidates as ground motion
models for the area of interest.
2. For each combination of magnitude and distance, computation of the correspond-
ing ground-motion parameters y1 . . . yn from the selected GMPEs.
3. Computation of the central representative value y¯ by processing the geometric
mean: y¯ = (y1 · · · · · yn)1/n.
4. Expression of the epistemic uncertainty with the standard deviation of the loga-
rithms of the ground-motion parameters: σlog y = stdev (log10 y1, . . . , log10 yn).
5. Smoothing of the standard deviations between the discrete distances. For example,
the smoothed standard deviation at distance k is computed as follows: σslog y,k =
0.25 · σlog y,k−1 + 0.5 · σlog y,k + 0.25 · σlog y,k+1. This step enables to reduce the
pinching effect of the confidence intervals if the various y1 . . . yn values are close to
each other for some combinations of magnitude and distance.
6. Computation of the upper/lower epistemic bounds: y−/+ = 10ˆ
(
log10 y¯ ± σslog y
)
.
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7. Representation of the three-branch GMPE in a tabulated format for various com-
binations of magnitude and distance, without any fitting to a functional form.
6.4.1.2 Application to the European context
While Atkinson and Adams [2013] have developed the approach described in the previous
section to the generation of probabilistic seismic hazard maps for Canada, a similar
representative GMPE approach is applied here to the European context. To this end, a
selection is made from recent GMPEs that are presented in the Bulletin of Earthquake
Engineering Special Issue on the new generation of ground-motion models for Europe
and the Middle East: four GMPEs are chosen as the basis for the derivation of the
representative GMPE model (see Appendix G), namely GMPEs from Akkar et al. [2014a]
(AB14), Bindi et al. [2014] (BI14), Bora et al. [2014] (BO14) and Derras et al. [2014]
(DE14). These GMPEs are all based on the RESORCE database of ground motion
records [Akkar et al., 2014b] and they share a common validity domain (i.e. Mw between
4.0 and 7.6, distance between 1 and 200 km). These GMPEs represent the most up-
to-date models and they are based on a recent database of records, which covers all
Europe and Middle East areas. The main difference between the GMPEs lies in the
computational methods that have been used to derive them (e.g. from conventional
regression techniques to data-driven approaches based on neural networks): therefore
it is expected that the resulting representative GMPE will cover the uncertainties due
to the various modelling assumptions used in the underlying GMPEs. The following
assumptions are used to generate a representative GMPE model for EC8 soil class B:
• Normal faulting style with 10 km focal depth is assumed by default.
• Since the selected models directly use shear wave velocity as a proxy to soil am-
plification, Vs,30 = 580 m/s is assumed for soil class B. Since the objective is to
assess the uncertainty due to the choice between various GMPEs, a deterministic
Vs,30 value has be chosen: further computations could be carried out in order to
quantify the uncertainties due to the description of the soil class (i.e. sampling of
Vs,30 in order to cover all possible values within the range of soil class B).
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• PGA is chosen as the output ground motion parameter in the present case, even
though the derived representative GMPE is able to also predict PGV and SA at
various periods (i.e. T = 0.05 s, 0.1 s, 0.2 s, 0.3 s, 0.5 s, 1.0 s and 2.0 s).
• The common distance metric is the epicentral distance. For models that use the
Joyner-Boore distance, the conversion is ensured by the equations from Atkinson
and Adams [2013], which are based on the Wells and Coppersmith [1994] fault
model.
These four GMPEs are plotted in Figure 6.6, for three selected magnitudes. They
are compared to actual ground-motion records that are extracted from the RESORCE
database with the following criteria: normal faulting style, focal depth between 0 and
20 km, Vs,30 between 360 and 800 m/s, and Mw ± 0.25 magnitude bins.
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Figure 6.6: Selected GMPEs with Vs,30 = 580 m/s, normal faulting and 10 km focal
depth. The green points represent records from the RESORCE database.
The aforementioned method is then applied and the resulting three-equation representa-
tive GMPE are plotted for a few magnitudes in Figure 6.7: the lower and upper bounds
representing the epistemic uncertainties are estimated for the 16th and 84th percentiles
(i.e. one time the standard deviation). Therefore the proposed model enables a com-
plex problem to be represented by a minimum number of branches for single-site hazard
analysis and mapping: respective weights for the median, upper and lower bounds could
for instance be [0.4518; 0.2741; 0.2741], according to the probability density function of
the normal distribution.
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Figure 6.7: Three-branch representative GMPE for soil class B and its underlying
models.
6.4.1.3 Aleatory uncertainties
Once the epistemic uncertainties have been quantified for the proposed representative
GMPE, aleatory uncertainties – which are represented by the intra-event and inter-
event variability – need to be assessed as well, in order to ensure that the model is fully
characterized and usable in the context of a seismic risk analysis.
The aleatory uncertainty can be decomposed into intra-event and inter-event variabil-
ities, which are represented by the standard deviations σintra and σinter. A quadratic
combination is then a common and valid approximation to express the total standard
deviation that corresponds to aleatory uncertainty [Kennedy et al., 1980]:
σalea =
√
σ2intra + σ
2
inter (6.1)
Similarly, the total uncertainty that intervenes in the prediction of the ground motion
parameters is expressed as follows:
σtot =
√
σ2epis + σ
2
alea =
√
σ2epis + σ
2
intra + σ
2
inter (6.2)
where σepis is the standard deviation representing the epistemic uncertainty that results
from the choice between different GMPEs: this quantity is directly obtained by following
the procedure described in the previous sub-section. Therefore, in order to extract the
terms composing the aleatory uncertainty, the following procedure is proposed:
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1. For each combination of magnitude and distance, ground-motion parameters are
computed from the selected GMPEs by randomly sampling the intra-event vari-
ability, for a high number of artificially generated outcomes (e.g. 10 000 values)
(i.e. Monte Carlo process).
2. All the sampled outcomes enable to compute an approximation of the total stan-
dard deviation σtot,intra, which is then used to extract the intra-event variability:
σ2intra = σ
2
tot,intra − σ2epis.
3. The same process is applied for the inter-event variability, which is expressed as:
σ2inter = σ
2
tot,inter − σ2epis.
4. The aleatory standard deviations are smoothed in the same way as the epistemic
standard deviations, as detailed in the previous sub-section.
As a result, the complete three-branch representative GMPE with its aleatory confidence
bounds is represented in Figure 6.8 for a few magnitude values. It can be noted that
the aleatory part is dominating in the overall variability, especially for higher magnitude
ranges: this observation should moderate the importance of the epistemic uncertainties
due to the choice of GMPEs. This may be especially true in the present situation, where
the four original GMPEs that have been selected are from the same era and are based
on the same ground-motion dataset (i.e. RESORCE database).
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Figure 6.8: Three-branch representative GMPE (black and red dotted lines) with
aleatory uncertainties (blue dotted lines). The green points represent records from the
RESORCE database, while the associated standard deviations over distance bins is
represented by vertical black lines.
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6.4.1.4 Validation
The potential bias of the proposed GMPE is checked by comparing the PGA predictions
to the ground-motion records that have been extracted from the RESORCE database
(see Figure 6.8). Eight discrete magnitude values are used in the representative GMPE,
therefore the database records are selected within Mw ± 0.25 magnitude bins, as shown
in Table 6.2. The geometric mean of the two horizontal components of each record is
computed as the reference PGA.
Table 6.2: Number of available records for each magnitude range.
Mw 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
Records 207 265 257 174 109 56 26 12
As a result, Figure 6.9 shows the proportion of RESORCE ground motions records that
are found to be above or below the GMPE predictions, for each magnitude bin:
• Green bars represent the records that are below the median GMPE (light green for
records between the median curve and the aleatory bound, dark green for records
below the aleatory bound). These correspond to an overestimation of the PGA by
the GMPEs.
• Red bars represent the records that are above the median GMPE (light red for
records between the median curve and the aleatory bound, dark red for records
above the aleatory bound). These correspond to an underestimation of the PGA
by the GMPEs.
It appears that the three-branch representative GMPE tends to be more balanced than
the individual GMPE models, since it combines the specific underestimations or overes-
timations of its underlying models. Some GMPEs (i.e. AB14 and BO14) present large
aleatory uncertainties, as opposed to the narrower intervals that are found for the BI14
and DE14 models: again, the use of the representative GMPE enables the generation
of averaged uncertainty bounds. The clearest trend can be observed for Mw 5.0 to 6.0
events: these magnitude bins correspond to the highest numbers of records, thus ensur-
ing a good statistical distribution of the samples. Conversely, the results become more
difficult to interpret for Mw 7.5, due to the scarcity of available records. The slightly
higher proportion of IMs that are underestimated might be due to the choice of the Vs,30
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Figure 6.9: Proportions of RESORCE ground motions accurately predicted by the
different GMPEs.
value to represent the soil class (i.e. 580 m/s corresponds to the middle of the velocity
range), while the lower bound of class B might lead to less conservative results.
In conclusion, this three-branch representative GMPE may be considered as a generic
model that accounts for epistemic uncertainties due to the choice between the most
recent GMPEs for Europe. Since no functional form is proposed, the values for some
combinations of magnitude and distance are detailed in Appendix H.
6.4.2 Epistemic Uncertainties due to the Choice of Fragility Curves
In the case that the collected structural data is insufficient or if a large number of bridges
are considered in a given study, the derivation of specific bridge fragility curves might
prove difficult or even irrelevant. An alternative consists in using fragility curves that
have been previously derived for some bridge typologies: such an approach presents
the merit of only requiring very limited data (e.g. visual inspection or photographs).
However it may result in very large uncertainties, which are quantified in the following
subsections.
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6.4.2.1 Available Data
The SYNER-G database of bridge fragility curves [Silva et al., 2014, Tsionis and Fardis,
2014], which has already been presented in Subsection 2.1.1.2, is designed as a catalogue
from which suitable fragility models can be selected for a given application. However,
before the directly application of the database, it is proposed to perform a preliminary
selection in order to choose only suitable fragility curves:
• The selected fragility curves must be analytically derived, since it appears that
most empirical studies are based on a single event, i.e. either 1994 Northridge
or 1995 Kobe earthquakes (typology of bridges in these two events differs from
European ones).
• The selected fragility curves must be based on a generic bridge model (i.e. repre-
sentative of a given type), preferably with several samples of mechanical or geo-
metrical variables.
• The selected fragility curves must contain enough information on key structural
parameters, in order to avoid poorly constrained models. Following the SYNER-G
taxonomy, the characteristics MM1 (main material), LS (level of seismic design),
DSS (deck structural system) and TC1 (type of pier) have been used as descriptors
of the bridge types: these characteristics have been identified as having the most
influence on the fragility parameters, after a quick sensitivity analysis. They are
also the ones that are easily identifiable with a visual inspection of the bridge,
as opposed to characteristics related to the structural features of the bridge (e.g.
type of bearing, pier detailing, etc.). If too many characteristics are considered
for the specification of bridge types, then there is a risk of finding too few valid
candidates.
• The selected fragility curves must use PGA as IM, for obvious harmonisation
reasons.
As a result, the original database of 30 references is reduced to 9 references that describe
6 bridge types (i.e. combinations of the four aforementioned bridge characteristics) for
a total of 39 data points, as shown in Table 6.3. The number of points represents
the number of fragility curves that correspond to the selected characteristics: some
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references propose multiple fragility curves for the same bridge type because these are
further classified with other characteristics that are not considered here.
Table 6.3: Summary of the selected fragility curves for each bridge type.
Bridge typology ID MM1 LS DSS TC1 # of points # of references
1 C NSD SSu McP 8 6
2 C NSD SSu ScP 7 1
3 C SD Co McP 3 3
4 C SD Co ScP 8 2
5 C SD SSu McP 4 3
6 C SD SSu ScP 9 3
As expected, there are important disparities across the different bridge types, both in
terms of available fragility curves and in terms of associated references. For each fragility
curve, the mean α and the standard deviation β are selected for the global damage states
DS1 (yield) and DS4 (collapse): the four usual damage states are not considered by all
selected fragility curves, therefore only the ones for which all models are available are
kept.
6.4.2.2 Statistical Model
The objective is to propose fragility parameters, along with their confidence bounds,
for each of the six bridge types. To this end, it is proposed to build a statistical model
that uses the fragility parameters from the literature as ‘observations’ in order to reduce
the variability for each bridge type. The problem at hand fits well with the derivation
of a random effects model, since the fragility parameters from the literature represent
hierarchical data: a single hierarchical level (i.e. one-way model) can be drawn from
different populaions of fragility parameters that correspond to different bridge typologies.
As opposed to fixed effects, random effects allow for individual effects (i.e. random
variability within a population belonging to the same group), which should be the case
in the present application. As a result, the following one-way random effects model is
proposed:

logαi,j = µ
(1)
0 + δ
(1)
ID (IDi) + 
(1)
i,j
log βi,j = µ
(2)
0 + δ
(2)
ID (IDi) + 
(2)
i,j
for i = 1 . . . Nbr , for j = 1 . . . ni (6.3)
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where Nbr is the number of bridge types (i.e. Nbr = 6 here), ni is the number of fragility
curves corresponding to bridge type i (see Table 6.3) and i,j is the individual error term,
which is assumed to follow a normal distribution:
 ∼ N (0, σ2) (6.4)
The factor δID is specific to each bridge type and is assumed to follow a normal distri-
bution:
δID(i) ∼ N
(
µi, σ
2
ID
)
for i = 1 . . . Nbr (6.5)
Finally, the fragility parameters logα and log β are assumed to be correlated through
the following covariance matrix:
M =
 σ2(1) σ(1) · σ(2) · ρ
σ(1) · σ(2) · ρ σ2(2)
 (6.6)
Therefore the correlation factor ρ, the standard deviations σ and σID and the means µ0
and µi are the variables that need to be determined in order to obtain a fully defined
statistical model. It is then proposed to use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
Bayesian analysis to update the posterior distribution of these variables given the ob-
servations of the fragility parameters (i.e. data points from the literature).
The problem at hand can be represented as a graphical structure (see Figure 6.10),
where the one-way random effect introduced by the bridge type term δID is explicated.
6.4.2.3 Results
The proposed statistical model is implemented in the OpenBUGS software [Lunn et al.,
2009], where three MCMC chains of 10 000 samples are simulated in order to check
convergence: each MCMC chain starts with different starting points, so that the sta-
bility of the statistical model can be checked by comparing the outcomes from several
MCMC chains. The prior distributions of the different variables are assumed to be
rather uninformative (e.g. normal distribution with zero mean and standard deviation
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Figure 6.10: Proposed random effects model for the prediction of fragility parameters.
10, or uniform distribution between −1 and 1) in order to limit their influence on the
posterior estimation. Some statistics of the updated distributions of the target variables
are detailed in Table 6.4, as a direct outcome of the OpenBUGS runs.
Table 6.4: Outcomes of the MCMC Bayesian analysis for the fragility parameters of
damage state DS1.
Variable Mean Standard deviation Variable Mean Standard deviation
µ
(1)
0 −1.68 0.26 µ(2)0 −1.15 0.26
σ(1) 0.47 0.06 σ(2) 0.49 0.06
σ
(1)
ID 0.57 0.24 σ
(2)
ID 0.56 0.24
µ
(1)
1 −0.45 0.29 µ(2)1 −0.39 0.29
µ
(1)
2 0.41 0.30 µ
(2)
2 0.13 0.30
µ
(1)
3 −0.20 0.33 µ(2)3 −0.13 0.32
µ
(1)
4 −0.56 0.29 µ(2)4 −0.63 0.30
µ
(1)
5 0.13 0.32 µ
(2)
5 0.50 0.33
µ
(1)
6 0.65 0.29 µ
(2)
6 0.52 0.29
ρ 0.36 0.15
The updated distributions of these variables can then be used to specify the statistical
model in Figure 6.10. A simple sampling of the different variables may be performed
in order to extract possible realisations of the fragility parameters α and β for damage
states DS1 and DS4. The generated samples can finally be used to compute the 16%
and 84% confidence bounds of the fragility parameters, which correspond roughly to a
±1 standard deviation interval (see Figure 6.11).
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Figure 6.11: Median values (black crosses) and 16%-84% confidence bounds (red
dashed lines) of the fragility parameters for the six bridge types. The green dots
represent the actual values that are been selected from the literature.
Regarding the prediction of parameter α, the results show that the variability within
each bridge type is rather large, while there is no significant gap between the different
bridge types (e.g. especially for DS4). Moreover, the taxonomy parameters that have
been used for the selection of fragility curves and for the description of bridge types (see
Table 6.4) do not seem to have a consistent contribution to the predictions. For instance,
bridge #1 (non-seismically designed) appears to be the most vulnerable, however this
is not the case for the other non-seismically-designed bridge #2. It seems that single-
column piers may lead to a more favourable configuration than multi-column piers,
except in the case of continuous decks with monolithic connections (i.e. bridges #3 and
#4). In order to investigate this aspect, a mixed effects model has been designed, where
the four structural parameters have been added as fixed effects to the existing one-way
random effects model. However, the difficulties to make this new model converge and
the evidence of a large auto-correlation in the sampling of the fixed effects do not enable
a reliable exploration of these new results.
The simple one-way random effects model that is considered here is the most robust
estimation of confidence bounds that is currently feasible, while more elaborate models
cannot be supported by the limited amount of data that has been selected. Moreover,
there is a large variability between the fragility curves given by the references for the
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same bridge type, which is due to the wide range of analytical approaches and modelling
assumptions that can be adopted by different groups of authors. Therefore it may be
concluded that the catalogue of bridge fragility curves cannot yield reliable fragility
estimates in its current state. It needs to be augmented with additional entries that are
generated by consistent derivation methods, in order to limit the variability between the
references. If such a catalogue must still be used due to insufficient knowledge on the
considered bridges, it is necessary to consider the confidence bounds estimated here in
order to account for the large uncertainties that are generated by this simplified approach
(e.g. coefficients of variation between 45% and 55% for the estimation of fragility mean
α).
6.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has reviewed the various sources of uncertainty that may be found in
the risk assessment of infrastructure systems exposed to earthquakes, ground failures
and floods. A conventional distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainties is
adopted, while it appears that a further classification among epistemic uncertainties
can be made, such as the identification of model-based or parameter-based uncertainty
sources.
Various statistical tools have also been detailed for the management of uncertainties,
which may be comprised of various tasks, such as uncertainty quantification, uncertainty
propagation and sensitivity analysis. Regarding the quantification of uncertainties, two
examples have been proposed, with the objective of specifying the possible sampling
range of these variables:
• model-based uncertainty due to the choice of a seismic fragility curve for bridges;
• model-based uncertainty due to the choice of a GMPE for seismic hazard assess-
ment.
Both applications have led to the definition of confidence bounds that cover ± one
standard deviation of the identified uncertainties. Such a formulation constitutes a
convenient way to propagate the uncertainties, since upper or lower confidence bounds
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may be sampled in order to generate results with low or high hypotheses. Therefore the
propagation and the influence of these uncertainties will be investigated through a small
example in Chapter 7.

Chapter 7
Bayesian Networks for the
Multi-Risk Analysis of
Infrastructure Systems
7.1 Introduction
The risk analysis of a Critical Infrastructure (CI) system that is subjected to multiple
hazards requires the specification of all the variables that are involved in the various
modelling steps. Based on the harmonisation work performed in the previous Chapters,
for a given hazard type the chain of analysis can be decomposed into the following events:
• Source event : an initiating event that may induce a given hazard level. This event
can usually be associated with a return period.
• Hazard event : this event represents the distributed loadings that may be applied
to the CI system, depending on the magnitude of the source event. It represents
the specific distributed demand on the system.
• Infrastructure (or Element) event : the physical state of all the infrastructure ob-
jects composing the CI system, based on the applied hazard event. Each one of
them have a propobability of being in a given state as determined by component-
specific fragility curves and performance indicators.
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• Network event : the state of the CI objects in terms of network functionality (e.g.
functionality loss, required restoration time, etc.), based on the physical infras-
tructure events, depending on the correlations of failures among components.
• Societal event : the direct and indirect consequences of the previous events, in
terms of global network performance indicators.
As shown in Chapter 6, uncertainty sources are present within all the aforementioned
steps. Therefore a full probabilistic framework is required to propagate uncertainties and
to derive the global risk curve (i.e. yearly probability of exceedance of a given system
performance indicator). Simulation-based methods such as the OOFIMS tool [Franchin
and Cavalieri, 2013] have proven to be robust and able to account for many uncertainty
sources. In parallel, BNs promise to deliver exact probabilities as opposed to sampling
methods, which is a valuable feature when the objective is the quantification of extreme
events. However, BNs suffer from computational limitations when processing large and
complex systems. Moreover, current BN formulations are mostly based on connectivity
analyses and they fail to predict capacity and serviceability losses, which are seen as the
more relevant performance indicators in most systems [Modaressi et al., 2014].
Therefore Section 7.2 investigates the efficiency and computational bottlenecks of cur-
rent BN formulations for the exact inference of systems. A hybrid approach, based on
the construction of a simplified BN from simulation results, is then presented as an al-
ternative to overcome the computational burden and as a decision support system for
real-life infrastructure.
These theoretical developments are then applied in Section 7.3 to a hypothetical road
network that is exposed to multiple hazards (i.e. earthquakes, floods and ground fail-
ures): this case study is used to demonstrate the applicability of the various findings of
this thesis, such as the multi-hazard fragility models, the functionality curves, the quan-
tification of epistemic uncertainties and the multi-risk framework. The reduced size and
complexity of the studied network will allow for an exact BN formulation to be applied,
thus proving the feasibility of the developed concepts.
Finally, Section 7.4 demonstrates the applicability of the multi-risk framework to a
large scale real-world road network (i.e. road network beetwen Bologna and Florence).
Due to the size of such a network (i.e. almost 300 vulnerable elements), a Monte Carlo
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simulation only is adopted here, since the objective in this section will be to demonstrate
the applicability of the multi-risk framework to realistic systems.
7.2 BN Formulation for Infrastructure Systems
The BN structure for the description of an infrastructure system globally follows the
same principles as the BNs for the reliability assessment of bridge systems (see Sec-
tion 5.4), with a different spatial scale. However two main differences can be noted:
• BNs for an infrastructure system require the inclusion of a spatially distributed
hazard layer, while a unique IM node is enough to represent the hazard for a single
bridge system.
• While the identification of system failure modes for a given bridge usually leads
to the construction of series subsystems of a reduced number of structural compo-
nents (e.g. failure of at least one pier within the bridge), the system performance
indicator of a given road network is based on more complex assemblies of damage
events which do not strictly correspond to series or parallel subsystems. Moreover,
a road network at the urban or regional level is usually composed of hundreds of
vulnerable elements, thus generating a much larger problem than for a bridge
system.
For the reasons above, additional modelling strategies have to be designed in order to
build BNs that are able to deal with real-life network systems. The following subsections
review the performance of some of the BN formulations that have been adopted in the
literature, while a simulation-based hybrid formulation is also introduced.
7.2.1 Modelling of Spatially Distributed Hazard Intensities
In the case of seismic hazard, different types of BN modelling strategies have been
proposed: Bensi et al. [2011] have introduced multiple models (e.g. point-source, finite-
rupture, directivity effects, etc.), all of them accounting for the spatial correlation of the
ground-motion field. Franchin and Laura [2014] have also introduced a BN formulation
where the seismic hazard is first evaluated over a grid, before being interpolated at the
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vulnerable sites, while accounting for the soil amplification effects. The point-source BN
model from Bensi et al. [2011] has been adopted in the present study for simplification
purposes: it has the merit of generating less BN nodes, which leaves more latitude to
the study of the BN part that deals with the prediction of the system performance given
the states of the components.
The different models and results are demonstrated on the simple example network that
is presented in Figure 7.1. It has been originally introduced by Kang and Lee [2015] as a
water pipe network, with two reservoirs (i.e. sources) and one outflow location (i.e. sink).
This layout has been selected in order to represent a hypothetical road network with two
origin points and one destination, while the edges represent vulnerable road segments
or bridges. A seismic source area is assumed to be located around the North-West of
the network, from which epicentre locations can be sampled. The magnitude range is
assumed to be bounded between 4.5 and 6.5, while the distribution follows a Gutenberg-
Richter law. Other hazards such as ground failure or flood have not been considered
here in order to concentrate on the complexity of the BN in terms of components-system
interactions.
Figure 7.1: Layout of the example network, adapted from Kang and Lee [2015].
The distributed seismic hazard part of the BN for the 11 vulnerable components is
represented in Figure 7.2. The different BN nodes have the following meaning:
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• M: magnitude range of the possible earthquake events;
• Epi: discretized locations of the epicentre of the earthquake events;
• Ri: epicentral distance from the infrastructure elements;
• Qi: median PGA values at the sites of interest, without any uncertainty terms;
• U and Vi: nodes containing the standard normal distribution in order to represent
the spatial correlation of the seismic hazard at the 11 vulnerable sites;
• ei: intra-event uncertainty term, specific to each element, due to the spatial cor-
relation assumption;
• n: inter-event uncertainty term, common to all elements;
• Si: final PGA values at the sites of interest, including intra- and inter-event un-
certainties;
• Ci: damage states of the infrastructure elements.
Figure 7.2: Seismic hazard layer of the BN for the example network.
The spatial correlation of the ground-motion field is ensured by the inclusion of the
intra-event variability terms ei, which are modelled from a spatially correlated random
field. As stated by Bensi et al. [2011], the generation of a Gaussian random field would
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require a densely connected BN in order to show the dependency of all sites with each
other. Therefore a Dunnett-Sobel class of random variables [Dunnett and Sobel, 1955]
has been adopted as an approximation, so that the correlation structure between the
intra-event terms at the vulnerable sites is emulated by the U and Vi nodes.
7.2.2 BN Formulations for Exact Inference
Exact inference algorithms such as junction tree or variable elimination should be the
first choice when solving a BN because they directly allow the quantification of ex-
act probabilities for tail events (e.g. high-consequence low-probability), as opposed to
sampling algorithms that yield approximate solutions. However, as detailed in Subsec-
tion 5.3.2, the junction tree algorithm is based on the assembly of matrices of potentials
for the different cliques of nodes, which may lead to memory problems for large BNs.
Therefore various BN formulations may be introduced and reviewed, with the objective
of enabling the efficient inference of large and complex systems.
7.2.2.1 Naive formulation
The most intuitive formulation is the construction of a converging structure (i.e. also re-
ferred to as naive formulation), where all the vulnerable elements are converging towards
the single system node that represents the performance measure of the infrastructure.
While straightforward to assemble and understand, this formulation is mainly hindered
by the size of the system CPT, which grows exponentially with the number of compo-
nents. For instance, if elements with binary states are considered, n elements in the
network will result in a system CPT size of 2n+1 lines. Using the example network that
has been introduced in the previous subsection, the corresponding naive formulation is
represented in Figure 7.3.
7.2.2.2 MLS formulation
If the selected performance indicator is solely based on the connectivity of the network,
then it is possible to decompose the system into subsystems of strictly parallel or series
elements, thus reducing the system to a more straightforward problem. For instance,
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Figure 7.3: Naive formulation for the system performance assessment of the example
network. The hazard layer has been left out for more clarity.
Bensi et al. [2013] have introduced the concept of Mininum Link Sets (MLSs) and Min-
imum Cut Sets (MCSs). In a given system, an MLS (respectively an MCS) represents
the smallest set of components where the joint survival (respectively the failure) of the
components induces the survival (respectively the failure) of the system. Therefore the
identification of all MLSs (respectively MCSs) results in the decomposition of the given
system into parallel (respectively in-series) sub-systems of in-series (respectively parallel)
components.
A preliminary step of this MLS formulation consists in the identification of all MLSs
within a system, since failure to provide an exhaustive inventory of the MLSs will result
in an underestimation of the performance of the system (i.e. overestimation of the sys-
tem’s losses). Therefore, in the present work, a recursive algorithm has been developed
and implemented in order to find all the MLSs that ensure the connection between a
source and a sink in a given system. In the scope of this study, network edges (e.g.
road segments, bridges, etc.) are considered as the vulnerable components, even though
the MLS-finding algorithm can be easily extended to vulnerable nodes as well. The
algorithm has been designed in a way that both cases of directed and undirected edges
can be treated, thus generalizing its application to several types of network systems (e.g.
road network, water supply system, electric power network, etc.). The main stages of the
MLS-finding algorithm are summarized in Figure 7.4: its structure is based on the fact
that identifying the shortest path between two vertices is a straightforward operation,
which is applied to updated versions of the network when the different edges composing
the shortest path are successively removed.
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Figure 7.4: Summary of the recursive MLS-finding algorithm for a graph G composed
of a series of edges ei, leading to the successive identification of MLS chains.
The recursive nature of the algorithm implies that the computational load increases
exponentially with the size and complexity of the network. For instance, if the initial
shortest path contains a long chain of components, the number of edge removal com-
binations to be explored may become intractable. This limitation may be overcome by
the preliminary identification of critical disjoint link sets or cut sets, as proposed by Lim
and Song [2012]. When applied to the example network in Figure 7.1, the algorithm has
identified 13 MLSs for the a-g connectivity and 14 MLSs for the b-g connectivity. The
MLSs for the first origin-destination couple (a-g) are detailed in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: MLSs identified for the a-g connectivity in the example network.
MLS Edge numbers MLS Edge numbers
mls1 [1, 5] mls8 [2, 10, 7, 8, 6]
mls2 [1, 4, 6] mls9 [2, 10, 9, 4, 5]
mls3 [2, 3, 5] mls10 [2, 10, 7, 8, 4, 5]
mls4 [2, 3, 4, 6] mls11 [1, 3, 10, 9, 6]
mls5 [2, 11, 6] mls12 [1, 3, 10, 7, 8, 6]
mls6 [1, 3, 11, 6] mls13 [2, 11, 4, 5]
mls7 [2, 10, 9, 6]
The MLS formulation can then be applied to the BN, as shown in Figure 7.5. For sim-
plification purposes, only the MLSs that represent the a-g connectivity are represented,
while the BN structure should be completed by the MLS formulation corresponding to
the second origin-destination couple (b-g).
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Figure 7.5: MLS formulation for the system performance assessment of the example
network (connectivity between nodes a and g).
The MLS formulation allows the number of parent nodes to be reduced, since the stud-
ied system may be decomposed into smaller sub-systems. However, additional nodes
MLSi need to be added in order to represent the survival or failure of all MLSs. This
formulation has the merit of generating smaller CPTs, even though it requires additional
steps to identify the MLSs and build the corresponding BN structure.
7.2.2.3 Efficient MLS formulation
The MLS formulation detailed above has resulted in smaller CPTs for the MLS nodes,
instead of using a single CPT for the whole system. However, in the case that some
MLSs contain many components, the same issue may arise, since a naive formulation is
still used to represent the relation between the components and MLS nodes. Therefore
advantage can be taken from the fact that each MLS is a series sub-system of com-
ponents, which can be represented as a chain structure instead of a naive formulation.
As suggested by Bensi et al. [2013], this efficient MLS formulation considers that each
MLS constitute a survival path sequence (SPS) where all components are represented
by survival path events (SPEs). Esi nodes are then introduced in order to represent
SPEs within each MLS: the logic behind this formulation is that successive checks are
performed along the SPS in order to ensure that a given SPE Esi is still in survival
state, based on the state of the previous SPEs and the state of the new component that
is added to the chain.
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Figure 7.6: Efficient MLS formulation for the system performance assessment of the
example network (connection between nodes a and g).
On the other hand, a similar chain structure may be assembled to represent the transition
from the SPE nodes to the global system node. This structure becomes necessary when
the given system has to be decomposed into many MLSs. To this end, intermediate
nodes Inti are introduced: they follow the same principles as the Esi nodes, except that
they represent a parallel assembly of the MLSs. Finally, this efficient MLS formulation
is represented in Figure 7.6, when applied to the previous example network.
It can be seen that the efficient MLS formulation strictly limits the number of parent
nodes to 2, which generates very small CPTs (i.e. 8 elements in the case of binary states).
However, this formulation comes at the cost of the number of nodes that have to be
modelled: 54 SPE nodes are required, even though only 11 components are considered.
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This is due to the fact that most components contribute to several MLSs at the same
time, thus leading to multiple instances of SPE nodes.
7.2.2.4 Efficient MLS formulation with coalesced SPSs
In order to reduce the number of instances of SPE nodes, Bensi et al. [2013] have
introduced an optimization process that aims to coalesce the different SPSs so that a
minimum of SPE instances are required. In the present work, this optimization step has
been implemented as an algorithm, whose main steps are summarized in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Main steps of the optimization algorithm of the SPE permutations. Nc
represents the number of components that are involved in the MLSs.
The main issue of the optimization algorithm is that the number of possible permutations
increases exponentially with the number of instances and the number of components
within the MLSs, potentially leading to high computation times before the actual start
of the Bayesian inference process. Therefore Bensi et al. [2013] propose the use of two
heuristics that aims at reducing the size of the problem space:
• Heuristic 1 consists in the identification and creation of super-components based on
the composition of the MLSs. Two types of super-components may be generated:
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class A super-components (in series) identify groups of components that always
appear together in the MLSs, and class B super-components (in parallel) identify
components that appear in different MLSs while sharing these MLSs with the same
set of other components.
• Heuristic 2 blocks the permutation order of some components within the MLSs,
based on their occurrence frequency in the MLSs. This heuristic allows the number
of possible permutations to be reduced, even though it may prevent the identifi-
cation of the most optimal permutation solution.
This efficient MLS formulation with coalesced SPSs is also built in the case of the example
network. First, heuristic 1 is applied to the MLSs in Table 7.1, in order to reduce the
number of elements to be permuted. As a result, the simplified set of MLSs is detailed in
Table 7.2: only 10 MLSs remain out of the original 13, since the class B super-component
SC2 = {9, SC1} has been generated, where SC1 is a class A super-component containing
the components {7, 8}.
Table 7.2: MLSs of the example network (a-g connectivity) after the application of
heuristic 1.
MLS Edge numbers MLS Edge numbers
mls1 [1, 5] mls6 [2, 4, 5, 11]
mls2 [2, 3, 5] mls7 [2, 3, 4, 6]
mls3 [2, 6, 11] mls8 [1, 4, 6]
mls4 [2, 6, 10,SC2] mls9 [1, 3, 6, 11]
mls5 [2, 4, 5, 10,SC2] mls10 [1, 3, 6, 10,SC2]
The optimization algorithm can then be applied and the optimal permutation of SPEs
is shown in Figure 7.8. A maximum number of Ni = 3 instances has been required,
for a total of 16 SPEs nodes: it can be easily checked that all the chains of SPE nodes
correspond to the MLSs in Table 7.2.
While this formulation leads to a drastic reduction of the number of SPE nodes, it can be
argued that the computational load is transferred to the execution of the optimization
algorithm, where the size of the permutation space has an exponential increase rate. For
instance, in the example network considered, the optimization of the SPE permutations
for the a and g connectivity has required several hours of computation. Bensi et al.
[2013] state that the implementation of the optimization process into the Tomlab tool-
box [Holmstro¨m, 2008] dramatically reduces the computation times, even though the
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Figure 7.8: Efficient MLS formulation with coalesced SPSs for the system performance
assessment of the example network (connectivity between nodes a and g).
execution of the optimization algorithm does not seem feasible for large and complex
systems (e.g. MLSs containing hundreds of elements).
7.2.2.5 Naive formulation with compression algorithm
As an alternative to the MLS-based formulations, Tien and Der Kiureghian [2015] have
introduced a compression algorithm that is applied to the system CPT when the naive
formulation is used. The authors take advantage of the repeating structure of the CPT
to jointly apply two compression methods (see Figure 7.9):
• Algorithm 1: representation of the data by consecutive bits of the same value (i.e.
runs).
• Algorithm 2: for mixed values that cannot be efficiently compressed for algorithm
1, a Lempel-Ziv algorithm [Ziv and Lempel, 1977] based on the encoding of recur-
ring phrases is applied.
In the example provided by Tien and Der Kiureghian [2015], only system and component
nodes are considered, without the hazard assessment part. Consequently, these variables
Chapter 7. Bayesian Networks for the multi-risk analysis of infrastructure systems 218
Figure 7.9: Compression of a vector with the two algorithms proposed by Tien and
Der Kiureghian [2015].
belong to a single clique and the variable elimination algorithm (i.e. bucket elimination)
is used to perform the inference. This enables to sequentially update the compressed
CPT when a variable is eliminated. The authors have shown that the memory storage
space only increases linearly with the compression algorithm, whereas the computation
time due the compression operations has an exponential rate with respect to the number
of components. Tien and Der Kiureghian [2015] have partially solved the computational
time issue through a careful ordering of the component variables within the system
CPT and by taking advantage of single-component MLSs (i.e. single components whose
failure leads to the system failure).
However, the compression algorithm has only been demonstrated for a trivial BN struc-
ture where the hazard assessment has been left out: in the case of more generic systems,
such as the ones presented in this study, the variable elimination algorithm may not be
used any more and the ordering of the variables becomes less transparent. Moreover,
seismic intensity nodes have to be added to the clique containing the system nodes, which
may complicate the structure of the table of potentials and dramatically reduce the effi-
ciency of the compression algorithm. It is also unclear how sum and product operations
can be performed on the compressed matrices without requiring preliminary decom-
pression/recompression operations. Therefore the compression algorithm approach has
not been considered in the following benchmark, pending further investigation of the
aforementioned issues.
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7.2.2.6 Summary and performance of the various formulations
The various BN formulations detailed above are benchmarked with the problem pre-
sented in Figure 7.1. The global system performance is assumed to be represented by
the single connectivity loss (SCL) [Poljansek et al., 2012], which represents the ratio of
the remaining number of connected sources after the event over the initial number of
connected sources, averaged over the sinks. In our example, the two sources a and b are
supposed to be connected to a single sink g, which leads to the following expression of
SCL:
SCL = 1− δa + δb
2
(7.1)
where the δ symbol takes the value 1 if the source is still connected, and 0 if not.
Therefore it can be seen that, in this simple example, SCL can only take three values,
namely 0, 0.5 and 1.
It is proposed to test the different BN formulations with two types of inference problems:
• Forward analysis: updating of the distribution of SCL given the observation of the
highest magnitude earthquake events;
• Backward analysis: updating of the distribution of magnitude given the total
disconnection of network (i.e. SCL = 1).
The results of the Bayesian updating are presented in Figure 7.10. It has been checked
that the results are identical for all BN formulations, which confirms the validity of these
constructions and the ability of the exact inference algorithm (i.e. junction tree) to yield
accurate probability distributions. The prior distribution represents the distribution of
a variable when no evidence has been entered into the BN (e.g. magnitude distribution
that is assumed for the area), while the posterior distribution represents the updated
distribution once one or more evidences are propagated in the BN.
However, the performance of these formulations in terms of complexity and computation
time is not equal, as shown in Table 7.3. The results are quite counter-intuitive, since the
inference performance seems to degrade as more elaborate BN formulations are applied.
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Figure 7.10: Prior and posterior distributions for the forward (left) and backward
(right) analyses.
This observation can actually be explained by the fact that the inference time is closely
related to the size of the cliques, while the number of nodes or the size of the CPTs does
not seem to play a significant role, as shown in the table.
Table 7.3: Comparison of the performance of the different BN formulations.
] of SPE and Maximum Inference time
Formulation intermediate nodes clique size Forward Backward
Naive − 24 576 000 0.4 s 3.5 s
MLS 27 24 576 000 0.6 s 3.6 s
Efficient MLS 132 24 576 000 0.6 s 3.6 s
Efficient MLS (coalesced) 34 196 608 000 2.1 s 17.5 s
As a result, the MLS-based formulations, which aim mainly at reducing the size of CPTs,
have no impact on the inference time. It appears that the triangulation of the BN within
the junction tree algorithm invariably leads to the same size of cliques, thus showing that
some parts of the BN constitute a computational bottleneck that cannot be reduced,
irrespective of the formulation that is adopted. A notable and disappointing exception is
the efficient MLS formulation with coalesced SPSs, where the inference time appears to
be much longer. A possible reason for this is the greater connectivity level between the
different SPE nodes, which tends to create a more complex structure that induces larger
cliques during the triangulation. The issue of the partial optimization of the elimination
order (i.e. see Subsection 5.3.2) may also be highlighted by this observation, since
applications to other network systems with different SPSs chains have shown that this
formulation performs better than the simpler ones in some cases. Therefore it may be
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concluded that MLS-based formulations do not necessarily provide better performances
in terms of inference. At best, they guarantee the treatment of slightly larger networks
than the naive formulation, which is quickly limited by the CPT size.
The review of the various BN formulations has highlighted the difficulty to find a mod-
elling strategy that enables the effortless and straightforward assessment of real-life
systems. Different types of computational bottlenecks can be found in each of the BN
formulations, as summarized in Table 7.4:
• The size of CPTs is the most obvious issue, since these objects are directly manip-
ulated when using the Bayes Net toolbox. This issue is the main motivation for
the development of the MLS-based formulations.
• However, MLS-based formulations require the preliminary identification of MLSs,
which can be a non-trivial and time consuming task for larger systems (i.e. recur-
sive algorithm).
• The aggregation of SPE chains requires an initial optimization step to build up
the coalesced SPSs that can lead to significant computation times, especially if
numerous SPE instances are required.
• More than the size of CPTs, it appears that the main issue resides in the size of
the cliques that are assembled. The clique size depends on the CPT size of the
nodes (i.e. number of parents and discrete states) and on the elimination order,
which is much more difficult to predict and quantify, since it is linked to the more
global connectivity of the ‘vicinity’ of the nodes.
• Finally, the compression algorithm proposed by Tien and Der Kiureghian [2015]
is also based on the identification of MLSs in order to sequentially construct the
system CPT, while the compression operations end up converting memory storage
space into high computation time.
The summary in Table 7.4 reveals that there is no straightforward BN formulation that
is able to tackle large and complex systems. Each modelling strategy is hindered by
one or more computational bottlenecks: the reduction of the size of CPTs or cliques
invariably requires time-consuming preliminary steps such as the identification of MLSs
or the optimization of SPSs. Moreover, it should be noted that the example network
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Table 7.4: Qualitative description of the main criticalities that are involved in the
various BN formulations.
CPT MLS SPE Inference
Formulation size identification optimization Compression (clique size)
Naive X X
Naive with compression X X
MLS X X X
Efficient MLS X X
Efficient MLS (coalesced) X X X
presented here is based on components with only binary states and that the selected
performance indicator is solely based on the system connectivity. Therefore, the objec-
tive of assessing more complex systems with realistic performance indicators based on
serviceability cannot be reached by the single use of the BN formulations detailed above.
7.2.3 BN Formulations based on Physical Simulations
The work presented in this sub-section is the outcome of a collaboration with University
of Roma La Sapienza [Cavalieri et al., 2017], which has been conducted in order to
improve the applicability of BNs to real-life systems.
7.2.3.1 Outline of the Proposed Method
Since the aforementioned BN formulations for exact inference are bound to present some
computational bottlenecks and are limited to the prediction of connectivity metrics, it is
proposed to take advantage of the versatility of simulation-based methods by developing
a hybrid procedure. It is based on the following steps (see Figure 7.11):
1. Monte-Carlo simulation of n runs of damage scenarios on the considered infrastruc-
ture system: for instance, the OOFIMS tool may be used to compute the system
performance of a given network, starting from the probability of occurrence of
hazard source events.
2. Computation of either connectivity- or capacity-based system performance indica-
tors for the n runs.
3. Computation of the correlation coefficients ρi between the component damage
events and the system performance indicator, for i = 1 · · · k components.
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4. Selection of a correlation threshold ρth below which the components are considered
to be insufficiently correlated with the system’s response.
5. Construction of a BN structure with a naive formulation, where only the compo-
nents that are well correlated (i.e. ρi ≥ ρth) contribute to the system node.
6. Construction of the system CPT by counting the simulation results (i.e. proportion
of system failures for each damage configuration of the selected components).
Figure 7.11: Outline of the t-Naive formulation.
This approach, later referred to as a thrifty-naive (t-Naive) formulation, enables the
development of a BN that only retains the most influential components, thus reducing
the computation load. The ρth threshold is used to adjust the number of components that
are considered in the analysis, which results from a trade-off between the computational
load and the accuracy of the predictions. Further investigations on the adequate values
of ρth for different types of systems and performance indicators are still needed.
A variant of the t-Naive formulation may also be considered in order to refine the results.
It is based on the observation that most system performance indicators are aggregated
from local performance indicators, such as the number of sources connected to a given
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sink, the head ratio of a given water tank, or the travel time between an origin and a
destination. Therefore a similar approach may be adopted, by evaluating the specific
correlations of the components with respect to these local indicators. An exact BN
formulation can then be designed in order to quantify the global indicators from the
knowledge of the local measures. It is likely that most components have a direct impact
on a few local performance measures, while having less influence on the rest of the
system. Therefore this variant, referred to as second-order t-Naive formulation, may be
able to offer a better resolution of the loss distribution, while maintaining computational
loads to an acceptable level.
7.2.3.2 Comparison with Exact Formulations
The t-Naive formulation is applied to the network layout that has been presented in
Figure 7.1. Additional sinks and sources are now considered in order to add complexity to
the system: nodes g and f are sinks, while nodes a, b and d are sources (see Figure 7.12).
The layout is here assumed to represent a water-supply system, so that flow-based
analyses are possible.
Figure 7.12: Layout of the example network with additional source and sink nodes,
adapted from Kang and Lee [2015].
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An OOFIMS simulation is then conducted with 10 000 runs, and two system performance
indicators are computed:
• the Single Connectivity Loss (SCL);
• the System Serviceability Index (SSI), which is a flow-based metric [Vanzi, 2004]
representing the averaged ratios of water heads at the sinks, after and before the
hazard event.
For each of the two performance indicators, the correlation coefficients with the com-
ponent damage events is then estimated and a cut-off threshold is chosen in order to
significantly reduce the number of components: a threshold ρth = 0.6 is arbitrarily
chosen, and any component Ci that is correlated to the performance indicator with a
correlation coefficient ρi ≥ ρth is kept for the Bayesian analysis. As a result, components
#1, 2, 7 and 9 are selected for the prediction of SCL, while components #4, 7, 9 and
11 are the most influential for the determination of SSI. The lists of components are
not exactly the same for both performance indicators, thus reflecting the differences of
accuracy between connectivity- and capacity-based loss measures. The corresponding
BN can then be constructed for the two performance indicators, as shown in Figure 7.13.
Figure 7.13: T-Naive formulation for the two performance indicators of the example
network.
The second-order t-Naive formulation may also be designed by considering the corre-
lations of the components with the local performance measure of each sink (i.e. water
head ratio or number of connected sources). Therefore intermediate nodes I and J are
introduced in order to represent the local measures (at sinks g and f ) that are needed for
the computation of SCL and SSI, respectively. The new BN formulation in Figure 7.14
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shows that this refinement in scale enables new components to be taken into account,
while the size of the system CPTs remains reasonable.
Figure 7.14: Second-order t-Naive formulation for the two performance indicators of
the example network.
The efficiency and accuracy of this hybrid approach is then tested by running two infer-
ence cases on the example network:
• Bayesian updating of the magnitude distribution and of the IM distribution at
component C7, given full connectivity loss (i.e. SCL = 1);
• Bayesian updating of the magnitude distribution and of the IM distribution at
component C7, given severe serviceability loss (i.e. SSI < 20%).
Different BN formulations are benchmarked, such as the exact inference with the efficient
MLS formulation, the hybrid method with all components (i.e. ρth = 0, referred to as
naive formulation from now on), and the t-Naive formulations (first- and second-order).
The posterior distributions represented in Figure 7.15 demonstrate the ability of the
t-Naive formulations to emulate the results of the exact inference, at least partially.
Applying a cut-off threshold to reduce the number of components does not seem to
have a significant impact on the accuracy, however it appears that the second-order t-
Naive formulation is able to follow more closely the full naive formulation. The results
highlight once again the need to consider flow- or capacity-based performance indicators:
a serviceability index below 20% require lower levels of magnitude or PGA than when
SCL is used as the loss metric.
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Figure 7.15: Posterior distribution of the selected variables, based on the different
BN formulations.
Table 7.5: Computation time (in seconds) of the different BN formulations.
Evidence SCL = 1 SSI < 20%
Formulation Mw PGAC7 Mw PGAC7
Efficient MLS (coalesced) 9.0 9.1 − −
Naive 26.9 25.9 26.0 26.7
t-Naive 1st 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.2
t-Naive 2nd 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
The computation time taken by the different inference operations is detailed in Table 7.5.
The t-Naive formulations represent a substantial gain in terms of computational loads
in all cases. The duration of the OOFIMS simulations should still be taken into account,
however it may be argued that the simulations are only run once in order to generate the
BN structure. The preliminary analyses of this hybrid approach are encouraging, even
though more in-depth investigations should be conducted on the role of the correlation
threshold or on the way the OOFIMS simulations may influence the accuracy of the
results.
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7.3 Application: Multi-Risk Assessment of a Simplifed
Road Network
The theoretical concepts described in the previous section are applied to a virtual proof-
of-concept example, in order to demonstrate the various steps involved and to estimate
which uncertainty sources are the most influential.
7.3.1 Characterization of the virtual proof-of-concept example
The virtual proof-of-concept example is presented in terms of asset types, network topol-
ogy and potential hazards.
7.3.1.1 General presentation
A hypothetical application is proposed in order to demonstrate the applicability of BN
modelling in the context of multi-risk analyses and uncertainty modelling. Due to the
difficulty to obtain reliable data on infrastructure elements and to find a well character-
ized area exposed to multiple hazards, it has been decided to assume a virtual case-study
in order to have total control of the variables of interest. Since the aim of this exercise is
limited to the feasibility study of the BN methods that have been detailed in the sections
above, this assumption is acknowledged as long as the results are not considered as the
outcome of an actual risk analysis.
The application site is arbitrarily located somewhere around Northern Central Italy. A
virtual road network is imagined, with the following components (see Figure 7.16):
• Plain road segments, connecting B1 to B3, B2 to B3, B2 to C2 and B3 to C1;
• A road on an embankment, connecting B1 to B2 and B1 to C3;
• A road along a slope, on the B2-B3 segment;
• Three bridges (B1, B2, B3): they are assumed to be identical structures, with a
span length of 48.8 m (see bridge model in Section 4.2) over two river streams
(in blue in Figure 7.16). The arrows show the direction of flow of the rivers
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Figure 7.16: Layout of the proposed virtual application, with its different components.
with a larger flow discharge under bridge B1. More detail about this is given in
Subsection 7.3.2.1.
• Four points of interest (C1, C2, C3, C4): they can be considered as hospitals,
cities or exits/entrances to the network, also referred to as Traffic Analysis Zones
(TAZs).
7.3.1.2 Network Topology
The topology of this simplified road network may be schematized as represented in
Figure 7.17.
The graph and the attributes of its nodes and edges can also be represented in tabular
form (see Tables 7.6 and 7.7). An undirected graph is assumed for this road network,
meaning that each edge can be travelled in both directions.
Only the edges are considered as vulnerable in the proposed example, since the nodes
may be seen as virtual objects representing the TAZs (i.e. traffic analysis zones) of the
network or the extremities of edges (i.e. intersections). Therefore the MLSs between
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Figure 7.17: Topology of the proposed network. Edge numbers are represented in
red, and nodes numbers in black.
Table 7.6: Location and description of the nodes composing the graph.
Node number Longitude Latitude Description
1 11.1794 44.2753 TAZ 1
2 11.2000 44.2753 Intersection
3 11.2006 44.2753 Intersection
4 11.2156 44.2212 Intersection
5 11.2472 44.1073 TAZ 4
6 11.2631 44.0500 Intersection
7 11.3411 44.0500 TAZ 2
8 11.2625 44.0500 Intersection
9 11.2000 44.0506 Intersection
10 11.2000 44.0500 Intersection
11 11.1836 44.0446 TAZ 3
each couple of TAZs are represented by enumerating the list of travelled edges only (see
Table 7.8). In the present example, it is assumed that TAZs #3 and #4 are sources (i.e.
origins), while TAZs #1 and #2 are potential sinks (i.e. destinations). This enables
the representation of the corresponding origin-destination matrix, along with the MLSs
that are associated with each travel, as shown in Table 7.8.
7.3.1.3 Hazard Types and Potential Damage Modes
The following hazard events are considered in the application:
• Earthquakes: the three bridges are assumed to be susceptible to seismic loading.
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Table 7.7: Connectivity and description of the edges composing the graph.
Edge number Start node End node Description
1 1 2 Road segment
2 2 3 Bridge B3
3 3 4 Road segment
4 4 5 Road along slope
5 5 6 Road segment
6 6 7 Road segment
7 6 8 Bridge B2
8 8 10 Road on embankment
9 2 9 Road segment
10 9 10 Bridge B1
11 10 11 Road on embankment
Table 7.8: Edge numbers composing the different MLSs for all inter-TAZ travels.
Origin / Destination TAZ #1 TAZ #2
TAZ #3 [11, 10, 9, 1] [11, 8, 7, 6]
[11, 8, 7, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1] [11, 10, 9, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
TAZ #4 [4, 3, 2, 1] [5, 6]
[5, 7, 8, 10, 9, 1] [4, 3, 2, 9, 10, 8, 7, 6]
• Landslides: they are expected to happen mainly on the mountain slope, due to
the occurrence of earthquakes (ground shaking) or heavy rainfall (soil saturation).
Ground failure (lateral spreading) could also happen at the level of the embank-
ment road.
• Fluvial floods due to the presence of the river streams.
• Scour at bridges due to the fluvial floods.
7.3.2 Modelling Assumptions
Although the proposed approach is applied to a virtual example, the underlying models
and input data are selected so that they are realistic and consistent with the type of
hazards and infrastructure elements that may be found in Northern Central Italy.
7.3.2.1 Hazard Models
Hazard data and models are selected for the infrastructure area, using mainly the meth-
ods and results from D’Ayala et al. [2014b] developed within the framework of the
INFRARISK project and described in detail in the following subsections.
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a. Earthquakes
A single seismic source area is assumed, from which epicentre locations are randomly
sampled: a rectangular shape is assumed, for which the geographical coordinates are
detailed in Table 7.9.
Table 7.9: Coordinates of the assumed seismic source area.
Area corner Longitude Latitude
North-West 11.2700 44.1500
South-East 11.3100 44.0700
The distribution of the magnitude events is assumed to follow the truncated Gutenberg-
Richter law, for which the activity parameters are selected from the SHARE source model
[Woessner et al., 2015]. The seismic activity parameters are detailed in Table 7.10.
Table 7.10: Assumed seismic activity parameters for the source area.
Parameter Value
Lower magnitude Mlow 4.0
Upper magnitude Mup 7.5
Mean annual rate λ0 0.01
b-value β 1.95
Finally, the distributed hazard intensities are computed thanks to the median of the
three-branch GMPE that has been derived in Section 6.4.1, based on four original Eu-
ropean GMPEs. The soil class of all vulnerable sites is assumed to correspond to the
EC8 soil class B, except for ther embankment which is assumed to be soil class D and
the road segments on soil class C (see Subsection 7.3.2.2).
b. Floods
The rational method is used for the estimation of flow discharge at the various bridge
locations, as detailed in INFRARISK deliverable D3.1 [D’Ayala et al., 2014b]. The flow
discharge Q is expressed as follows:
Q =
C · I ·A
3.6
·Ku (7.2)
where C is the run-off coefficient of the drainage area, I is the maximum rainfall in-
tensity during concentration time Tc, A is the catchment area and Ku is the uniformity
coefficient [Ferrer, 1993, Temez, 1991].
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The concentration time Tc may be obtained as a function of the length of the waterway
between the bridge location and the catchment area, as well as the gradient of the main
watercourse. The run-off coefficient is estimated through the following equation:
C =
(
Pd
P0
− 1
)
·
(
Pd
P0
+ 23
)
(
Pd
P0
+ 11
)2 (7.3)
where Pd is the design daily rainfall and P0 is the run-off threshold, which mainly depends
on the type of terrain.
Finally, the maximum rainfall intensity is obtained as a function of Id, the design hourly
intensity for an event of a given return period:
I = Id ·
(
I1
Id
) 280.1−T0.1c
280.1−1
(7.4)
The ratio I1/Id represents the ratio of the maximum hourly intensity over the daily-
averaged intensity for the given case-study area. This value is usually tabulated in
guidelines or standards. Id may be directly estimated from the daily rainfall Pd (i.e.
Id = (Pd/24) ·R, where R is a reduction factor). The design daily rainfall Pd is usually
obtained through the analysis of rain records of weather stations over the area of interest.
Sufficient time series then allow different return periods to be associated with given levels
of daily rainfall.
In the present example, two catchment areas are assumed, i.e. one feeding the river
branch under bridge B2 and the other linked to the river stream under bridge B3.
Based on the examples and assumptions used in D’Ayala et al. [2014b], three return
periods are proposed, as shown in Table 7.11.
Table 7.11: Rainfall events for each return period and each catchment area.
Daily rainfall
Return period Catchment area 1 (B2) Catchment area 2 (B3)
50 years 154 mm 235 mm
100 years 174 mm 289 mm
500 years 226 mm 362 mm
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These design rainfall events are then used to estimate the maximum flow discharge that
is expected under bridges B2 and B3 (see Table 7.12), again using some of the parameters
that have been assumed in INFRARISK deliverable D3.1 [D’Ayala et al., 2014b].
Table 7.12: Assumed parameters for rainfall events and resulting flow discharge from
the rational method, for different return periods and bridge locations.
T [y] A
[
km2
]
Pd [mm] TC [h] P0 [mm] I1/Id Id [mm/h] C Ku Q
[
m3/s
]
B2 50 11.96 154 1.04 40 9 6.1 0.33 1.07 63.22
100 11.96 174 1.04 40 9 6.9 0.37 1.07 80.34
500 11.96 226 1.04 40 9 8.9 0.47 1.07 129.86
B3 50 44.46 235 2.13 40 9 9.3 0.48 1.07 339.39
100 44.46 289 2.13 40 9 11.4 0.55 1.07 481.02
500 44.46 362 2.13 40 9 14.3 0.62 1.07 686.44
It should be noted that the bridge B1 is located at the confluence of the two river streams
that cross bridge B2 and B3. For simplification purposes, it is then assumed that the
maximum flow discharge at B1 is the sum of the flow discharges under B2 plus B3 for
the various return periods. This simplistic model may still be reasonably accurate, if
it can be assumed that the rainfall events over the two catchment areas are strongly
correlated due to their geographical proximity (i.e. joint occurrence of maximum daily
rainfall).
c. Landslides
As detailed in INFRARISK deliverable D3.1 [D’Ayala et al., 2014b], an infinite slope
model for superficial landslides is adopted for road segments that run along slopes. In
the case of earthquake-triggered landslides, the yield acceleration ky can be expressed
as follows [Saygili, 2008, Saygili and Rathje, 2009]:
ky =
(FS − 1) · g
tanφ′ + 1tanα
(7.5)
where FS represents the factor of safety, φ′ is the internal friction angle and α is the
slope angle. The factor of safety under static conditions is estimated as follows:
FS =
c′
γ · t · sinα +
tanφ′
tanα
− γw ·m · tanφ
′
tanα
(7.6)
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where c′ is the effective cohesion of the soil, γ is the soil unit weight, γw is the water unit
weight and m is the saturation ratio. The soil parameters are summarised in Table 7.13
due to lack of knowledge on the shear strength of the soil, a cohesion of 0 kPa and a
friction angle of 40◦ are assumed, as suggested by CDMG [1998]. Regarding the thickness
of the moving layer, Jibson et al. [2000] have stated that a typical value for superficial
landslides on natural slopes is several feet, i.e. 8 ft translating to 2.43 m.
Table 7.13: Soil parameters assumed for the landslide hazard analysis.
Paramer Value
Effective cohesion (c′) 0 kPa
Internal friction angle (φ′) 40◦
Soil unit weight γ 19 kN/m3
Failure surface thickness (t) 2.43 m
The major difficulty lies in the estimation of the saturation ratio m, which potentially
depends on many factors [Saygili, 2008] including: depth of the groundwater table,
precipitation pattern, soil transmissivity, slope geometry, etc. It is usually estimated
through detailed hydrology models or expert judgement. In the present exercise, due to
the lack of relevant data, an arbitrary probability distribution of the saturation ratio as
a function of the type of rainfall event is proposed (see Table 7.14), in order to demon-
strate the impact of rainfall on the landslide hazard and to account for the uncertainties
surrounding the estimation of this parameter.
Table 7.14: Proposed distribution of the soil saturation ratio according to the type
of rainfall event.
Rainfall Saturation ratio [m]
event 0.20 0.50 0.75 1.00
None 80% 20% − −
50 y 15% 70% 15% −
100 y − 15% 70% 15%
500 y − − 20% 80%
Therefore the proposed model allows the prediction of the occurrence of earthquake-
triggered superficial landslides, by comparing the PGA value at the site with the yield
acceleration ky of the slope. Since the yield acceleration is a function of the saturation
ratio, which depends on the amount of rainfall, this landslide hazard model is dependent
on both the earthquake and rainfall events.
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7.3.2.2 Fragility Models
Fragility models are selected for the various infrastructure elements at risk, using mainly
the results from the previous chapters for bridges, or literature surveys for other road
elements [D’Ayala et al., 2015].
a. Bridges
All bridges are assumed to be identical multi-span simply-supported concrete girder
bridges, as described in Nielson [2005]. These bridges have been the object of a specific
fragility assessment for cumulated hazards (see Section 5.5). In the present context, since
the measure of interest is the potential disconnection of the TAZs from the network, the
failure modes that are bound to lead to the closure of the bridge are considered, namely
deck unseating (failure mode 3) and collapse of substructure components (failure mode
4). The corresponding fragility model is displayed in Figure 7.18 (aggregation of failure
modes 3 and 4).
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Figure 7.18: Fragility model for the closure of bridges B1 and B3, as a function of
flow discharge Q and peak ground acceleration PGA.
This fragility surface is able to predict the bridge failure probability due to earthquake or
flood alone, as well as the interaction between flood and earthquake cumulated damages,
in the case where an earthquake occurs during the period when a bridge has been
damaged by a flood (i.e. submersion and scour effects). Damage due to earthquake-
induced ground failure is also accounted for.
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b. Embankments
Fragility curves for embankments exposed to earthquake-induced ground failure are se-
lected from the study by Argyroudis and Kaynia [2015]. An EC8 soil type D and an
embankment height of 6 m are assumed. As a result, the fragility parameters for the
extensive/complete damage to these types of embankments are: α = 4.807 m/s2 and
β = 0.800.
c. Road segments
Fragility curves for plain road segments exposed to earthquake-induced ground failure
are also selected from Argyroudis and Kaynia [2015]. Even though this study is focused
on the fragility of embankments and cuts, it could be assumed that the road segments of
the present case-study are built on a layer of compacted soil, which may correspond to a
shallow embankment with stiffer soil (i.e. h = 2 m and EC8 soil type C). As a result, the
fragility parameters for the extensive/complete damage to these types of road segments
are: α = 15.402 m/s2 and β = 1.000.
d. Roads along a slope
Fragility curves for roads running along a slope and exposed to landslides have been
developed in D’Ayala et al. [2015]. They are characterized by the yield acceleration of
the slope, as shown in Table 7.15. The extent of the damage is given by the amount
of displacement that is induced, which is usually obtained through empirical equations
such as the one by Bray and Travasarou [2007]. Therefore the road fragiltiy curves are
directly linked to the yield acceleration ky, which determines whether displacement is
initiatied on the slope or not.
Table 7.15: Fragility curves for extensive damage to urban roads along a slope, as a
function of ky [D’Ayala et al., 2015].
ky [g] α
[
m/s2
]
β
0.05 4.517 0.406
0.10 7.226 0.382
0.20 13.318 0.349
0.30 18.418 0.328
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The proposed fragility curves can be considered as a multi-hazard fragility model, since
they are expressed as a function of PGA for different values of ky, which is linked to
flood events through the soil saturation ratio m.
7.3.3 Corresponding Bayesian Network
Based on the previously discussed assumptions, a BN can be built in order to perform
the multi-risk analysis of the road network (see Figure 7.19): all the successive steps of
the risk analysis are present, i.e. the definition of the source events, the hazard events,
the physical damage events and the functional consequences at the system level.
The BN nodes that are involved in the prediction of the distributed seismic hazard
intensities have already been defined in Subsection 7.2.1. The other nodes involved in
this BN are the following:
• FL: range of rainfall events for the three return periods, being directly linked to
the flow discharge value at each bridge location.
• ky: possible values of yield acceleration based on the extent of rainfall event.
• SCi: super-components, i.e. groups of elements that are found to be in series
within the MLSs.
• Esi: survival events for the elements within the same MLS.
• Nsi: number of sources still connected to sink i.
• SCL: single connectivity loss.
On Figure 7.19, the red nodes represent the input to the Bayesian Network in terms
of potential source events (i.e. earthquakes and rainfall). The blue nodes represent the
computation of the distributed hazard values, based on the geographical coordinates of
the system (brown nodes). The green nodes represent the damages to infrastructure
elements, while the yellow nodes represent the computation of the disconnected TAZs
and the SCL based on the failures of elements. Finally, the grey nodes represent aleatory
uncertainty sources (i.e. intra- and inter-event variability of the ground motion levels).
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Figure 7.19: Bayesian Network for the multi-risk analysis of the infrastructure system.
The efficient MLS formulation has been adopted to represent the system performance,
however the limited size of the MLSs does not require the application of the optimisation
algorithm to coalesce the SPE chains. Still, three class A super-components (in series)
have been created, since they enable a straightforward reduction of the number of SPE
nodes. The details of the equations and contents of the CPTs of the various BN nodes
are presented in Appendix I.
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7.3.4 Multi-Risk Analysis
Currently, there are limited examples in the literature of multi-risk analyses that account
for all possible interactions, from the source events to the loss estimations. Selva [2013]
relies on a formal statistical model to include multi-risk interactions at hazard, vulner-
ability and exposure levels. This approach is applied to two hypothetical cases, i.e. (i)
seismic risk and volcanic ash deposits and (ii) tsunami risk induced by damaging earth-
quakes. Mignan et al. [2014] have simulated time series that may include any number
of source events or triggered events, depending on their rate of occurrence. These time-
dependent scenarios are randomly generated through a sequential Monte Carlo method
that is able to treat either independent coinciding events or triggered/cascading events.
This approach is applied to a virtual city that is potentially exposed to a wide range
of hazard types (i.e. the ‘MATRIX Virtual City’ concept). The results are presented
under the form of a risk matrix (i.e. loss vs frequency) and the risk migration between
different interaction assumptions can be observed.
Since the BN approach proposed in the present study may not be easily applicable to
a time-dependent framework with sequential events, it is first checked whether the BN
can comply with the multi-risk probabilistic model that has been introduced by Selva
[2013]. He introduces the concept of a persistence time window ∆Tp, which is crucial to
properly model the effect of a second hazard event while the effects of the first event in
terms of vulnerability and exposure are still present. Considering two potential events
E1 and E2, the probability of E1 occurring while the effects of E2 are still present is
given by the following expression [Selva, 2013]:
H(E1,E2) (xj) = H
(E1|E2) (xj ; ∆Tp) · P (E2; ∆T ) (7.7)
where H(.) (xj) represents the probability of having a given hazard event with the value
x ≥ xj , and ∆T is the global exposure time over which the risk is estimated. In the
context of the present case-study example, E2 represents the rainfall event, E1 the
earthquake event and the exposure time is set as ∆T = 1 year; this corresponds to
the objective of quantifying the yearly losses for the road infrastructure. Finally, it is
assumed that the persistence time window ∆Tp could be around 1 month (i.e. accounting
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for the time needed by the flood to recede and the duration of the subsequent repair
operations).
Regarding the risk factor Rc (≥ l), which gives the probability of exceeding losses l over
time period ∆T , Selva [2013] defines the following expression for the risk due to E1 with
possible interactions with E2:
R(E1)c (≥ l) = R(E1,E2)c (≥ l) +R(
E1,E¯2)
c (≥ l) (7.8)
where the total risk is decompose into two disjoints configuration (i.e. with or without
the contribution of the second event E2). The first term on the right side is referred to
as the co-active risk factor: it represents the part of the risk that is only generated by
the joint occurrence of E1 and E2 in the same time window ∆Tp. The second term is
the isolated risk factor, which can be seen as the part of risk that remains when E1 is
not interacting with E2. It can be further decomposed into two distinct parts:
R
(E1,E¯2)
c (≥ l) = R(E1,s)c (≥ l)−R(E1,v)c (≥ l) (7.9)
The first term is referred to as the single risk factor for E1, since it represents the risk
due to E1 over the whole ∆T period, without considering the effects of E2. The second
term is referred to as the virtual risk factor, since it represents the risk due to both E1
and E2 over ∆T , except that the fragility and exposure models are not updated due to
the potential impacts of E2.
This framework is then applied to the BN approach proposed here. The modularity
of the BN and its ability to handle different types of evidence (i.e. assumptions or
observations) permits the generation of risk curves for the different assumptions above:
• Earthquake risk only (single risk): the FL node (flood intensity) is evidenced with
P (FL = 0) = 1, while the probability of occurrence of the M node is set for
∆T = 1 year.
• Flood risk only (single risk): the M node (magnitude range) is evidenced with
P (M = 0) = 1, while the probability of occurrence of the FL node is set for
∆T = 1 year.
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• Interacting earthquake and flood risks (co-active risk): the full distributions of
FL and M nodes are sampled. The probability of occurrence of FL is set for
∆T = 1 year, while ∆Tp = 1 month is used for M.
• Interacting earthquake and flood risks without updating fragility model (virtual
risk): it is obtained by summing the flood single risk (with ∆T = 1 year) and the
earthquake single risk (with ∆Tp = 1 month).
• Earthquake risk outside the time window of flood risk (isolated risk): it is obtained
by subtracting the virtual risk from the sum of the flood and earthquake single
risks (both with ∆T = 1 year).
• Global risk from both earthquake and rainfall events over a year (multi-risk): it is
obtained by summing the isolated risk factor and the co-active risk factor.
The BN can then be solved for these different scenarios, and the resulting risk curves
(i.e. yearly probability of exceedance for the different SCL values) are presented in
Figure 7.20 and Table 7.16.
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Figure 7.20: Risk curves for the SCL index, using the different risk factors.
Selva [2013] has also introduced δR, a single risk bias measure which estimates the bias
in the risk measure when only single risk analyses are performed, without accounting
for the interaction effects:
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Table 7.16: Yearly probability of exceeding the given SCL value with the different
risk factors considered.
SCL Risk factor
Single EQ Single FL Co-active Virtual Isolated Multi
50% 5.0967E-05 7.0933E-04 7.1378E-04 7.1360E-04 4.6701E-05 7.6049E-04
75% 7.1977E-06 1.2414E-07 7.6648E-07 7.2671E-07 6.5951E-06 7.3616E-06
100% 6.1278E-07 − 5.4186E-08 5.1300E-08 5.6148E-07 6.1566E-07
δR = R(E1,E2)c −R(E1,v)c (7.10)
It consists in the difference between the virtual risk factor and the co-active risk fac-
tor. Selva [2013] also proposes to normalise this bias measure by the single risk factor.
However, in the present case-study, both hazard events have damaging potential and E2
(i.e. rainfall event) is not limited to the role of an aggravating risk factor. Therefore it
is proposed here to normalize by the sum of both single risk factors:
δR% =
R
(E1,E2)
c −R(E1,v)c
R
(E1)
c +R
(E2)
c
(7.11)
The multi-risk bias values for the present example are detailed in Table 7.17. The effect
of multi-risk interaction looks rather light, i.e. the bias measure is not exceeding 1%
with ∆Tp = 1 month, however it is interesting to observe that the bias follows the same
trend as the risk migration estimated by Mignan et al. [2014]: when considering multi-
risk interactions, extreme consequence events tend to have a large rate of occurrence
(i.e. SCL = 75% and SCL = 100% in the present case), which seems to have partly
migrated from the rate of occurrence of less severe events (e.g. SCL = 50%). The risk
bias measure is also presented for different values of the persistence time window ∆Tp,
thus showing the significant influence of the temporal aspect on multi-risk analyses.
Table 7.17: Relative risk bias measure using SCL as the system’s loss measure.
SCL δR% with ∆Tp = 1 week δR% with ∆Tp = 1 month δR% with ∆Tp = 3 months
50% 0.004% 0.027% 0.058%
75% 0.127% 0.574% 1.648%
100% 0.109% 0.495% 1.412%
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7.3.5 Sensitivity from Uncertainty Sources
This section details the effects of some of the uncertainty sources that have been identi-
fied. Such a task can be efficiently conducted by taking advantage of the BN approach,
which enables the value of some nodes to be forced (i.e. evidence input) and the distri-
bution of the outputs through an exact inference to be observed.
7.3.5.1 Summary of Uncertainty Sources
The models and assumptions used in the present examples include the following sources
of uncertainty, based on the general uncertainty framework described in Section 6.2:
• Aleatory uncertainties:
– Inter-event variability of the GMPE model: it is represented by the normally
distributed term η that is associated with each GMPE.
– Intra-event variability of the GMPE model: it is specific to each site i and
is represented by the normally distributed term i. A spatial correlation
structure is adopted between the vulnerable sites to generate the terms i,
based on a correlation distance.
– Dispersion inherent to the fragility models: it corresponds the standard-
deviation of the fragility functions. It does necessarily include aleatory un-
certainties, since it is usually a combination of record-to-record variability,
modelling assumptions and definition of the damage state.
• Epistemic uncertainties:
– Choice of a GMPE: the 3-branch representative GMPE that has been dis-
cussed in Section 6.4.1 is used here in order to represent the epistemic uncer-
tainties due to model choice.
– Choice of a fragility curve: if only global features are identified (e.g. deck
type, spans, pier type, etc.), a hybrid fragility model is derived from existing
references, along with confidence bounds (see Section 6.4.2).
– Dispersion inherent to the functionality models: for bridges, a probabilistic
functionality loss model may be adopted given the physical damage states,
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since closure of the bridge may not be accurately predicted due to the lack of
knowledge (i.e. interpretation of the damage states considered).
– Estimation of the yield acceleration ky: the evolution of the soil saturation
ratio, which is used in the computation of the yield acceleration, along with
the rainfall pattern, is completely assumed due the absence of any predictive
model and relevant expertise on this aspect.
– Interactions between the different risks: the interaction between the flood and
the seismic hazard is represented by the development of a multi-risk fragility
model for bridges. This model is based on the assumption that a given bridge
might still be damaged after a flood event, thus increasing its vulnerability
from a subsequent earthquake: therefore a time frame is needed in order to
account for this risk interaction (i.e. duration during which the bridge might
remain unrepaired).
7.3.5.2 Aleatory Uncertainties
The aforementioned computations have been conducted by bounding the aleatory un-
certainties of the GMPE to the ± 1 σa,tot interval, where σa,tot is the standard deviation
that results from the composition of intra- and inter-event variability (which are inherent
to the GMPE model):
σa,tot =
√
σ2intra + σ
2
inter (7.12)
The effect of the range of the possible uncertainty values is illustrated in Figure 7.21. As
expected, the inclusion of aleatory uncertainties in the hazard prediction models results
in a significant increase of the expected losses. It is interesting to note that the loss
probabilities tend to converge and even slightly decrease for ± 3 σa,tot. For such a level
of variability, very high and unrealistic hazard intensity values are sampled, which may
lead to a saturation of the fragility functions (i.e. failure probabilities equal to 1), while
in the meantime, very low hazard intensities are also sampled, thus resulting in no failure
at all. Truncating the ground motion variability at ± 1 σa,tot appears to constitute a
sound assumption in the present case: the highest generated values with this sigma level
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are of the order of 20-25 m/s, while the use of ± 2 σa,tot or above would lead to intensity
values that are not physically realistic.
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Figure 7.21: Risk curves for the SCL index, with different assumptions on the aleatory
uncertainties associated with the GMPE model.
Another variable that is related to the GMPE aleatory uncertainties is the correlation
distance of the ground motion field, which is used to express the spatial correlation
of the intra-event error term. In the present study, a correlation distance of 13.5 km
for PGA has been assumed, based on the recommendations of Akkar and Bommer
[2010]. The effect of other assumptions (i.e. no spatial correlation or infinite correlation
distance) on the global loss of the infrastructure system is represented in Figure 7.22.
It can be observed that the removal of the spatial correlation factor will lead to an
underestimation of the risk. This phenomenon may be explained by the definition of the
system performance indicator that has been selected. The single connectivity loss SCL
counts the number of sources that are still connected to a given sink, while the topology
of the present virtual network generates multiple MLSs between each couple of source
and sink. Therefore the studied example may be assimilated to a ‘parallel’ system, where
multiple paths need to be disrupted for a source to be disconnected and the SCL value
to change. Finally, the present problem with a correlation distance of 13.5 km may be
adequately bounded by the two extreme assumptions, i.e. no correlation (lower bound)
and full correlation (upper bound).
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Figure 7.22: Risk curves for the SCL index, with different assumptions on the spatial
correlation distance.
7.3.5.3 Epistemic Uncertainties
Regarding epistemic uncertainties, the variability that is linked to the choice of ground
motion model (i.e. GMPE node), to the estimation of the slope yield acceleration
(i.e. ky node) and the persistence time window is investigated by successively entering
different input variables into the BN. The assumptions for each uncertainty sources are
summarised in Table 7.18.
Table 7.18: Assumptions used for the epistemic uncertainty sources.
Uncertainty source Median value Lower bound Upper bound
GMPE Median GMPE curve Lower GMPE curve Upper GMPE curve
ky Median ky values Lower ky values Upper ky values
from Table 7.14 from Table 7.14 from Table 7.14
∆Tp 1 month 1 week 3 months
The effect of these epistemic uncertainty sources is represented in Figure 7.23. The
largest change is observed when epistemic uncertainties on the ground motion model are
considered, however it is much smaller than the discrepancies generated by the aleatory
uncertainties (see Figure 7.21). On the other hand, epistemic uncertainties associated
with the ky node have a very limited impact on the final losses: this may be due
mostly to the fact that they are only feeding into a small portion of the infrastructure
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system (i.e. road segment along slope). Finally, the temporal effect, i.e. the change
in the value of the persistence time window, is not visible at this level, even though it
has been shown that it has a major impact on the risk bias measure (see Table 7.17).
Presently, the only interactions at the fragility level that have been taken into account
are the detrimental effect of floods on the seismic fragility of the three bridges. Therefore
more multi-risk models for more infrastructure component types and more failure modes
should be developed in order to better account for these interaction effects.
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Figure 7.23: Effect of some sources of epistemic uncertainties on the risk curve.
The aggregated effects of all epistemic uncertainties are summarised in Figure 7.23,
where the upper and lower bounds are defined by computing the 16th-84th percentiles
of the various realisations of the different variables considered in Table 7.18. The epis-
temic uncertainties are mostly concentrated at the higher loss levels, where a factor of
2 is observed between the probabilities of the upper and lower bounds at SCL = 100%
(i.e. 1.04E-06 vs 2.27E-06). However, the present results should come with a significant
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caveat, since only seismic risk assessment has been the object of uncertainty quantifica-
tion. The development of a proper assessment method for the flood hazard along with
the corresponding uncertainties should be carried out in order to accurately quantify
the uncertainty sources that are brought by the different hazard types.
7.3.5.4 Investigation of Fragility Models
In the previous sub-section, the multi-risk analysis have been conducted with the as-
sumption that functionality loss of the bridges is directly obtained from the specific
multi-hazard fragility function. However, different levels of complexity and accuracy
may also be tested through the following fragility models:
• Model 1: it is assumed that no specific knowledge on the bridges is available, there-
fore the literature-based fragility curves that have been proposed in Section 6.4.2
are used, along with their 16%-84% confidence bounds. In the present example, the
attributes of the bridges are ‘C-SSu-NSD-McP’ (i.e. concrete, simply-supported,
non-seismically designed, multi-column piers), which correspond to bridge ID #1.
Only the curve corresponding to global damage state DS4 is considered, while
assuming bridge closure when DS4 is reached.
• Model 2: probabilistic functionality curves are used instead of fragility functions.
Therefore the curve from Figure 5.16 corresponding to 100% lane closure is used
here, in order to directly predict bridge closure.
• Model 3: probabilistic functionality curves are also used, but functionality losses
are based on the aggregation of global damage states (i.e. the 100% lane closure
curve from Figure 5.19).
The effect of fluvial flood has also to be integrated to these models, which consider only
seismic hazard. A simple way is to directly use the fragility curve for deck unseating
due to hydraulic forces, which will lead to the closure of the bridge by definition. The
seismic damage states and the flood-induced damage states can then be merged into
a functionality node, which assesses the closure or not of the bridge, as shown in Fig-
ure 7.24. Such a formulation has the merit of integrating the potential bridge closure
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due to floods. However, scour fragility curves are not included, since cumulated dam-
ages cannot be modelled by the use of separate fragility functions for seismic and flood
hazards.
Figure 7.24: BN formulations for multi-hazard (left) and single hazard (right) fragility
functions, for component #2 exposed to both seismic and flood hazards.
The multi-risk analysis is then performed with this modified BN formulation, for the
different fragility models, as shown in Figure 7.25.
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Figure 7.25: Multi-risk analyses using different fragility models.
The different loss curves using the single hazard fragility models present the same shape,
which widely diverges from the multi-hazard model. It appears that the effects of scour
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and cumulated damages (i.e. scour-earthquake interactions) lead to substantial addi-
tional losses, especially for SCL = 50%, which cannot be taken into account by the
single hazard models. The fit improves for heavier losses (e.g. SCL = 100%), which is
due to the integration of the flood-induced fragility curve (i.e. Figure 7.24). Although
the adopted limit states are not exactly the same, there is a good agreement between
Model 2 and the multi-hazard model. However, Model 3, which is based on global
damage states, does not present a good fit, thus demonstrating the necessity to refine
functionality models. Finally, as expected, Model 1 performs rather poorly, since a sig-
nificant underestimation of losses is observed. It appears also that choosing between
these different fragility models leads to a significant scatter in the loss curves, which
may be compared to the relatively narrow confidence bounds that are found with the
other epistemic uncertainties (i.e. Figure 7.23). Therefore this observation demonstrates
the necessity to derive refined fragility functions that integrate functionality looses and
multi-hazard interactions.
7.4 Application: Multi-Risk Assessment of a Real-World
Road Network
The above detailed models and developments are also applied to a road network system
that is representative of a real-world infrastructure, in order to check their ability to be
implemented on wider scales.
7.4.1 Characterization of the case-study
The road network around Bologna, Italy, has been chosen as a realistic case-study, as
detailed in the sub-sections below.
7.4.1.1 General Presentation
The area surrounding Bologna in Italy constitutes one of the case-studies selected in
the FP7 INFRARISK project, due to the variety of hazard types that are present (e.g.
seismic faults, riverine floods on the Arno and its tributaries, landslides in the Tuscan-
Emilian Apennines, etc.). Furthermore, the highway connecting the cities of Bologna
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and Florence represents a critical part of the traffic between the North and the South
of Italy (see Figure 7.26). Therefore this case-study area has been chosen here in order
to demonstrate the capabilities of the proposed approach.
Figure 7.26: Location of the case-study area with the black frame showing the spatial
extent of the network considered.
7.4.1.2 Network Topology
The road network layout has been vectorised, and, after a quick treatment in a Geo-
graphical Information System, the simplified topology of the network may be extracted
as shown in Figure 7.27.
The topological representation of the network does not account for the shape of the
road segments between two nodes: however, the proper length of each edge is extracted
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Figure 7.27: Road network considered in the case-study area.
from the Geographical Information System and is stored as an attribute of the edge.
Morevover, three different road types are identified, to which free-flow travel speeds
may be assigned, i.e. highways (110 km/h), primary roads (70 km/h) and secondary
roads (50 km/h). This treatment enables an efficient computation of the road network,
while providing realistic estimates of the travel times. In total, the model of the studied
network is comprised of 647 edges and 625 nodes: 13 of these nodes are selected as
TAZs, out of which 7 are cities (i.e. Bologna, Florence, Modena, Lucca, Pisa, Pistoia
and Imola) and 6 are external nodes representing exits and entrances to the network
(i.e. South-West, West, North-West, North, East and South-East directions). Finally,
280 bridges are identified along the road network: therefore the edges to which they
belong are considered as vulnerable elements and they will govern the performance of
the system in the subsequent risk analysis.
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7.4.2 Modelling Assumptions
The hazard and fragility models used in the analysis are detailed in the following sub-
sections: several assumptions are proposed, since the objective is less to deliver a thor-
ough risk assessment of the area than to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed
approach to real-world systems.
7.4.2.1 Hazard models
Seismic hazard events are based on the results of the FP7 SHARE project, which pro-
poses a harmonized probabilistic seimisc hazard map for Europe. The seismic source
areas identified in SHARE are used here in order to sample seismic events based on the
activity parameters of the sources. Seven source areas are selected around the stud-
ied road network, as shown in Figure 7.28, while the corresponding Gutenberg-Richter
parameters are described in Table 7.19.
Table 7.19: Activity parameters of the selected seismic source areas, taken from
Woessner et al. [2013]. λ0 represents the yearly occurrence of events of magnitude
greater than 0, while β stands for the b-value parameter in the Gutenberg-Richter
relationship.
Area ID λ0 (Mw ≥ 0) β Maximum Mw
ITAS293 3.70 1.0 7.3
ITAS292 3.95 1.0 7.3
ITAS297 3.80 1.0 7.3
ITAS295 3.90 1.0 7.3
ITAS299 3.60 1.0 7.3
ITAS305 3.80 1.0 6.6
While the previous virtual example was based on a single seismic source, the presence of
multiple seismic sources in this case-study requires to first sample which seismic source
will generate the potential earthquake event, as described by Cavalieri et al. [2012].
Let us assume n seismic sources with yearly occurrence rates λ0,i. Then the yearly
occurrence rate of a given loss metric y may be expressed as follows:
λY (y) =
n∑
i
λ0,i ·GY |i (y|i) = λ0,tot
n∑
i
pi ·GY |i (y|i) = λ0,tot ·GY (y) (7.13)
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Figure 7.28: Selected seismic source areas around the road network, from Woessner
et al. [2013].
where pi represents the probability of sampling source i (i.e. relative weight of each
source) and GY |i (y|i) represents the probability of exceeding annual losses y due to
source i.
Therefore, the global yearly occurrence rate of an earthquake event λ0,tot is aggregated
from the activity rate of all seismic areas, while the pi terms represent the relative weight
of each source in the sampling. Once an earthquake event is sampled, the estimation
of the ground motion field at the vulnerable sites (i.e. location of bridges) is performed
with the three-branch representative GMPE that has been presented in Chapter 6, while
accounting for the spatial correlation of the intra-event residuals.
In the case of flood hazard events, existing models and data for the studied area are
much scarcer. The main waterways crossing the road networks are identified, which
results in 163 bridges over water streams (see Figure 7.29), meaning that such elements
are potentially exposed to both earthquake and flood events.
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Figure 7.29: Main waterways crossing the road network.
The study by Caporali et al. [2005] on the historical flood events of the Arno river
provides valuable information on the intensity and frequency of recorded events in the
Tuscany area. The 1966 flood of the Arno river, with maximum flow discharges of
2 290 m3/s at the river mouth and 3 540 m3/s upstream from Florence, is considered
as an exceptional event (i.e. 8 events of this type have been identified since the XIIth
century). On the other hand, events such as the 1992 flood, with around 2 000 m3/s
flow discharge recorded upstream from Florence, are considered as large events. Based
on these events, three levels of flood intensity with distinct return periods are assumed
for the studied area, as detailed in Table 7.20. The maximum flow discharge values
are the ones assumed at the mouth of the Arno, while the values at other locations are
deduced by considering the relative size of the rivers and the contributions from their
tributaries. For simplification purposes, it is assumed that a flood event correponds to
a global elevation of the flow discharge across the whole studied area (i.e. assumption
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that the catchment areas of the different rivers are not too far away and are thus sub-
jected to similar rainfall events). As previously stated, the flood hazard assessment step
contains many shortcomings and assumptions, since this specific task is out of the scope
of the thesis, which concentrates on how multiple hazard events may influence multi-risk
analyses.
Table 7.20: Assumed parameters for the flood hazard events.
Flood event Peak flow
[
m3/s
]
Return period
Medium 300 ∼ 25 years
Large 1 200 ∼ 50 years
Exceptional 2 300 ∼ 100 years
7.4.2.2 Fragility Models
A short investigation of the bridges present in the case-study area has led to the identifi-
cation of the most common types, which consist mostly of multi-span simply-supported
concrete bridges. For the sake of the demonstration, four specific bridges are selected
and modelled (see Table 7.21), in order to test the ability of the multi-hazard fragility
model presented in Chapter 5 to cover various bridge configurations.
Table 7.21: Assumed bridge types for the case-study area.
Bridge type Length [m] # of spans Columns per pier Seismic design
1 198 5 4 Yes
2 84 3 4 Yes
3 68 2 3 No
4 20 1 − No
These four bridges are arbitraly assigned to the various locations of the road network,
based on the following considerations:
• Bridge type 1 corresponds to long-span viaducts, which may be used on highways
crossing moutainous areas (e.g. highway segment between Bologna and Florence)
or main waterways (e.g. highway crossing the Arno river).
• Bridge type 2 corresponds to bridges on primary roads or highways in flat areas.
They are assumed to be mostly found in the Emilia-Romagna region.
• Bridge type 3 is the same as type 2, except that the bridges are not seismically
designed. Therefore they are assumed to be located in the southern part of the
case-study (Tuscany region), where the seismic zonation is less compelling.
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• Bridge type 4 corresponds to small single-span bridges that may be found on
secondary roads in mountainous areas, for the crossing of small water streams.
An accurate survey of all 280 bridges selected in the case-study area would require a
tremendous effort, which would not efficiently serve the purpose of the study. Therefore
only four bridge types are assumed in order to emulate the performance of a somewhat
realistic road network. This choice represents a strong limitation of the study, however
the main purpose is to identify potential multi-risk interactions, which are not strongly
dependent on the accuracy of the exposure catalogue.
In total, 86 bridge types 1, 24 bridge types 2, 54 bridge types 3 and 116 bridge types 4
are assigned as vulnerable elements. The procedure detailed in Chapter 5 is applied in
order to derive multi-hazard fragility functions that may be used independently from the
hazard loading (i.e. earthquake only, flood only, or joint flood and earthquake effects).
The resulting fragility models are displayed in Appendix J, for the four system failure
modes that have been defined in Table 5.5. Therefore the functionality metrics that are
derived from the system failure modes may be directly used in the subsequent network
analysis.
7.4.3 Multi-Risk Analysis
In the case of this complex real-world road network, two system performance indicators
are considered:
• A purely connectivity-based indicator, SCL (see Equation 7.1), which measures
the amount of inter-TAZ connections that are lost;
• Another connectivity-based indicator, RTT, which accounts for the extra travel
time between each TAZ (i.e. the loss of some edges may not induce the disconnec-
tion between two points, however it may lengthen the path between them). The
RTT metric is estimated through the following steps:
– For n TAZs, n(n − 1)/2 inter-TAZ travel times are evaluated under nor-
mal conditions, assuming two-way roads everywhere and considering free-flow
speed on the various road segments.
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– For each couple of TAZs, the path TTi leading to the shortest travel time is
computed with the weighted adjacency matrix.
– The ratio of extra travel time TTi / TTi,0 is computed for each travel i, where
TTi,0 is the travel time in normal conditions.
– The global performance indicator RTT corresponds then to the average of all
travel ratios across all inter-TAZ travels.
The RTT metric may not be considered as a capacity-based indicator since it assumes a
free-flow traffic speed, without accounting for demand on the road network and potential
evolution before and after the event. However, this performance indicator is expected
to provide a more refined picture of the network’s functionality than the SCL indicator,
especially in the case of a densely connected network with numerous alternate routes.
The multi-risk framework presented in Section 7.4.3 is then applied, thus requiring
successive simulations of single earthquake events, single flood events and potential
joint events. A plain Monte Carlo approach with 100 000 samples is adopted in the
present case, due to the large number of vulnerable elements and the need to compute
travel times for the RTT indicator (i.e. such a metric is hardly computable using Bayesian
Networks alone). As a result, the yearly probability of exceedance of the two performance
indicators is presented is Figures 7.30 and 7.31, assuming a persistence time window
∆Tp = 1 month.
The probabilistic loss curves that have been derived clearly show the profile of the single
earthquake and flood risks in the studied area: flood events mostly occur for shorter
return periods, thus disrupting the road network on a moderate scale, while earthquake
events tend to induce widespread losses for long return periods. The multi-risk losses
result from the aggregation of both single risks, as well as the potential cumulated
damages when hazard events have a joint occurrence. The risk bias measure, which has
been introduced in Equation 7.11, highlights the effect of cumulated damages on the
aggregated losses. It may be seen as the difference between an analysis that accounts for
multi-risk interactions and an analysis that simply sums the contributions of the single
risk. For shorter return period, the bias measure is found to be in the order of magnitude
of 1%, however it increases dramatically for extreme events (i.e. up to 10-20%): this
observation is in agreement with the hypothesis that catastrophic infrastructure failures
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Figure 7.30: Yearly probability of exceedance of SCL.
usually result from unforeseen cascading events, such as interacting hazard loadings that
are not taken into account in design guidelines.
Finally, it is worth noting that the RTT indicator is able to better capture the response
of the network for low-consequence events: for instance, the SCL curve shows a sys-
tem degradation starting with 3 · 10−2 yearly probability, while the use of the RTT
demonstrates that travel times may already be altered with a 8 · 10−2 yearly probabil-
ity. Measuring the losses with the RTT indicator also reveals a clear threshold effect in
the system (i.e. starting from RTT = 2.34 at a 1.9 · 10−2 probability), which may be
used to identify potential mitigation measures in order to get a more evenly distributed
degradation rate. Lastly, the risk bias measure appears to be higher when considering
the SCL measure: road disconnections are only based on functionality levels FL3 and
FL4, which show a strong interacting effect between earthquake and flood loadings (see
Appendix J). On the other hand, the RTT indicator is also influenced by functionality
levels FL2, which is less dependent on the flood intensity.
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Figure 7.31: Yearly probability of exceedance of RTT.
7.5 Conclusion
This Chapter has investigated the application of BNs to the risk assessment of infras-
tructure systems. To this end, exact BN formulations based on the identification of link
sets have been benchmarked. It appears that these formulations do not fully avoid the
current computational issues, since they mostly tend to displace the bottlenecks to other
locations of the treatment chain. An alternative, using a simplified BN that is generated
by simulation results, is therefore introduced, with the objective of treating complex and
real-life systems and computing capacity- or serviceability-based performance indicators.
Then, the adoption of a BN model on a virtual, yet realistic, proof-of-concept example
has led to a twofold result:
• The use of an exact inference algorithm provides access to an exact loss distribu-
tion, even in the case of extreme events, as opposed to Monte Carlo simulation
schemes. Thanks to this feature, the effect of various sources of uncertainties
can be quantified, by adding an evidence on the Bayesian nodes of interest and
observing the updated loss distributions.
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• The Bayesian Network presented here has been used to study multi-risk interac-
tions at both hazard and fragility levels, thanks to the risk decomposition proposed
by Selva [2013]. By changing the evidences in the BN (e.g. absence or not of the
flood or earthquake events, change of the occurrence rate of the earthquake events,
etc.), the different risk factors such as single risk, co-active risk, virtual risk and
isolated risk, can be easily quantified by using the Bayesian inference.
The study of the effect of the different uncertainty sources has revealed that aleatory
uncertainties due to the evaluation of the seismic hazard play an important part in the
global risk assessment. Especially, the spatial correlation of the intra-event variability is
an essential component of the analysis when considering a distributed system of inter-
dependent components. It has been shown that the global risk may be underestimated
when omitting this spatial dependency. Regarding epistemic uncertainties, their com-
bined effect has also been found to be significant, especially for low-probability high-
consequence events, even though additional uncertainty sources should be accounted
for when performing a proper flood hazard assessment. The comparison between vari-
ous models of fragility functions has also demonstrated that the proposed multi-hazard
fragility functions accounting for functionality losses are key elements for an accurate
estimation of losses in a multi-risk context.
The use of the persistence time window ∆Tp is critical in order to account for the risk
interaction between floods and earthquakes. These two hazard events are independent;
however it is possible to account for their joint occurrence within a given time frame
that would see flood-damaged components being exposed to potential earthquakes. This
time window has a huge effect on the risk bias measure, which identifies the discrepancies
between a multi-risk analysis with interactions and superimposed single risk analyses. A
bias in the order of 0.5%-1% has been estimated in the case of a simplified hypothetical
network, which may seem quite modest, especially when comparing with all the other
uncertainty sources involved. However, it should be noted that only four components
in the considered infrastructure system account for flood-earthquake interactions (i.e.
the three bridges and the road segment exposed to slope failure). On the other hand,
the Bologna case-study, which contains many bridges exposed to multiple hazard, has
provided a risk bias measure in the order of 1% for shorter return periods, while the bias
tends to increase up to 10-20% in the case of extreme events. The complexity and the
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size of the real-world case-study has prevented the use of an exact BN formulation (i.e.
use of Monte Carlo simulations only), however further efforts should be devoted to the
design of a couple BN – Monte Carlo approach, which would give access to elaborate
performance indicators within a decision support system.

Chapter 8
Conclusions and Impact
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
The seismic risk assessment of road infrastructure systems has been the subject of several
studies in the years 2000s, the most notable examples being the SYNER-G project in
Europe [Pitilakis and the SYNER-G Consortium, 2009–2013] or the REDARS method-
ology in the United States [Werner et al., 2000]. The main steps of such a risk analysis
may be summarised as follows:
• Seismic hazard assessment of the exposed area, usually through the generation of
spatially correlated ground motion fields;
• Fragility analysis of the exposed physical elements, such as bridges;
• Performance assessment at the system level, such as the estimation of disconnected
locations or the quantification of additional travel times.
At the element level, most existing fragility functions for bridges use a global damage
scale, which renders the interpretation of physical damage in terms of functionality
loss impractical and somewhat inaccurate. Moreover, in a multi-risk context, fragility
functions for other hazard types, such as floods or ground failures, much scarcer. Finally,
the use of different types of fragility models raises the issue of the harmonization between
different damage scales and intensity measures.
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Therefore a procedure has been proposed here for the derivation of hazard-harmonized
fragility functions, which present the twofold merit of (i) directly providing the dam-
age consequences in terms of functionality, through the definition of consistent system
damage states, and (ii) using a single functional form that accommodates different types
of intensity measures (i.e. different types of hazard loadings) and potentially accounts
for cumulated damages. To this end, the proposed framework is based on the following
steps:
1. Identification of the main failure modes that are susceptible to affect the various
bridge components (e.g. piers, foundations, deck, etc.), in the case of earthquake,
flood and ground failure hazards.
2. For each component failure mode, derivation of component fragility curves follow-
ing state-of-the-art methods.
3. For each component failure mode, quantification of induced losses in terms of repair
durations, functional losses (i.e. speed reduction and lane closure) and relative
repair costs, through an expert-based survey sent to infrastructure managers.
4. Definition of functionality-consistent damage scales at the level of the bridge sys-
tem, so that functional consequences can directly be deduced from the fragility
functions, whatever the hazard type that triggered them.
5. Derivation of system fragility functions based on the component fragility curves,
using BNs in order to account for correlation between component damages and
joint failure events.
The use of BNs has proven to be very efficient and accurate for this task, with respect
to more conventional system reliability methods. The modularity of this approach offers
many choices to the modeller, such as computing the joint probability occurrence of
damage events, or performing a Bayesian inference (i.e. backward analysis) in order to
disaggregate the different source events that lead to a given event.
As a result, this procedure has been applied to a generic bridge model, for which a
multi-hazard fragility surface has been derived: one intensity measure represents the
loading due to ground shaking and earthquake-induced ground failure, while the other
represents the effect of flood-induced scour and hydraulic lateral forces on the deck.
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This fragility surface can then quantify the probability of occurrence of different system
failure modes that are directly correlated to specific functional consequences. It is also
valid for various combinations of hazard events (i.e. single events or combined events
where an earthquake follows a flood), since it accounts for cumulated damages due to
previous damage events.
In the case of single seismic risk assessment, the BN structure is slightly modified in
order to develop probabilistic functionality curves for the same bridge model. The
functionality loss models that have been obtained through the expert-based survey are
used to create a new layer of nodes in the BN, which enables the probability of different
levels of functionality loss to be estimated given various levels of seismic input.
On the other hand, at the road network level, the use of BNs has also been investigated
following the previous developments by Bensi et al. [2011]. A benchmark of various
BN formulations for exact inference has shown that this approach is not yet ready to
tackle large and complex systems, let alone systems that require elaborate performance
indicators based on flow capacity or serviceability. The computational bottlenecks that
have been identified might be avoided by adopting a hybrid formulation that makes
use of Monte-Carlo simulations. These simulation results are used to select only the
most critical elements (i.e. bridges that are have the most impact on the network’s
performance) and to build CPTs by counting the occurrences of the different damage
events. The resulting simplified BN is liberated from most computational issues and it
seems to be able to satisfyingly emulate the probability updating that is obtained from
exact inference. However, the results are limited by the sampling techniques used during
the simulations, which may overlook extreme events. Therefore such an approach might
not be the most suitable for the specific objectives of the present study, even though it
may prove useful as a decision support system: the inference capabilities of the BN are
helpful to infrastructure managers in an operational context, as opposed to pure Monte
Carlo simulations.
Finally, a simple small-scale road network has been designed in order to demonstrate the
ability of an exact BN formulation to perform a multi-risk analysis, with earthquake and
flood hazards represented as independent events. Meanwhile, a Monte Carlo simulation
approach has been adopted to perform the multi-risk assessment of a complex real-
world road network. The multi-risk framework by Selva [2013], originally developed
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for single independent assets, has been successfully applied to a spatially distributed
system of interdependent elements. As expected, the persistence time window is an
essential parameter for the treatment of multi-risk interactions. Different assumptions
for the bridge fragility models have also been compared, from the most conventional to
the most elaborate. The results validate the proposed framework for the derivation of
hazard-harmonized fragility functions, which possess the double ability to account for
cumulated damages from different hazard events and to directly express the consequences
in terms of functionality.
8.2 Impact
A robust and original methodological framework has been developed for the multi-risk
assessment of infrastructure systems, with an emphasis on the derivation of functionality-
based multi-hazard fragility functions. While the present work has focused on road
networks and bridges potentially exposed to earthquakes, floods and ground failures,
the developed procedure is generic enough to be applied to a wide range of physical
infrastructure systems or critical facilities (e.g. hospitals, emergency services, etc.), for
any type of natural or man-made hazards.
The preliminary steps of the fragility analysis of bridges have led to the compilation of
a table of potential failure modes, which may be used as a state-of-the-art reference for
the construction of bridge damage scales. Similarly, different methods for the derivation
of fragility curves have been investigated and demonstrated, thus revealing a need for
further efforts in terms of quantifying vulnerability to floods or ground failures.
The quantification of functional consequences for each component failure mode has been
made possible through a straightforward expert-based survey. Though incomplete and
over-simplistic, such a task has led to the construction of a damage-loss correspondence
matrix for bridge components. This original result constitutes a significant step towards
the development of more robust functionality models, which have been shown to be
essential tools within infrastructure risk analyses.
The main lesson that may be taken from the BN analysis of the example road network
(see Chapter 7) is the key role played by multi-risk interactions. While network elements,
such as bridges, or network systems are designed to withstand specific levels of single
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hazard events (e.g. through seismic design or additional redundancies in the system),
these measures might prove insufficient in the case of joint or cascading hazard events.
In the case of a spatially distributed system, multi-risk effects are especially enhanced:
hazard events occurring at the same location on the same element might increase its
chance of failure, while hazards events occurring at different locations of the system
might also induce the loss of the whole system, due to the interdependency between
network elements.
Therefore the aforementioned results and the proposed method are expected to be of
particular interest to infrastructure managers or catastrophe modellers. The application
of this method to a given infrastructure will highlight its weakness with respect to multi-
risk interactions, while yielding more accurate results thanks to the use of functionality-
based fragility functions.
8.3 Recommendations for Future Work
While the present work has been mainly devoted to methodological developments, ap-
plications to real case-studies have been hindered by the lack of available data for the
specification of an existing road network. Close interactions with infrastructure man-
agers are necessary at this stage, due to the huge amount of data this is required by such
analyses. However, the applications to the generic examples that have been presented
in this study have still revealed the following gaps:
• The loss models based on the expert-based damage-functionality matrix are cur-
rently very coarse. They should be significantly improved by conducting a more
robust and larger-scale elicitation process, which would involve a wider range of
experts and infrastructure managers.
• For some component failure modes, especially for flood-related damages, there are
barely any existing fragility functions or derivation methods. Moreover, seismic
fragility curves appear to be the most advanced in terms of robustness and uncer-
tainty treatment, with respect to other hazard types. Therefore significant efforts
should be devoted to either the analytical derivation of flood fragility curves (e.g.
treatment of fluid-structure interactions) or the collation of empirical data from
past disasters.
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• Similarly, in terms of hazard assessment, methods for the generation of seismic
ground motion fields are rather mature and are able to account for various un-
certainty sources, as well as spatial correlations. This is not the case of flood
hazard assessment, where a more systematic approach should be adopted for the
multi-risk analysis. Presently, the rational method that has been considered here
appears to be too simplistic, while the uncertainties on its parameters should be
properly quantified.
A more general issue lies in the applicability of BNs to any type of systems. It has been
shown that the BN formulation for the derivation of system fragility functions at the
bridge level is very robust and is able to deal with a large number of bridge components.
On the other hand, the investigated BN formulations for infrastructure systems appear
to be much more limited: such a difference is due to the complex structure of networks
(i.e. presence of many link sets or cut sets) and to the additional hazard nodes that are
needed for the generation of spatially distributed intensity measures. In other words,
spatial variability - and more specifically spatial correlation - is one of the reasons the
resulting BNs are very complex when assessing a spatially distributed infrastructure
system (i.e. it requires the creation of many nodes in the BN in order to reproduce
this correlation). The other computational bottleneck is due to the computation of
the system performance based on the components’ damage states, especially when a
system does not mainly contain in-series or in-parallel components. As a result, the
combination of these two effects has the potential of generating huge cliques of strongly
interconnected nodes, so that their computation through an exact inference algorithm
is often unfeasible.
Therefore the development of a BN procedure that would be able to avoid these com-
putational issues remains the main challenge. The t-Naive BN formulation that has
been described here might be a viable alternative, even though more extensive tests and
validations are required.
Finally, the application of the proposed framework to other types of physical systems
looks very promising, since it would lead to a fully harmonized ‘system of systems’,
which would account for both multi-risk interactions and system interdependencies.
Appendix A
Glossary of Graph Theory Terms
This glossary defines the most common terms that are used throughout the thesis to de-
scribe graphs and Bayesian Networks. Most definitions have been taken from Wikipedia
and Gross and Yellen [2004].
+ acyclic: A graph is acyclic if it has no cycles.
+ adjacency matrix: The adjacency matrix of a graph is a matrix whose rows and
columns are both indexed by vertices of the graph, with a one in the cell for row i and
column j when vertices i and j are adjacent, and a zero otherwise.
+ adjacent: The relation between two vertices that are both endpoints of the same
edge.
+ arc: An edge of a directed graph, also sometimes called an arrow.
+ child: In a rooted tree, a child of a vertex v is a neighbor of v along an outgoing
edge, one that is directed away from the root.
+ clique: A clique is a maximal complete subgraph, i.e. one that is not part of any
larger complete subgraph.
+ complete: A complete graph is one in which every two vertices are adjacent: all
edges that could exist are present.
+ connected: A connected graph is one in which each pair of vertices forms the
endpoints of a path.
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+ DAG: Abbreviation for directed acyclic graph, a directed graph without any directed
cycles.
+ directed: A directed graph is one in which the edges have a distinguished direction,
from one vertex to another.
+ edge: An edge is (together with vertices) one of the two basic units out of which
graphs are constructed. Each edge has two vertices to which it is attached, called its
endpoints. Edges may be directed or undirected.
+ graph: A system of vertices connected in pairs by edges. A graph G is often repre-
sented as G(V,E), where V is the set of vertices and E the set of edges.
+ incidence matrix: The incidence matrix of a graph is a matrix whose rows are
indexed by vertices of the graph, and whose columns are indexed by edges, with a one
in the cell for row i and column j when vertex i and edge j are incident, and a zero
otherwise.
+ MCS: Abbreviation for miminum cut-set, i.e. the smallest path whose disconnection
ensures the disconnection between two given vertices.
+ MLS: Abbreviation for miminum link-set, i.e. the smallest path whose connection
ensures the connection between two given vertices.
+ neighbour: A vertex that is adjacent to a given vertex.
+ network: A graph in which attributes (e.g. names) are associated with the nodes
and/or edges.
+ node: A synonym for vertex.
+ path: A path is usually a sequence of vertices and edges, with both endpoints of an
edge appearing adjacent to it in the sequence.
+ root: A designated vertex in a graph, particularly in directed graphs.
+ sink: A sink, in a directed graph, is a vertex with no outgoing edges.
+ source: A source, in a directed graph, is a vertex with no incoming edges.
+ subgraph: A subgraph of a graph G is another graph formed from a subset of the
vertices and edges of G.
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+ undirected: An undirected graph is a graph in which the two endpoints of each edge
are not distinguished from each other.
+ vertex: A vertex (plural vertices) is (together with edges) one of the two basic units
out of which graphs are constructed.

Appendix B
Regression using Generalized
Linear Models
The Generalized Linear Model (GLM) is considered as a generalisation of the conven-
tional linear regression and it is usually applied to cases where the errors of a set of
response variables may not be expressed as a normal distribution. A GLM is defined by
three components, namely:
• a probability distribution, which belongs to the family of exponential distributions;
• a linear predictor η, which is expressed as a linear combination of variables xi
through coefficients θi;
• a link function g, which defines the relation with the probability of having the
response y given the xi, i.e.: P (y|xi) = g−1 (η)
In the case where a GLM is used for the derivation of fragility curves, the response
variable y corresponds to the discrete damage indicator, which is defined as follows:

yk = 1 if damage is reached
yk = 0 if not
for each simulation outcome k (B.1)
This sampling of binary success/failure occurrences corresponds to the Bernouilli or
binomial distributions, therefore the following link functions are popular choices:
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g (µ) =

Φ−1 (µ) probit
log
(
µ
1−µ
)
logit
log [log (1− µ)] complementatry loglog
(B.2)
The use of the probit as a link function constitutes an interesting way to express the
fragility curvs as a lognormal distribution, so that the outcome of the regression may
be compared to most available fragility curves, which are usually represented under the
lognormal form. For illustration purposes, consider the outcome of n simulations, where
the binary damage states yk, for k = 1 . . . n, are recorded. If a single-parameter fragility
curve is derived (i.e. probability of damage expressed as a function of intensity measure
im), the linear prediction may be expressed as follows:
η = θ0 + θ1 · log im (B.3)
where θ0 and θ1 are the GLM regression coefficients, which may be quantified through
various optimization algorithms, such as maximum likelihood methods.
The probability of reaching or exceeding the damage state (i.e. y = 1) given im can
then be written as:
P (ds ≥ DS|im) = g−1 (η) (B.4)
If the probit function is used, the damage probability becomes:
P (ds ≥ DS|im) = Φ (θ0 + θ1 · log im) (B.5)
As written in Chapter 2, the following functional form is usually proposed for a fragility
curve under the lognormal assumption (see Equation 2.1):
P (DS ≥ ds|im) = φ
(
log im− logα
β
)
(B.6)
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where α and β represent the mean and the standard deviation of the fragility curves,
respectively.
Therefore, these fragility parameters may be obtained from the GLM regression param-
eters through a simple identification between Equations B.5 and B.6:

α = exp
(
− θ0θ1
)
β = 1θ1
(B.7)

Appendix C
Survey Form of Functionality
Losses
This Appendix presents an excerpt of the form that has been sent to various experts for
the survey of functionality losses for bridges, as described in Chapter 3.
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Figure C.1: Excerpt of the bridge functionality survey form.
Appendix D
Expert-based Functionality Losses
This appendix details the results of the expert-based survey: as stated before, the fol-
lowing numerical values should be considered for illustrative purposes only, due to the
scarcity of collected data.
Table D.1: Duration of repair operations (lower and upper bounds in days) for each
of the component failure modes identified. Multiple lines for a given damage states
indicate multiple propositions from the different groups of experts.
ID Du- Du+ ID Du- Du+ ID Du- Du+
1-D1 7 30 7-D2 15 15 13-D3 45 45
14 14 7-D4 30 30 13-D4 60 60
1-D2 7 30 8-D1 15 15 14-D1 7 7
30 30 8-D2 30 30 14-D4 30 30
1-D3 30 60 8-D4 30 30 15-D1 30 90
60 60 9-D1 30 30 60 60
1-D4 7 30 15 15 16-D1 15 15
150 150 9-D4 45 45 1 1
2-D3 7 30 10-D1 30 30 60 60
60 60 15 15 17-D1 7 60
3-D4 30 60 10-D2 15 15 30 30
75 75 10-D3 30 30 18-D1 7 60
4-D1 14 14 10-D4 60 60 30 30
4-D2 30 30 11-D1 30 30 19-D1 7 60
4-D3 150 150 15 15 30 30
5-D1 60 60 11-D2 30 30 20-D1 7 60
30 30 11-D3 60 60 30 30
5-D2 60 120 12-D1 30 30 21-D1 120 120
45 45 15 15 60 60
5-D4 60 60 12-D2 15 15 22-D1 7 7
6-D1 60 120 12-D3 30 30 15 15
30 30 12-D4 60 60 23-D1 7 7
6-D2 60 60 13-D1 15 15 30 30
6-D3 90 90 13-D2 30 30
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Table D.2: Reduction of functionality in % (lower and upper bounds, either for
proportion of closed lanes, speed reduction or vertical load capacity reduction) for each
of the component failure modes identified. Multiple lines for a given damage states
indicate multiple propositions from the different groups of experts. The ‘emerg’ index
means that the infrastructure element is open for emergency vehicles only.
ID Metric FL- FL+ ID Metric FL- FL+
1-D1 speed 0% 0% 10-D2 speed 20% 20%
speed 10% 10% 10-D3 speed 20% 20%
1-D2 speed 0% 0% 10-D4 speed 25% 25%
speed 20% 20% 11-D1 speed 20% 20%
1-D3 load 40% 40% 11-D2 speed 20% 20%
load 100% 100% 11-D3 speed 25% 25%
1-D4 closed 100% 100% 12-D1 speed 20% 20%
load 100% 100% 12-D2 speed 20% 20%
2-D3 load 40% 40% 12-D3 speed 20% 20%
load 100% 100% 12-D4 speed 25% 25%
3-D4 closed 100% 100% 13-D1 speed 20% 20%
load 100% 100% 13-D2 speed 20% 20%
4-D1 speed 0% 0% 13-D3 speed 20% 20%
speed 10% 10% 13-D4 speed 25% 25%
4-D2 speed 20% 20% 14-D1 speed − −
4-D3 closed 100% 100% 14-D4 closed 100% 100%
5-D1 speed 0% 0% 15-D1 closed 0% 100%
speed 20% 20% closed 100% 100%
5-D2 speed 20% 20% 16-D1 speed 25% 25%
closed 50% 50% emerg − −
5-D4 closed 100% 100% 17-D1 load 20% 20%
6-D1 speed 0% 0% load 0% 100%
speed 20% 20% 18-D1 closed 50% 50%
6-D2 load 25% 25% load 0% 100%
6-D3 load 40% 40% 19-D1 load 20% 20%
7-D2 speed 25% 25% load 0% 100%
7-D4 speed 25% 25% 20-D1 closed 50% 50%
8-D1 closed 0% 0% load 0% 100%
8-D2 closed 50% 50% 21-D1 load 25% 25%
8-D4 speed 25% 25% closed 100% 100%
9-D1 speed 20% 20% 22-D1 speed 0% 0%
9-D4 speed 25% 25% 23-D1 speed 0% 0%
10-D1 speed 20% 20% speed 20% 20%
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Table D.3: Reduction of functionality during repair operations in % (lower and upper
bounds, either for proportion of closed lanes, speed reduction or vertical load capacity
reduction) for each of the component failure modes identified. Multiple lines for a given
damage states indicate multiple propositions from the different groups of experts. The
‘emerg’ index means that the infrastructure element is open for emergency vehicles
only.
ID Metric FLI- FLI+ ID Metric FLI- FLI+
1-D1 speed 0% 0% 10-D3 closed 50% 50%
speed 10% 10% 10-D4 closed 75% 75%
1-D2 speed 0% 0% 11-D1 speed 50% 50%
speed 20% 20% closed 50% 50%
1-D3 load 100% 100% 11-D2 closed 50% 50%
load 40% 40% 11-D3 closed 75% 75%
1-D4 closed 100% 100% 12-D1 speed 50% 50%
load 100% 100% closed 50% 50%
2-D3 closed 100% 100% 12-D2 closed 50% 50%
load 40% 40% 12-D3 closed 50% 50%
3-D4 closed 50% 50% 12-D4 closed 75% 75%
closed 100% 100% 13-D1 closed 50% 50%
4-D1 speed 0% 0% 13-D2 closed 50% 50%
speed 10% 10% 13-D3 closed 50% 50%
4-D2 speed 20% 20% 13-D4 closed 75% 75%
4-D3 closed 100% 100% 14-D1 closed −% −%
5-D1 closed 25% 25% 14-D4 closed 100% 100%
closed 50% 50% 15-D1 closed 100% 100%
5-D2 closed 50% 50% closed 25% 25%
closed 50% 50% emerg −% −%
5-D4 closed 100% 100% 16-D1 emerg −% −%
6-D1 closed 0% 0% closed 50% 50%
closed 50% 50% 17-D1 closed 0% 100%
6-D2 closed 50% 50% load 20% 20%
6-D3 closed 50% 50% 18-D1 closed 0% 100%
7-D2 closed 50% 50% closed 50% 50%
7-D4 closed 75% 75% 19-D1 closed 0% 100%
8-D1 closed 0% 0% load 20% 20%
8-D2 closed 50% 50% 20-D1 closed 0% 100%
8-D4 closed 75% 75% closed 50% 50%
9-D1 speed 50% 50% 21-D1 closed 100% 100%
closed 50% 50% speed 50% 50%
9-D4 closed 75% 75% 22-D1 speed 50% 50%
10-D1 speed 50% 50% speed 20% 20%
closed 50% 50% 23-D1 speed 0% 0%
10-D2 closed 50% 50% speed 20% 20%

Appendix E
Component-Level Fragility
Parameters
This appendix summarizes the fragility parameters that have been derived for the main
bridge system described in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Table E.1: Component-level fragility parameters for the three hazard types and for
all affected bridge components. For EQ events and EQ-induced GF events, the IM
of choice is PGA (peak ground acceleration) in m/s2, while the flow discharge Q in
m3/s is used to represent FL events. In the y direction, since the bridge system has a
symmetric behaviour, only the components representing the first half of the bridge are
displayed.
D1 D2 D1 D2
Comp. α β α β Comp. α β α β
FL
De 3789.9 0.500 4433.1 0.436 Pf 285.77 0.574 847.62 0.530
EQx - scour D0
P1 4.295 0.420 8.214 0.427 P2 4.514 0.0.415 8.531 0.430
A1 2.500 0.446 - - A2 2.569 0.391 - -
B1 1.994 0.647 10.299 0.465 B2 4.083 0.746 Inf 1
B3 12.795 1.105 Inf 1 B4 Inf 1 Inf 1
B5 1.776 0.688 Inf 1 B6 2.660 0.471 10.752 0.419
EQx - scour D1
P1 5.279 0.471 9.878 0.445 P2 5.336 0.479 10.001 0.438
A1 2.527 0.456 - - A2 2.517 0.426 - -
B1 1.933 0.615 9.409 0.461 B2 3.628 0.737 Inf 1
B3 14.164 1.020 Inf 1 B4 Inf 1 Inf 1
B5 1.634 0.677 Inf 1 B6 2.639 0.504 9.982 0.416
EQx - scour D2
P1 17.245 0.539 17.837 0.558 P2 17.245 0.539 17.837 0.558
A1 2.498 0.475 - - A2 2.498 0.475 - -
B1 2.042 0.660 6.917 0.564 B2 2.892 0.618 17.997 1.021
B3 Inf 1 Inf 1 B4 Inf 1 Inf 1
B5 1.400 0.702 Inf 1 B6 2.597 0.519 6.468 0.543
EQy - scour D0 - fluvial flood D0
P1 9.124 0.331 18.841 0.330 A1 2.422 0.482 - -
Sh1 3.287 0.436 14.558 0.091 Sh2 3.767 0.450 Inf 1
Sh3 4.219 0.428 13.938 0.187
EQy - scour D1 - fluvial flood D0
P1 14.458 0.319 18.591 0.267 A1 2.389 0.488 - -
Sh1 2.561 0.521 13.559 0.301 Sh2 3.036 0.445 18.919 0.286
Sh3 10.260 0.740 15.375 0.193
EQy - scour D2 - fluvial flood D0
P1 14.896 0.251 14.896 0.251 A1 2.385 0.495 - -
Sh1 2.180 0.525 11.475 0.415 Sh2 2.663 0.437 14.446 0.183
Sh3 14.199 0.101 Inf 1
EQy - scour D0 - fluvial flood D1
P1 9.605 0.338 16.180 0.170 A1 2.317 0.459 - -
Sh1 - - 12.663 0.151 Sh2 - - 12.998 0.149
Sh3 - - 12.958 0.196
EQy - scour D1 - fluvial flood D1
P1 13.655 0.320 16.062 0.225 A1 2.334 0.464 - -
Sh1 - - 10.875 0.548 Sh2 - - 14.764 0.128
Sh3 - - 15.739 0.335
EQy - scour D2 - fluvial flood D1
P1 14.189 0.260 14.189 0.260 A1 2.362 0.483 - -
Sh1 - - 7.940 0.561 Sh2 - - Inf 1
Sh3 - - Inf 1
GF
Em1 1.962 0.700 4.120 0.700 Em2 1.962 0.700 4.120 0.700
Af1 12.617 1.032 - - Af2 12.617 1.032 - -
Appendix F
Structure of the Bayesian
Network for System Fragility
Assessment
The formulation of a Bayesian Network for the reliability assessment of a bridge system
(see Section 5.4) is detailed here, through the example of a system with six components
(see Figure F.1).
F.1 Construction of the CPTs
Each Bayesian node in Figure F.1 is characterized by discrete states, in order to facilitate
an exact inference of the probabilities (i.e. junction-tree algorithm). Therefore the CPT
of each node, which provides the probability of occurrence of each state given the states
of the parent nodes, must be specified when constructing the BN.
F.1.1 CPT for Node IM
This root node is defined with a unique, which represents the IM value (e.g. PGA) that
is applied to the structural system. This parameter will be changed for each step when
deriving the fragility function over a given IM range. Therefore the correponding CPT
is reduced to its simplest expression, as shown in Table F.1.
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Figure F.1: Layout of the proposed BN for the reliability assessment of a 6-component
system, with one CSRV U1.
Table F.1: CPT for node IM.
IM state CPT
imval 1
F.1.2 CPT for Nodes U1 and V1...V6
All of these root nodes represent variables with a standard normal distribution. They
are discretized into 19 discrete states, as shown in Table F.2.
F.1.3 CPT for Nodes C1...C6
Each component node Ci has three parents, namely IM, U1 and Vi. If it is assumed
that the component has binary states (i.e. 0 for survival and 1 for failure), then the
CPT contains 722 elements (i.e. 1x19x19x2), as shown in Table F.3.
The probability pj,k is equal to 1 if the following condition is verified, and 0 otherwise:
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Table F.2: CPT for nodes U and V.
U/V state CPT
−1.6449 0.0184
−1.2816 0.0312
−1.0364 0.0415
−0.8416 0.0498
−0.6745 0.0566
−0.5244 0.0619
−0.3853 0.0659
−0.2533 0.0688
−0.1257 0.0704
0 0.0710
0.1257 0.0704
0.2533 0.0688
0.3853 0.0659
0.5244 0.0619
0.6745 0.0566
0.8416 0.0498
1.0364 0.0415
1.2816 0.0312
1.6449 0.0184
Table F.3: CPT for nodes C. These lines are repeated for each value of j and k
(number of discrete states in U1 and Vi).
IM state U1 state Vi state Ci state CPT
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
imval uval,j vval,k 0 1− pj,k
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
imval uval,j vval,k 1 pj,k
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
√
1− r2i · v2val,k + ri · uval,j ≥ −
log imval − logαi
βi
(F.1)
where αi and βi are the fragility parameters of component i (mean and standard devia-
tion, respectively), and ri is the correlation coefficient estimated from the Dunnet-Sobel
approximation (see Chapter 5 for more details).
F.1.4 CPT for Nodes In1...In6 and SYS
The intermediate nodes In1 and the system node SYS have a similar structure. They
are based on an in-series assembly of the components and they check whether the system
is still in survival state (i.e. state 0) everytime a new component is added to the chain.
Such a CPT contains 8 elements (i.e. 2x2x2), as shown in Table F.4.
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Table F.4: CPT for nodes Int and SYS.
Inti−1 state Ci state Inti state CPT
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
F.2 Application of the Junction-Tree Inference Algorithm
This section details the main steps of the junction-tree algorithm, applied to the example
in Figure F.1.
F.2.1 Estimation of the Elimination Order
As stated in Section 5.4, finding the optimal elimination order (i.e. smallest clique sizes)
constitutes an NP-hard problem, which cannot be solved on a large scale by automated
procedures. Therefore most software such as the Bayes Net toolbox adopt a sequential
algorithm, which finds the node that generates the fewest fill-in edges when eliminated,
one node at a time: as a result, the solution may not represent the optimal elimination
order that would be obtained when considering the BN globally.
The first step consists in the moralization of the BN graph (i.e. parent nodes are linked
by undirected edges), as shown in Figure F.2.
The algorithm finds the node which elimination generates the fewest extra edges to add
to the moralized graph (i.e. when a node is eliminated, all neighbours must be connected
again with each other with undirected edges). In the case that some nodes would lead
to the same number of fill-in edges (i.e. ties), the second criteria is the small clique size
that is generated (i.e. size of the neighbour nodes that are assembled as a clique). The
step-by-step elimination algorithm for the studied example is detailed in Table F.5.
F.2.2 Construction of the Junction Tree
The elimination order that has been detailed above is then used to identify the cliques
of nodes that are created: when a given node is eliminated, it is assembled into a clique
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Figure F.2: Layout of the moralized BN.
along with its neighbours (i.e. all nodes that are connected to the eliminated node
through an edge). When a node elimination leads to a clique that is a sub-part of a
previously assemble clique, it is not added to thej unction tree. Following these rules,
the elimination order from Table F.5 leads to the construction of the junction-tree in
Figure F.3.
With the selected elimination order, 12 cliques are created and are connected through
separator variables (i.e. the nodes that are common to both cliques). The potential
of each clique must then be computed and stored into multi-dimensional matrices: a
potential refers to all possible joint probabilities that may be found within a clique (i.e.
the combinations of all node states). The objective of an optimal elimination order is to
limit the size of the potentials to be computed: in the present example, this operation
amounts to 4 964 joint probabilities (i.e. the sum of the element sizes over the 12 cliques).
One of the main advantages of the junction-tree algorithm is that, once the junction tree
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Table F.5: Step-by-step elimination algorithm, where the best canditate nodes for
the first and second criteria are detailed.
Step Fewest fill-in edges (number) Smallest clique (size) Eliminated node
1 V1...V6, SYS (0 ) SYS (8 ) SYS
2 V1...V6 (0 ) V1...V6 (722 ) V1
3 V2...V6 (0 ) V2...V6 (722 ) V2
4 V3...V6 (0 ) V3...V6 (722 ) V3
5 V4...V6 (0 ) V4...V6 (722 ) V4
6 V5, V6 (0 ) V5, V6 (722 ) V5
7 V6 (0 ) − V6
8 C1, C2, C6, In4 (2 ) In4 (16 ) In4
9 C1, C2, C6 (2 ) C1, C2, C6 (152 ) C1
10 C2, C6 (2 ) C2 (76 ) C2
11 C6, In1 (2 ) C6, In1 (152 ) C6
12 C5, In1 (2 ) C5 (76 ) C5
13 In1, In3 (2 ) In1, In3 (152 ) In1
14 C3, In3 (2 ) C3 (76 ) C3
15 IM, U1, In2, In3 (2 ) IM, U1, In2, In3 (152 ) IM
16 U1 (0 ) − U1
17 C4, In2, In3 (0 ) C4, In2, In3 (8 ) C4
18 In2, In3 (0 ) In2, In3 (4 ) In2
19 In3 (0 ) − In3
is built, it can be used to perform inference on any node without the need to redo this
step.
F.2.3 Bayesian Inference
Bayesian inference is carried out by selecting one or more nodes as evidence nodes (i.e.
a state of the node is preset) and by propagating this evidence through the junction
tree. The updated probabilities of the states of any nodes can then be observed.
In the present example, IM is considered as the evidence node: however, since this
node has been defined with only one state, the distribution of the evidence has no
consequence on the structure of the clique potentials. In the case where a multi-state
node is considered as an evidence, the dimensions of the potentials that contain this node
are reduced in order to consider only the state of the node that is entered as evidence.
The junction tree is then used to propagate the evidence up to the output node (here,
SYS).
The updated probabilities at the output node are collected by marginilazing the potential
of a clique that contains the given node. For better computational performances, the
clique with the smallest size that contains the output node is chosen. In the present
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Figure F.3: Junction-tree of the BN, containing the cliques (bolded spherical shapes)
and the separators (rectangles).
Table F.6: Marginalization of the potential of clique 1, with respect to node SYS.
Joint probabilities
C6 = 0 C6 = 1
In4 = 0 In4 = 1 In4 = 0 In4 = 1
SYS = 0 P
(
sys, c6, in4
)
P (sys, c6, in4) P
(
sys, c6, in4
)
P (sys, c6, in4)
SYS = 1 P
(
sys, c6, in4
)
P (sys, c6, in4) P
(
sys, c6, in4
)
P (sys, c6, in4)
Marginal probabilities
SYS = 0 P (sys) = P
(
sys, c6, in4
)
+ P (sys, c6, in4) + P
(
sys, c6, in4
)
+ P (sys, c6, in4)
SYS = 1 P (sys) = P
(
sys, c6, in4
)
+ P (sys, c6, in4) + P
(
sys, c6, in4
)
+ P (sys, c6, in4)
example, the updated probabilities of SYS are extracted from clique number 1 (see
Table F.6), by computing the marginal probabilities of the states of SYS.

Appendix G
GMPEs used for Uncertainty
Quantification
This section describes the four GMPEs that have been selected in order to derive a
three-branch representative GMPE, according to the method by Atkinson and Adams
[2013].
G.1 GMPE by Akkar et al. [2014a]
The ground-motion parameter Y , expressed in g, is broken down into a reference term
and a site-related term:
log Y = log YREF + logS (G.1)
where:
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log YREF =

a1 + a2 (M − 6.75) + a3 (8.5−M)2
+ [a4 + a5 (M − 6.75)] log
√
R2 + a26 + a8FN + a9FR if M ≤ 6.75
a1 + a7 (M − 6.75) + a3 (8.5−M)2
+ [a4 + a5 (M − 6.75)] log
√
R2 + a26 + a8FN + a9FR if M > 6.75
(G.2)
and:
logS =

b1 log (Vs,30/VREF ) + b2 log
[
PGAREF+c(Vs,30/VREF )
n
(PGAREF+c)(Vs,30/VREF )
n
]
if Vs,30 ≤ VREF
b1 log
[
min(Vs,30;VCON )
VREF
]
if Vs,30 > VREF
(G.3)
The parameters of this GMPE are detailed in Table G.1, for Y = PGA and r = repi.
The Fi variables represent the fault mechanism, i.e. normal (FN = 1 and FR = 0),
reverse (FN = 0 and FR = 1) or strike-slip (FN = FR = 0).
Table G.1: Parameters of the GMPE by Akkar et al. [2014a].
Parameter Value Parameter Value
a1 2.52977 b1 −0.41997
a2 0.0029 b2 −0.28846
a3 −0.05496 c 2.5
a4 −1.31001 n 3.2
a5 0.2529 VREF 750 m/s
a6 7.5 VCON 1 000 m/s
a7 −0.5096 σintra 0.6375
a8 −0.1091 σinter 0.3581
a9 0.0937
G.2 GMPE by Bindi et al. [2014]
The ground-motion parameter Y , expressed in cm/s2, is broken down into a distance
term, a magnitude term, a site term and a style-of-faulting term:
log10 Y = e1 + FD + FM + FS + Fsof (G.4)
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where:
FD = [c1 + c2 (M − 5.5)] log10
√
r2 + h2 − c3
(√
r2 + h2 − 1
)
(G.5)
FM =

b1 (M − 6.75) + b2 (8.5−M)2 if M ≤ 6.75
b3 (M − 6.75) if M > 6.75
(G.6)
FS = γ log10 (Vs,30/800) (G.7)
Fsof = f1E1 + f2E2 + f3E3 (G.8)
The parameters of this GMPE are detailed in Table G.2, for Y = PGA and r = rjb.
The Ei variables represent the fault mechanism, i.e. normal (E1 = 1 and E2 = E3 = 0),
reverse (E2 = 1 and E1 = E3 = 0), strike-slip (E3 = 1 and E1 = E2 = 0) or unspecified
(E1 = E2 = E3 = 0).
Table G.2: Parameters of the GMPE by Bindi et al. [2014].
Parameter Value Parameter Value
e1 3.32819 b3 0
c1 −1.2398 γ −0.3019
c2 0.21732 f1 −0.03977
c3 0.001186 f2 0.077525
h 5.26486 f3 −0.03776
b1 −0.0855 σintra 0.282398
b2 −0.09256 σinter 0.149977
G.3 GMPE by Bora et al. [2014]
This GMPE is based on the random vibration theory, which is used to predict the
response spectral ordinates of a SDOF oscillator for an input ground motion of finite
duration. Such a framework requires the estimation of the Fourier amplitude spectrum
(FAS), YFAS , and of the ground motion duration, Dgm, as illustrated in Figure G.1.
The variables Dgm and YFAS are empirically estimated from earthquake records, under
the following functional forms:
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YFAS
Dgm
Random Vibration Theory
with SDOF of frequency f
osc
Y
max
 at f
osc
Figure G.1: Estimation of peak ground-motion parameter Ymax from YFAS and Dgm
(adapted from Bora et al. [2014]).
logDgm = b1 + b2M + (b3 + b4M) log
√
r2 + b25 + b6 log Vs,30 (G.9)
log YFAS = c1+c2M+c3M
2+(c4 + c5M) log
√
r2 + c26−c7
√
r2 + c26+c8 log Vs,30 (G.10)
The parameters of these regression equations are detailed in Table G.3, for Y = PGA
and r = rjb.
Table G.3: Parameters of the GMPE by Bora et al. [2014].
Parameter Value Parameter Value
b1 −2.4805 c4 −4.4669
b2 0.7907 c5 0.3654
b3 1.3711 c6 8.9008
b4 −0.1297 c7 0
b5 5.3554 c8 0.6137
b6 −0.3445 σDgm,intra 0.4809
c1 −3.9567 σDgm,inter 0.3179
c2 −0.7322 σYFAS ,intra 1.7329
c3 0.0964 σYFAS ,inter 1.2349
G.4 GMPE by Derras et al. [2014]
The ground-motion parameter Y , expressed in m/s2, takes the following form:
log10 Y =
1
2
D3 (Tmax − Tmin) + Tmin (G.11)
where:
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D3 = W2 · tanh D2 + b2 + 1; (G.12)
D2 = W1 ·D1 + b1; (G.13)
D1 = 2
P−Pmin
Pmax −Pmin − 1; (G.14)
The input parameters are specified in the vector P, which is bounded by vectors Pmin
and Pmax:
P =

log10 r
M
log10 Vs,30
h
F

; Pmin =

−1
3.6
1.964
0
1

; Pmax =

2.738
7.6
3.204
25
3

(G.15)
The weighting matrices are the following, for Y = PGA:
W1 =

2.648 −1.070 0.174 0.092 −0.014
−1.909 −0.535 −0.705 0.168 −0.027
0.204 1.781 −0.080 0.014 0.062
−0.693 0.442 0.776 −0.032 −0.163
0.016 0.218 −1.606 −0.042 0.026

; W2 =

−0.541
0.254
0.11
0.076
−0.02

t
(G.16)
The rest of the GMPE coefficients is presented below, for Y = PGA:
b1 =

−1.271
1.513
0.591
−0.127
−0.416

; b2 = −0.143; Tmin = −2.979; Tmax = 0.981 (G.17)
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The derivation of this GMPE has led to the definition of intra-event and inter-event
standard deviations, respectively σintra = 0.267 and σinter = 0.155.
Appendix H
Proposed Representative GMPE
This appendix details the values of the proposed three-branch GMPE, which cannot be
represented under a functional form.
Table H.1: Predicted PGA [m/s2] from the proposed three-branch representative
GMPE (median branch).
Mw
Repi [km] 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
1.26 0.696 1.102 1.699 2.537 3.474 4.474 5.353 6.110
1.58 0.670 1.070 1.659 2.489 3.464 4.462 5.341 6.097
2.00 0.636 1.028 1.607 2.423 3.448 4.444 5.321 6.077
2.51 0.594 0.975 1.541 2.342 3.403 4.417 5.291 6.046
3.16 0.543 0.906 1.453 2.233 3.268 4.375 5.247 6.001
3.98 0.481 0.819 1.337 2.086 3.097 4.315 5.181 5.933
5.01 0.411 0.717 1.195 1.897 2.866 4.147 5.089 5.838
6.31 0.337 0.603 1.029 1.666 2.565 3.813 4.964 5.710
7.94 0.264 0.486 0.852 1.411 2.212 3.375 4.806 5.547
10.00 0.199 0.376 0.677 1.148 1.834 2.850 4.410 5.349
12.59 0.145 0.279 0.517 0.901 1.468 2.309 3.706 5.125
15.85 0.102 0.201 0.382 0.684 1.138 1.810 2.915 4.881
19.95 0.071 0.141 0.274 0.504 0.860 1.385 2.210 4.163
25.12 0.049 0.097 0.193 0.363 0.635 1.040 1.647 2.988
31.62 0.033 0.067 0.133 0.256 0.460 0.769 1.219 2.083
39.81 0.023 0.045 0.091 0.178 0.327 0.560 0.897 1.474
50.12 0.015 0.031 0.062 0.122 0.230 0.403 0.656 1.061
63.10 0.010 0.021 0.042 0.084 0.159 0.286 0.477 0.772
79.43 0.007 0.014 0.029 0.057 0.110 0.202 0.344 0.565
100.00 0.005 0.010 0.020 0.039 0.075 0.141 0.247 0.413
125.89 0.003 0.007 0.013 0.027 0.052 0.098 0.176 0.302
158.49 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.018 0.036 0.068 0.125 0.220
199.53 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.025 0.048 0.089 0.160
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Table H.2: Predicted PGA [m/s2] from the proposed three-branch representative
GMPE (lower branch).
Mw
Repi [km] 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
1.26 0.470 0.840 1.393 2.194 3.098 3.790 4.298 4.776
1.58 0.467 0.829 1.367 2.154 3.103 3.801 4.306 4.779
2.00 0.460 0.812 1.335 2.098 3.110 3.817 4.317 4.781
2.51 0.448 0.788 1.292 2.033 3.090 3.843 4.335 4.784
3.16 0.426 0.749 1.232 1.949 2.981 3.880 4.359 4.784
3.98 0.392 0.694 1.147 1.831 2.841 3.921 4.388 4.776
5.01 0.343 0.620 1.035 1.672 2.649 3.847 4.410 4.745
6.31 0.283 0.529 0.900 1.470 2.380 3.580 4.383 4.663
7.94 0.220 0.431 0.751 1.238 2.038 3.200 4.231 4.493
10.00 0.163 0.335 0.601 0.998 1.657 2.716 3.793 4.21
12.59 0.116 0.249 0.465 0.775 1.290 2.172 3.158 3.825
15.85 0.081 0.179 0.349 0.586 0.976 1.654 2.546 3.408
19.95 0.057 0.125 0.256 0.434 0.725 1.226 2.007 2.820
25.12 0.040 0.086 0.183 0.318 0.533 0.899 1.532 2.134
31.62 0.028 0.059 0.126 0.229 0.391 0.658 1.132 1.646
39.81 0.020 0.040 0.084 0.162 0.284 0.481 0.823 1.275
50.12 0.014 0.028 0.055 0.110 0.203 0.350 0.595 0.966
63.10 0.009 0.019 0.037 0.073 0.140 0.249 0.426 0.708
79.43 0.006 0.013 0.025 0.048 0.093 0.171 0.299 0.504
100.00 0.003 0.009 0.017 0.032 0.061 0.113 0.204 0.353
125.89 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.021 0.040 0.074 0.136 0.244
158.49 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.015 0.026 0.048 0.089 0.166
199.53 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.018 0.033 0.061 0.116
Table H.3: Predicted PGA [m/s2] from the proposed three-branch representative
GMPE (upper branch).
Mw
Repi [km] 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
1.26 1.032 1.446 2.072 2.933 3.895 5.280 6.668 7.816
1.58 0.962 1.382 2.014 2.876 3.866 5.239 6.625 7.780
2.00 0.879 1.301 1.936 2.798 3.823 5.173 6.558 7.724
2.51 0.789 1.206 1.838 2.698 3.749 5.076 6.459 7.642
3.16 0.691 1.094 1.713 2.560 3.583 4.934 6.315 7.526
3.98 0.589 0.967 1.559 2.377 3.375 4.748 6.117 7.371
5.01 0.491 0.829 1.378 2.151 3.100 4.470 5.872 7.184
6.31 0.400 0.687 1.177 1.889 2.764 4.061 5.623 6.992
7.94 0.318 0.548 0.967 1.607 2.401 3.560 5.459 6.847
10.00 0.244 0.421 0.762 1.321 2.03 2.991 5.128 6.797
12.59 0.181 0.313 0.576 1.046 1.67 2.454 4.349 6.866
15.85 0.129 0.225 0.418 0.798 1.329 1.981 3.337 6.993
19.95 0.089 0.159 0.293 0.585 1.021 1.565 2.433 6.145
25.12 0.060 0.110 0.203 0.414 0.756 1.203 1.771 4.184
31.62 0.039 0.075 0.141 0.286 0.541 0.898 1.312 2.637
39.81 0.026 0.051 0.099 0.196 0.377 0.652 0.977 1.706
50.12 0.017 0.034 0.069 0.136 0.260 0.464 0.724 1.166
63.10 0.012 0.023 0.048 0.096 0.182 0.329 0.533 0.842
79.43 0.009 0.015 0.033 0.068 0.130 0.238 0.396 0.632
100.00 0.007 0.011 0.023 0.048 0.094 0.175 0.298 0.484
125.89 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.033 0.068 0.131 0.227 0.373
158.49 0.004 0.006 0.011 0.023 0.049 0.098 0.174 0.291
199.53 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.016 0.035 0.071 0.129 0.219
Appendix I
Underlying Equations in the
Bayesian Network for Multi-Risk
Assessment
This Appendix details the CPTs and equations that are defined for each node of the
multi-risk Bayesian Network proposed in Chapter 7 (see Figure 7.19).
I.1 Earthquake Magnitude Node M
It is a root node of 11 states (Mlow ≤ mi ≤ Mup for i = 1 . . . 10; mi = −∞ for i = 11),
expressing the probability of occurrence of magnitude mi. For each magnitude value,
the probability of occurrence is given by the Gutenberg-Richter distribution:

P (mi) = γ0 · exp(−β·mi)−exp(−β·Mup)exp(−β·Mlow)−exp(−β·Mup) for i = 1 . . . 10
P (mi) = 1−
∑10
j=1 P (mj) for i = 11
(I.1)
Mlow, Mup, γ0 and β are the lower and upper magnitude bounds, the mean annual rate
of earthquake events and the b-value, respectively.
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I.2 Epicentre Node Epi
It is a root node of 20 states, representing the earthquake generating area through a
discretized grid of locations epii. The epicentre locations are assumed to be uniformly
distributed:
P (epii) = 1/20 for i = 1 . . . 20 (I.2)
I.3 Epicentre Distance Nodes R1...R11
It is a node of 20 states: the corresponding ri values are linearly distributed between
rmin and rmax, which are evaluated as the extreme distances of the problem (i.e. com-
bination of closest/furthest epicentre location with the position of the infrastructure
element considered). The probability of having epicentral distance ri is conditional on
the epicentre location epij :

P (ri|epij) = 1 if element-epicentre distance ∈ [ri−; ri+]
P (ri|epij) = 0 if element-epicentre distance 6∈ [ri−; ri+]
for i = 1 . . . 20 (I.3)
I.4 Median Seismic Intensity Nodes Q1...Q11
This node of 20 states is conditional on the magnitude and the epicentral distance. The
corresponding qi values are logarithmically distributed between qmin and qmax, which are
evaluated as the extreme intensity measures of the problem (i.e. ground motion resulting
from the smallest/greatest epicentral distance with the smallest/greatest magnitude).
For each combination of distance rj and magnitude mk, the median intensity qtmp is
deterministically computed and the CPT is built by checking whether the computed
seismic intensity falls within the range of qi:

P (qi|rj ,mk) = 1 if qtmp = f (rj ,mk) ∈ [qi−; qi+]
P (qi|rj ,mk) = 0 if qtmp = f (rj ,mk) 6∈ [qi−; qi+]
for i = 1 . . . 20 (I.4)
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I.5 Standard Normal Distribution Nodes U, V1...V11
It is a root node of 10 states that results from a discretization of the standard normal
probability distribution function. The values ui are linearly distributed between the
16% and 84% percentiles (i.e. corresponding to one level of σ) and the corresponding
probabilities are expressed as follows (a normalization is performed so that the sum of
probabilities is equal to 1):
P (ui) =
φ (ui)∑10
j=1 φ (uj)
for i = 1 . . . 10 (I.5)
I.6 Intra-Event Variability Nodes e1...e11
This node of 10 states is conditional on two standard normal distribution nodes U
(common to all components) and V (specific to each component). The corresponding
ei values are linearly distributed between emin and emax, which are evaluated as the
extreme values of the combined standard normal variables multiplied by the intra-event
variability . For each combination of standard normal variables uj and vk, the intra-
event variability is deterministically computed as follows:
etmp =
√
1− t2 · vk + t · uj (I.6)
where t is an approximate correlation factor, which is based on the Dunnett-Sobel class
[Dunnett and Sobel, 1955] and the correlation matrix between the infrastructure ele-
ments.
The elements of the correlation matrix are expressed as follows:
ρl,m = exp
(
−3 · dl,m
dρ
)
(I.7)
where dρ is the correlation distance of the seismic intensity (taken as 13.5 km here) and
dl,m is the distance between infrastructure elements l and m.
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Finally, the CPT is built by checking whether the computed intra-event variability falls
within the range of ei:

P (ei|uj , vk) = 1 if etmp = f (uj , vk) ∈ [ei−; ei+]
P (ei|uj , vk) = 0 if etmp = f (uj , vk) 6∈ [ei−; ei+]
for i = 1 . . . 10 (I.8)
I.7 Inter-Event Variability Node n
It is a root node of 10 states that results from a discretization of the standard normal
probability distribution function. The values ni are linearly distributed between the
16% and 84% percentiles (i.e. corresponding to one level of σ) and are multiplied by
the inter-event variability η. The corresponding probabilities are expressed as follows (a
normalization is performed so that the sum of probabilities is equal to 1):
P (ni) =
φ (ni)∑10
j=1 φ (nj)
for i = 1 . . . 10 (I.9)
I.8 Distributed Seismic Intensity Nodes S1...S11
This node of 20 states is conditional on the intra- and inter-variabilities and on the
median seismic intensity. The corresponding si values are logarithmically distributed
between smin and smax, which are evaluated as the extreme intensity measures when
uncertainties are added. For each combination of median intensity qj , intra-event vari-
ability ek and inter-event variability nl, the distributed seismic intensity is determinis-
tically computed as follows:
stmp = 10ˆ
[log10 qj+ek+nl] (I.10)
Finally, the CPT is built by checking whether the computed seismic intensity falls within
the range of si:
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
P (si|qj , ek, nl) = 1 if stmp = f (qj , ek, nl) ∈ [si−; si+]
P (si|qj , ek, nl) = 0 if stmp = f (qj , ek, nl) 6∈ [si−; si+]
for i = 1 . . . 20 (I.11)
I.9 Flood Intensity Node FL
It is a root node of 4 states (fli values found in Table 7.12 for i = 1 . . . 3; fli = 0 for
i = 4), expressing the probability of occurrence of flow discharge events. For each flood
value, the probability of occurrence is given by the assumed return period Ti of the
arbitrary events (i.e. 50, 100 and 500 years, respectively):

P (fli) =
1
Ti
for i = 1 . . . 3
P (fli) = 1−
∑3
j=1 P (flj) for i = 4
(I.12)
I.10 Yield Acceleration Node ky
This node of 3 states is conditional on the rainfall event (FL node). An arbitrary
distribution is assumed for demonstration purposes, due to the lack of knowledge and
expertise to evaluate the soil saturation ratio based on the amount of rainfall. Therefore
arbitrary values have been proposed in order to highlight the dependence between rainfall
and landslide hazard and to demonstrate how account for hazard interactions. The
corresponding CPT has already been presented in Table 7.14.
I.11 Component Nodes C1...C11
This node of 2 states is conditional on the distributed seismic intensity only, for most
components. The probability of failure is directly provided by the fragility curve of
the component, with fragility parameters α and β and normal cumulative distribution
function φ:
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
P (failure|sj) = φ
(
log sj−logα
β
)
P (survival|sj) = 1− φ
(
log sj−logα
β
) (I.13)
I.12 Super-Component Nodes SC1...SC3
Super-components are in-series assemblies of components. For instance, in the case of
SC1, which is the super-component including C2, C3 and C4, the CPT is formulated
as follows:

P (closed|C2 = 0,C3 = 0,C4 = 0) = 0 P (open|C2 = 0,C3 = 0,C4 = 0) = 1
P (closed|C2 = 1,C3 = 0,C4 = 0) = 1 P (open|C2 = 1,C3 = 0,C4 = 0) = 0
P (closed|C2 = 0,C3 = 1,C4 = 0) = 1 P (open|C2 = 0,C3 = 1,C4 = 0) = 0
P (closed|C2 = 1,C3 = 1,C4 = 0) = 1 P (open|C2 = 1,C3 = 1,C4 = 0) = 0
P (closed|C2 = 0,C3 = 0,C4 = 1) = 1 P (open|C2 = 0,C3 = 0,C4 = 1) = 0
P (closed|C2 = 1,C3 = 0,C4 = 1) = 1 P (open|C2 = 1,C3 = 0,C4 = 1) = 0
P (closed|C2 = 0,C3 = 1,C4 = 1) = 1 P (open|C2 = 0,C3 = 1,C4 = 1) = 0
P (closed|C2 = 1,C3 = 1,C4 = 1) = 1 P (open|C2 = 1,C3 = 1,C4 = 1) = 0
(I.14)
The convention used here is 0 for survival/open (i.e. damage state 0) and 1 for failure/-
closed (i.e. damage state 1).
I.13 Survival Path Event Nodes Es1...Es18
The SPE nodes have two states (1 for failure / 0 for survival) and they have been
introduced by Bensi et al. [2011]. Their CPTs are defined as follows:
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

P
(
Es,i = 0|Es,Pa(i), Ci
)
= 1
P
(
Es,i = 1|Es,Pa(i), Ci
)
= 0
if
[⋃{
Es,Pa(i) = 0
}]⋂ {Ci = 0}

P
(
Es,i = 0|Es,Pa(i), Ci
)
= 0
P
(
Es,i = 1|Es,Pa(i), Ci
)
= 1
otherwise
(I.15)
The convention used here is 0 for survival/open (i.e. damage state 0) and 1 for failure/-
closed (i.e. damage state 1). The symbol Es,Pa(i) represents the SPE nodes that are
parent nodes of the considered SPE node Es,i.
I.14 Connected Sources Nodes Ns1 and Ns2
This node of 3 states is conditional on the SPE nodes that represent the MLSs involved
in the considered Source-Sink (or Origin-Destination) couple. The 3 states represent
the number of sources that are still connected to the sink, i.e. 0, 1 or 2 sources (in the
present example, 2 sources are supposed to reach each of the 2 sinks). In the example
of Ns1, the CPT is defined as follows:

P (0|Es4 = 0, Es9 = 0) = 0 P (1|Es4 = 0, Es9 = 0) = 0 P (2|Es4 = 0, Es9 = 0) = 1
P (0|Es4 = 1, Es9 = 0) = 0 P (1|Es4 = 1, Es9 = 0) = 1 P (2|Es4 = 1, Es9 = 0) = 0
P (0|Es4 = 0, Es9 = 1) = 0 P (1|Es4 = 0, Es9 = 1) = 1 P (2|Es4 = 0, Es9 = 1) = 0
P (0|Es4 = 1, Es9 = 1) = 1 P (1|Es4 = 1, Es9 = 1) = 0 P (2|Es4 = 1, Es9 = 1) = 0
(I.16)
I.15 System Connectivity Loss Node SYS
This nodes of 10 states is conditional on the nodes of connected sources. The values sysi
are linearly distributed between 0 and 1, which are the extreme values of SCL. For each
combination of the nodes Ns1 and Ns2 (values ns1,j and ns2,k), the single connectivity
loss is computed as follows:
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scltmp =
1
2
·
(
ns1,j
ns1,0
+
ns2,k
ns2,0
)
(I.17)
where ns1,0 and ns2,0 are the number of sources initially connected to sinks 1 and 2.
Finally, the CPT is built by checking whether the computed SCL falls within the range
of sysi:

P (sysi|ns1,j , ns2,k) = 1 if scltmp = f (ns1,j , ns2,k) ∈ [sysi−; sysi+]
P (sysi|ns1,j , ns2,k) = 0 if scltmp = f (ns1,j , ns2,k) 6∈ [sysi−; sysi+]
for i = 1 . . . 10
(I.18)
Appendix J
Multi-Hazard Fragility Functions
for the Case-Study
This Appendix presents the multi-hazard fragility models that have been derived for the
four bridge types proposed for the Bologna case-study, following the procedure detailed
in Chapters 4 and 5.
Figure J.1: Multi-hazard fragility model for bridge type 1, with respect to the four
functionality levels described in Table 5.5.
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Figure J.2: Multi-hazard fragility model for bridge type 2, with respect to the four
functionality levels described in Table 5.5.
Figure J.3: Multi-hazard fragility model for bridge type 3, with respect to the four
functionality levels described in Table 5.5.
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Figure J.4: Multi-hazard fragility model for bridge type 4, with respect to the four
functionality levels described in Table 5.5.
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